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日本・アラブの相互認識に関する研究

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関する研究

Study on Arab-Japanese Mutual Images

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Japan National Committee for the Study
of Arab-Japanese Relations

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THE STUDY OF ARAB-JAPANESE RELATIONS
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PREFACE

With the expansion of Arab-Japanese economic relations, it has been earnestly needed to have a closer academic tie between Japan and Arab World, through research activities, documentations and discussion meetings. In this vein, we embarked on a joint study project on the Arab-Japanese relations in 1978. The main purpose of the project is to promote studies on various aspects of Arab-Japanese relations since 19th century and thereby contributing to the intensification of Arab-Japanese relations on cultural and academic level.

As part of our program, the International Symposium on Arab-Japanese Relations was successfully held in Tokyo during the period from 27 to 29 March 1979, with thirty-two participants including eight scholars from Arab countries. This volume contains the excellent papers submitted, which are broadly dealt with the following areas.

1. Modernization in Japan and the Arab World
2. Political, economic and cultural relations between Japan and the Arab World
3. Arab studies including language education and understanding of the Arabs in the schools of Japan

We believe that they represent a preliminary and very useful work to further our joint study project.

We wish to thank the Japan Foundation and the Toyota Foundation whose generous financial aids helped make the symposium itself, and this report, possible.

October 10, 1980

Shinji Maejima
Chairman, Japan National Committee
for the Study of Arab-Japanese
Relations

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PROGRAM

Opening Session and Reception,

Tuesday 27th at Gakushikaikan (28, 3 Chome, Kanda-Nishikicho, Chiyoda-ku. Phone: 03-292-5931) Room No.210.

First Session

Wednesday 28th at the Institute of Developing Economies (42, Ichigaya-Hommuracho, Shinjuku-ku. Phone: 03-353-4231)

Chairmans: Prof. Khairy Issa

Dr. Michitoshi Takahashi

Prof. Ootori Kurino

Prof. Ali Hilal Dessouki

Coordinator: Dr. San-eki Nakaoka

(10:00 - 13:00)

- | | |
|--|-------------------------|
| 1 Arab-Japanese Economic Relations | Dr. Fouad Hashem Awad |
| 2 Japan and the New Economic Order | Prof. Khairy Issa |
| 3 Diplomacy of Resources in Arab Japanese Relations (Economic Survey and Political Analysis) | Dr. Seif El-Wady Romahi |
| 4 Japan's Discovery of Arab World - Basis of Cognizance and Future - | Prof. Yuzo Itagaki |

(15:00 - 18:00)

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|---|-------------------------|
| 5 Arabic Studies in Japan | Prof. Raouf Abbas Hamid |
| 6 "What is the Arab World Like?"; Seen from the Perspective of World History - As the First Step to the Study of "The Image of the Arab World in Japan."-Prof. Goro Yoshida | |
| 7 Arabic Teaching in Japan | Prof. Osamu Ikeda |

Second Session

Thursday 29th at the Institute for the Study of Language and Cultures of Asia and Africa (51-21, 4 Chome, Kita-ku. Phone: 03-917-6111)

Chairmans: Prof. Mouhamed Anis

Mr. Hideji Tamura

Prof. Ali Hilal Dessouki

Prof. Hamid Rabie

Coordinator: Prof. Wataru Miki

(10:00 - 13:00)

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|--|--------------------------|
| 1 Japanese Foreign Policy: Formulation and Implementation in the Arab World | Prof. Hamid Rabie |
| 2 Towards a Comparative Study of Arab and Japanese Modernization Experiences - a Case Study of Some Social and Political Aspects | Prof. Ali Hilal Dessouki |
| 3 On the Exchange of Experiences between the Emergence of Japan and Egypt | Prof. Mouhamed Anis |

(15:00 - 18:00)

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| 4 Hajji Omar Mitsutaro Yamaoka, His Life and His Works | Prof. Shinji Maejima |
| 5 Early Japanese Pilgrims to Mecca | Prof. Kojiro Nakamura |
| 6 Studies on Egypt's Legal System Conducted by Japanese Bureaucrats in the Early Meiji Era | Dr. San-eki Nakaoka |
| 7 Shigetaka Shiga and the Arab World | Mr. Yoshiro Mutaguchi |

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

His Imperial Highness Prince Mikasa (Honorary Adviser, Japan National Committee)
(Cairo University)

Prof. Raouf Abbas Hamid (Cairo University)
Prof. Mouhamed Anis (Cairo University)
Prof. Khairy Issa (Cairo University)
Mrs. Masao Fukushima (ex-Librarian, Ministry of Justice)
Prof. Fouad Hashem Awad (Cairo University)
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Prof. Wataru Miki (Senior Research Staff, Institute of Developing Economies)

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Dr. Kosei Morimoto (Editorial Writer, the Asahi Shimbun)
Mr. Yoshiro Mutaguchi (Institute for Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo)
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Prof. Goro Yoshida (Hiroo Highschool)
Prof. Nobuaki Nutahara (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

- Guests and Observers -

Mr. Masao Abe (Expert)
Mr. Isao Amagi (Director General, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science)
(Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)
Mr. Susumu Fujita (Institute of Developing Economies)
Miss Kumiko Izumisawa (Middle East Institute)
Mr. Shizuma Kai (Head, Administrative and General Affairs Dept., Japan Foundation)
Mr. Kunio Katakura (Tsudajuku University)
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Mr. Hiroshi Nagaba (Institute of Developing Economies)
Mr. Eiji Nagasawa (Tokai University)
Mr. Masaru Horiuchi (Vice-President, Science Council of Japan)
Prof. Koshiro Okakura (Managing Director, Japan Foundation)

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Mr. Tatsumi Yokobori	(Japan Foundation)
Prof. Takeshi Yukawa	(Keio University)
Mr. Hajime Watanabe	(Toyota Foundation)
Mr. Akihiro Takano	(NHK)

OPENING ADDRESS

Fouad Hashem Awad

Your Imperial Highness Prince Mikasa, Dr. Shinji Maejima, Chairman of the Japan National Committee for the Study on Japan-Arab Relations, your Excellencies Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of Dr. Seifi-eddin Abulezz, who has worked very hard in the organization of the present symposium and earnestly hopes for its success, but who is unable to be here in person due to unavoidable circumstances, it is my honor to speak to you at the opening session of this significant gathering.

As you know, our joint programme was formed last year, and both of its national counterparts have in their membership many scholars and professors in various disciplines, such as history, geography, economics, politics, and many other areas of cultural study. The participants from Arab countries to the symposium are comprised mainly of staff members of the Egyptian universities, but we are now endeavoring to strengthen its activities in the hope that we may enlist the cooperation and support of a still wider circle of capable persons in the future.

I believe that joint studies by Japanese and Arab thinkers and scholars, as we can observe at our gathering here today, will not only promote mutual cultural relations, but will also make it possible to find ways and means for materializing effective joint work between our two peoples in the future. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Japan Foundation, whose invaluable assistance both financially, and spiritually, has played a great role in furthering the collaboration of our two peoples. We must also express our many thanks to the Institute of Developing Economies for its efforts in keeping us in contact with various other research institutes and scholars interested in a scientific joint work between the Japanese and the Arabs.

As we all know, Japan has made great strides in recent decades, and we have much to learn from this phenomenon. Within the comparative study of various aspects of the history, geography, economy, and culture of Japan and the Arab countries, I think many interesting topics emerge for discussion. As we understand it, the Japanese economy is based on large-scale modern industries on the one hand, and traditional agriculture on the other, and it depends largely upon foreign countries for its industrial raw materials and fuel. Japan looked for markets for

its commodities (even the Meiji era showed many signs of this), and increasingly made its way into international markets in order to pay for necessary raw materials and fuel. In keeping up the nation's large-scale industrialization and playing an even game on the international market arena with the mere advanced industrial nations, richer in natural resources, Japanese human resources were indeed a great asset. While we Arabs all marvel at the great achievements of Japan and regard it as the only Asian nation to reach the height of the Western nations, we know, nevertheless, that its tremendous industrial progress is not a mere copy from the West, and nor can it be accredited to support from the West.

The Arab countries are fortunately blessed with both natural and human resources. Now that these resources have come to be valued more than ever before, we believe that the lessons learnt from the Japanese experience can be put to effective use. Cooperative relationships between the Arab countries and Japan should be furthered not only because the latter is largely dependent on the former for fuel resources, but also because in recent years the imbalance in our mutual trade exceeds 10 billion dollars annually.

In Japan and the Arab countries we can see similarities in many regards: their histories, peoples, and geographical positions. We know from history that the religious teachings of Buddhism once tied together a spirit of friendship in the vast area of Asia, from Ceylon in the west to the easternmost islands of Japan. As for Islam, on the other hand, the followers of the Caliph and Prophet Muhammad disseminated the teachings of Islam and its values in Syria, Egypt, and the far crines of Southern Africa. Japan presents a unified nation with a beautifully integrated cultural amalgam, and the Arabs have similarly strong moral and spiritual ties among themselves too. Geographically speaking, Japan commands the strategically important gateway from the Pacific into East Asia, where the interests of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States are intricately interwoven. The position of the Arab countries is also strategically important, as they lie between the three continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. Here, also, we see conflicting influences and interests of the great powers.

Today, in order for our relationship to be effective and valid, it goes without saying that we must carry out a comprehensive study on Japan-Arab relations in their many aspects, and analyze, appraise and pass a correct judgement on them. Furthermore, I believe that our relations must first be put under the light of fair and proper scientific

inquiries, to make their further promotion possible.

In concluding my speech, let me express my earnest hope and expectations that the symposium starting tomorrow will prove a great success.

Thank you.

OPENING ADDRESS

Shinji Maejima

His Imperial Highness,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Thanks to both the Arab National Committee and the Japan National Committee, the first symposium on Arab-Japan relations has been made possible. It is our great pleasure and honour to be able to welcome all those distinguished scholars from Arab countries here to Tokyo, especially now, when the cherry-blossoms are at their best.

We Japanese have been proud of our exclusive, long-established culture and have made untiring efforts to foster it, whilst at the same time enthusiastically absorbing prominent foreign cultures. As cultural history shows, our ancestors were very keen to understand and absorb Chinese, Indian, and modern European cultures. As for the Arabic or Islamic culture, one of the most influential cultures in the world, we have unfortunately paid less attention to it. I am now examining just why we have not felt the necessity to absorb it, and will give my own explanations later on. Gradually from the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, there appeared a few people who suddenly realized the greatness of the Arab countries and their culture and who wished to promote goodwill between the two nations. Encouraged by those predecessors, we have devoted ourselves to the study of Arabic culture for about fifty years, during which period the level of our knowledge on Arabic culture has made remarkable progress. For example, many young Japanese go to study in Cairo and other cities of Arab countries, whilst in Japan the number wanting to learn Arabic continues to grow. Fifty years ago, who could have anticipated such a situation? Nowadays, there are many people stressing the necessity of cultural exchanges between us. In the light of this situation, the following two points are important areas for mutual research: How have the two nations, with their respectively long-established histories, conducted cultural exchanges? How should we promote this cooperation in the future?

We are sure that this symposium will produce many valuable results, and are anxious for this kind of symposium to be held regularly in the future also. As the president of the Committee, I wish to express my gratitude to His Imperial Highness, Prince Mikasa, who was kind enough to answer for the Honorary Adviser of the Japan National Committee in

attending this symposium. I would also like to thank the Japan Foundation, and the Toyota Foundation, for their generous financial support. Thank you very much.

ARAB-JAPANESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Fouad Hashem Awad

I. The General Picture:

Economic relations between Japan and the Arab countries reflect both the growing importance of oil in Arab trade and the special position that oil imports occupy in the growth of the Japanese economy. The development effort on the part of the Arab countries, coupled after 1973 with immensely growing financial resources, are making the Arab market one of the prime areas of export orientation for Japanese industry and know-how. A few words on the general economic indicators of growth in the two regions are perhaps worth noting.

During the nineteen seventies, the Arab gross domestic product increased from just under 40 billion dollars in 1970 to 155 billion dollars in 1976, at an average annual rate of growth of 25%; the petroleum sector (and the petroleum producing countries) accounted for much of that sustained increase. In 1976 the petroleum sector accounted for 56 per cent of G.D.P., while agriculture was 7% and industry only 6%; services accounted for 30 per cent. In the same year fixed capital formation amounted to 34 billion dollars, or some 22% of gross domestic product while gross national savings reached 45%. These global figures for the region hide, of course, very serious discrepancies from one country to another.

On the other hand, foreign trade and international payments occupy a dominant position in the Arab Economy. In 1975/76 Arab exports of goods and services were over 60% of G.D.P. while imports were worth only 30%. Over the years of the seventies both exports and imports increased ten fold to reach in 1977 about 98 billion dollars for exports (up from \$89 billion in 1976) and 64 billion dollars for imports (up from \$50 billion in 1976). Foreign trade of the oil-producing countries represents 92 per cent and 73 per cent of total Arab exports and imports of goods and services, respectively.*

Although Arab foreign trade formed rather an insignificant part of total world trade (8% of world exports and 4% of world imports during 1974/76), it contributed almost 30% of the total exports of the

* The foreign trade balance of the Arab Region showed a surplus of \$34 billion in 1976, which was in fact the difference between a gross surplus of \$44 billion for the oil producing countries and a deficit of \$10 billion for non-oil producing countries.

developing countries, and 17% of the their total imports.

The Japanese economy enjoyed a period of sustained accelerated economic growth of almost two decades that raised Japan's gross national product to the third highest GNP in the world. From the late 1950's and until 1972 Japan's real gross national product rose at an average annual rate of about 10 per cent and industrial output by 12 per cent. The world-wide inflation of 1973 affected Japan, as it did other advanced industrial nations, and a slow-down of economic growth was later followed by a period of recovery starting 1976; a 6 to 7 per cent average annual rate of growth of real gross national product during the rest of the 1970's is planned (a 7% rate was promised at the Bonn Summit for the fiscal year 1978, although many Japanese economists think it would be difficult to achieve), and a steady 5% annual rate for the 1980's is thought feasible.

The Japanese gross national product reached \$565⁽¹⁾ billion in 1976 and \$643⁽¹⁾ billion in 1977. Fixed capital formation was some 32 per cent of GNP over 1976/77. (It may be interesting to notice that this is almost five times as much the combined fixed capital formation in all the Arab countries).

This fast rise in production, its diversity and the success of Japan in adapting that were features of the growth of the 1960's strengthened very significantly the country's foreign current account position by the end of the decade, making Japan a major exporter of long-term capital. The events of 1973 however wiped out the surplus of Japan on current account and Japanese exports of goods and services totalled \$89.2 billion in 1977⁽¹⁾ (up from \$80 billion in 1976), and imports were \$89.5 billion (up from \$77.5 billion in 1976). The favourable developments of the earlier period had led to an accumulated surplus of over \$17 billion by 1973 making possible an increase of about \$8 billion in the net outflow of long-term capital. Japan had thus become a major donor of capital. The total flow of financial resources from Japan to developing countries in 1976 amounted to more than \$4 billion of which one-quarter was in Official Development Assistance (ODA). Japan now holds fourth position among the DAC⁽²⁾ member countries (after the USA, Germany F.R. and France).

Although foreign trade plays a much smaller role in the Japanese GDP than in the case of the Arab Region, the dependence of Japan on

(1) Estimate.

(2) Development Assistance Committee.

foreign trade does not require emphasis. Japan depends on overseas supply sources for most of its energy needs, and in the case of oil the dependence is almost complete. The growth of its exports can also be said to be of significant importance, both to pay for its inflated import bill and to sustain the growth of its domestic product.

II. The Growth of Arab-Japanese Economic Relations:

The rapid growth of economic interests between Japan and the Arab World is quite recent. The Japanese recognition of the importance of the Arab World as a major source of natural resources, particularly but not only petroleum, and an extensive field for Japanese investments started perhaps after the second World War. The Arab countries, on the other hand, have always watched the Japanese development stride with interest and admiration. More recently, with Arab economic development under way, and with vast financial resources becoming available in the area, the rise of Japan in the last two decades to become one of the major industrially advanced countries in the world, and the successful attempt of Japan to transfer, adapt and produce technology are very good reasons for the Arab World to look to Japan for much closer economic ties and cooperation.

The growth in Arab-Japanese economic relations can be witnessed from the following:

1. Arab exports to Japan increased from about 5 per cent of total Arab exports at the beginning of the present decade to over 20 per cent in 1977, thus rising from \$1.1 billion to over \$18 billion, or sixteen fold (table 1).
2. Japanese exports to the Arab Region increased from about 3 per cent of total Japanese exports in the early 1970's to over 8 per cent in 1977, thus rising from about \$400 million in 1970 to over \$8 billion, or twenty-fold (table 1).
3. Contracts awarded in the Arab Region to Japanese firms rose in the last couple of years 1977/78 to what is worth over \$7000 million in each year: these covered areas of industry (iron & steel, petrochemicals, textiles, natural gas, vehicles, cement works, communications, construction & contracting, dredging & reclamation, desalination, hotels, electricity and power, etc.). Two Arab countries took up 50 per cent of the total worth of these contracts, shared between them almost equally: they are Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

4. Export finance credit from the Japanese government-owned Export-Import Bank to the Arab countries also went up very markedly during the last year. This is an area where the new role of the Arab markets is of particular significance both to Japanese dealers and Japanese surplus funds.

Japanese businessmen had found in the Arab Region, at a time when other significant markets for Japan (the U.S.A. and Europe) were protesting against, and resisting, Japanese penetration of their economies, a vast market quite willing to take up almost everything the Japanese have to offer. With the slump in the ship industry and the collapse of Japanese ship exports, ship export financing which used to absorb more than 50% of the funds of the Export-Import Bank shrunk quite sharply. In 1978 it went down to only one-quarter of total lending. The Middle East, particularly the Arab countries, was stepped in to replace the shrinking ship export finance. Total lending from the Export-Import Bank of Japan to the Middle East in 1977 in the form of supplier credit went up to 37 per cent, compared with only 5 per cent in 1976. This amounted to \$815 million, a nine-fold increase on the 1976 level. Iraq alone got two massive contracts of \$550 million worth of Export-Import finance for a thermal power plant and fertiliser plant.

5. Arab and Japanese money and capital markets are also getting to play a role - although still a rather minor one - in the growing economic cooperation movement between the two regions. The Japanese capital is gradually luring more Arab buyers, and is growing steadily to be a market for Arab financial investment, at a time when the value of other foreign exchanges is depreciating on world markets. The penetration of Arab buyers into the Japanese bond market began in 1974 when Saudi Arabia bought \$200 million worth of these bonds. Since then the oil producing countries are believed to have bought an average of \$300-500 million worth a year through 1977. During the first quarter of 1978 alone Japanese bond sales to Middle East buyers reached \$1000 million. Abu Dhabi alone bought bonds worth \$200 million, Saudi Arabia perhaps more, and Kuwait and Qatar have also been in the market.

At the same time, Japanese exporters are raising short-term loans on the Saudi market as a hedge against exchange

losses caused by the rising value of the Yen and to protect their financial commitments. Such loans are in Saudi Riyals, and are normally for 3-5 years.

III. Areas of Mutual Economic Interest:

1. Exchange of Goods:

The growth of foreign trade between Japan and the Arab World reflects the special position that each region has come to occupy in relation to the other. Japan/Arab foreign trade was around \$200 million immediately after the second World War. It now is in the vicinity of \$30,000 million. The number of contracts of heavy industrial machinery awarded to Japanese exporters in the Middle East increased from just one in the early 1950's to 46 in 1975; their value was over one-billion dollars. While, in the early 1950's the Middle East accounted for only 0.5 per cent of the value of total Japanese exports of heavy machinery, it rose to 22 per cent in 1975. The Middle East has thus become the second major export market for Japan (see table 5).

On the other hand, about 60 per cent of Japan's energy needs are provided for by Arab countries. Over 56 per cent of Japan's oil imports come from three Arab countries in the Gulf area: Saudi Arabia (30%), Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (20%). Other Arab countries provide at least another 10 per cent of all Japan's oil imports. At the same time, Japan is now the biggest exporter to the Gulf oil-producing countries.

Japan's dependence on the Arab Region for oil is thus being gradually matched by a growing dependence of that region on Japan for the provision of machinery and equipment required for the economic development of the region. Interdependence is thus coming to replace - though very slowly - the one-way relationship of dependence of one area on the other. Other areas of economic cooperation which are growing in importance too are the transfer of capital, direct technical assistance programmes, joint ventures and the transfer of technology.

A general feature of the exchange of goods between Japan and the Arab Region has been the growing surplus in favour of that region. Over the years, that surplus has grown to reach some \$10 billion per annum (table 1). The picture is not the same however for each Arab country. While the oil-producing

countries in general have a surplus on their trade balance with Japan, the non-oil producing countries have a deficit (tables 2, 3). At the same time, among the oil-producing countries group, the surplus was enjoyed by the Gulf-Area countries, while Algeria and Iraq come under the deficit group, Libya is rather a marginal case (table 2). Another way of putting this is to say that with the exception of only three countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates - the whole region is in effect in deficit with Japan. The surplus of these countries with Japan amounted in 1977 to almost \$11 billion, with Saudi Arabia's share reaching 65 per cent of the total (table 2). This explains the recent growing interest in the Saudi Arabian market and the concentration of Japanese investments - referred to earlier - in this market.

Another interesting observation on the country foreign trade figures in table 2 is that in one case at least - Iraq - Japanese investment & loans quickly grasped the opportunity offered by the potentialities for development of oil-money and raised the exports of Japan to Iraq twenty fold between 1973 and 1977; from under \$50 million to about \$1000 million. In Algeria a similar trend is also observed where Japanese exports rose from \$50 million in 1973 to over \$500 million in 1977. In both instances, irrespective of oil-money, but because of the real large potentialities for development, an initially small deficit on trade with Japan continued to grow into a relatively huge one, particularly in the case of Algeria.

Japanese trade with the Arab Region is quite concentrated and has grown more so over the years, apparently because of the impact of oil in this trade. Ninety per cent of Japan's imports from the Area continued to come from only six Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq and Bahrain; the first accounts for over 50%. Over eighty per cent of Japan's exports went again to six Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Egypt; one-third of the total supplied the market of the first. Ten years ago these same six countries absorbed only sixty per cent of total Japanese exports; the share of the first country was at that time less than 20 per cent (see table 4).

2. Other Areas of Economic Cooperation:

i- Technical Cooperation:

In the field of economic cooperation there is a growing movement towards closer ties with the Arab Region. Figures on the activities of Japan's International Cooperation Agency show that in 1977 some 17 per cent of overseas trainees came from the Middle and Near East, 11 per cent of total experts dispatched abroad and 16 per cent of Overseas Cooperation Volunteers went to that region. The total number of overseas participants accepted was over 29000 and the number of dispatched experts, including survey teams, was about 18000 in 1977⁽¹⁾. Examples of major technical cooperation projects in the Arab countries are:

- Centre Hospitalier et Universitaire, Universite des Sciences et des la Technologie d'Oran, Algeria;
- Drug Quality Control, Tunisia;
- Nursing Education and Research, Egypt;
- Arab Maritime Transport Academy, Egypt.

ii- Japanese direct investments in the Arab Region have been in the past, and still are rather negligible. Over the last 25 years, for example, total direct investments in the Arab countries were a little over \$ one billion (an average of \$ 40 million per annum) representing investments in some 90 projects. These investments were less than 5 per cent of Japan's total direct investments abroad during that period (table 6).

The disparity between this very modest figure for investments and the volume of Japanese foreign trade with the Arab Region which now amounts to over 25 per cent of its total foreign trade is worth noting. The trend in recent years is not different. In FY 1976 total direct investments in the Arab countries were only \$134 million representing 3.8 per cent of total Japanese direct investments abroad in that year, while in FY 1977 the figures went down further to \$53 million and 1.8 per cent respectively⁽²⁾.

Of course the fact that Japan has a huge trade deficit with the Arab Region as a whole is part of that modest share

of Japanese investments in the Arab countries. Normally, a trade balance in this case would require a reverse flow of long-term capital. The recent movement of Arab investors to buy bonds on the Japanese capital market is witness to this. Compared with the deficit on the Japanese trade balance with the major Arab oil-exporting countries, this new form of capital transfer in favour of Japanese balance of payments position is not expected to be really effective. On the other hand, the surplus which Japan enjoys in its trade with the rest of the Arab World is not well matched by a corresponding flow of investment capital to those countries. Japan has perhaps been more occupied until now with the impact of its huge imports of oil from the major Arab oil exporting countries, on the vulnerability of its economy and the problem of balancing its foreign payments.

iii - Japan has thus come to realise that a certain degree of interdependence with the Arab World would have to replace the present picture of simple two-way dependence of each area on the other with no generally broad framework of joint interests to guide that relationship.

Another avenue of financial cooperation between Japan and the Arab Region lies in Official Development Assistance (ODA). This is particularly so with respect to non-oil exporting countries. ODA takes two forms generally; bilateral grants and bilateral loans. Bilateral grants do not require any repayment from the recipient country, and with their technical cooperation element, they furnish one of the most important forms of successful cooperation between countries. One of the developments Japan has introduced in this field is the "project-type cooperation", which combines the despatch of experts, supply of equipment and receiving counter part personnel in one organic project. This project-type cooperation is aimed at facilitating and intensifying the transfer of technology.

Bilateral loans under ODA carry concessional terms. The average terms and conditions of Japanese Government loans are around 3.5 per cent per annum interest rate, 25 years maturity period and 7.5 years grace. Japanese annual bilateral grants have recently been in the vicinity of \$200 million while bilateral loans were around \$600 million. The Government of Japan has disclosed at the Bonn Summit last summer its intention to

(1) Look Japan, Vol. 24, No. 269, August 10, 1978, pp. 526.

(2) Ibid, p. 14.

double ODA within three years⁽¹⁾, which means an annual increase in ODA allocations of more than 25 per cent. Last year, although the overall Japan ODA contribution was third among 17 DAC member countries it ranked 14th in the ratio of aid to GNP, which was only 0.21%. If ranked within all aid donors (including the oil producing countries) it would come 22nd. No figures were available to us on the volume of ODA allocated to the Arab countries in recent years, but there is ample evidence that those were only minor. Japan has indicated however, in recent international gatherings, its intention to expand its grant assistance to countries in the Arab Region, particularly the non-oil producing countries.

IV. Transfer and Adaptation of Technology:

The long history of Japan in the field of transfer and adaptation of technology and its noted success in moving from the era of transferring to an era of transformation and creativity of Japanese technology represents an important field of cooperation with the Arab countries. The magnitude of the Japanese success in this field and the prospects that it could present to the Arab countries are great; some experts figure that almost 50 per cent of the growth of Japanese gross domestic product is now a result of Japanese technological advance with the same input of capital and labour. Cooperation in this field requires careful consideration. The form of technology transferred has to be appropriate to the receiving country rather than the most suitable for the Japanese industries. Present Japanese technology is probably too sophisticated for the Arab countries. Intermediate technology that matches the stage of development of the Arab countries may be more easily absorbed and applied by these countries. The mere transfer of Japanese advanced technology embodied in large-scale turn-key industries could further and deepen the duality of the economy that is one of the common characteristics of many Arab countries. Furthermore, transferred technology must not only be appropriate and easily applicable, but also reflect the true needs

(1) In his address to the joint annual meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C. on September 25, 1978, Mr. R. McNamara, President of the World Bank observed that, in general, "there have been statements of intention to increase the flow of ODA (from the large contributors, the U.S.A., Japan and Germany). But these statements have yet to be translated into action."

of the people at the present stage of development of the Arab countries. The type of technology most suitable should also make use of local resources and production possibilities and be best suitable to the local conditions. Until now, Japanese economic and technical cooperation has been based on the industrial project system. Such a system has often worked more for the benefit of Japanese industries than it has for developing countries⁽¹⁾. If future cooperation between Japan and the Arab countries in the field of technology is to succeed it has to be built on shared responsibility. The receiving countries would have to build the infra-structure to which the technology will be applied: communication facilities, industrial promotion centres, agricultural test centres, technical research centres, etc. Japan would have to redirect and intensify its technical cooperation to help achieve this through an economic and cooperation programme that is separated from Japan's commercial base⁽²⁾.

Table 1.

Total Japanese Commodity Trade with
20 Arab Countries, 1967-1977

(Unit: million U.S. dollars)

	Exports	Imports	Balance
1967	286.8	790.7	- 503.9
1968	378.7	960.6	- 581.9
1969	450.2	946.0	- 495.8
1970	421.2	1100.9	- 679.7
1971	650.6	1622.5	- 971.9
1972	881.6	2163.8	-1282.2
1973	1184.5	2932.9	-1748.4
1974	2545.3	10526.7	-7981.4
1975	4317.5	11381.9	-7064.4
1976	5640.6	14236.3	-8595.7
1977	7917.8	18203.0	-10285.2

(1) Look Japan, op. cit., p.3

(2) Ibid.

Table 2.

Japan's Exports to and Imports from the (Arab) Oil Countries
by Country 1967-1977.

(Unit: million U.S. dollars)

	1967		1968		1969		1970		1971		1972	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Algeria	6.1	3.1	9.2	1.5	15.9	4.0	20.2	4.2	46.9	0.5	25.8	0.7
Bahrain	9.7	16.8	12.1	10.7	11.2	6.6	14.7	25.3	22.4	25.9	28.6	29.0
Iraq	19.8	42.3	41.7	26.2	25.4	3.6	15.9	0.2	27.3	2.8	34.4	6.1
Kuwait	70.9	303.2	71.9	310.3	117.9	267.8	94.4	308.3	89.9	461.5	128.8	607.4
Libya	21.6	0.1	24.6	0.5	30.2	(1)	31.4	5.3	47.4	9.7	63.3	5.3
Qatar*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.9	5.2
Saudi Arabia	51.7	318.3	73.7	392.4	79.4	418.3	83.8	435.1	147.2	658.4	263.6	998.5
U A E	20.1	23.8	32.8	64.3	39.7	84.2	36.9	117.5	69.2	253.5	106.7	250.2
Oman	0.8	14.5	2.3	51.3	1.1	64.6	2.4	65.0	42.9	90.1	7.6	142.6
Total	200.7	722.1	268.3	857.2	320.8	849.1	299.7	960.9	493.2	1502.4	676.7	2045.0
Balance	- 521.4		- 588.9		- 528.3		- 661.2		-1009.2		-1368.3	

(1) Negligible.

* Figures for Qatar before 1972 were included in UAE Total.

1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
50.5	5.6	146.9	32.2	259.9	36.5	204.1	10.4	521.2	26.6
28.4	74.3	57.5	354.0	55.3	175.3	108.5	228.2	113.6	319.0
48.5	3.4	452.0	190.5	811.5	393.7	625.3	577.4	966.8	834.0
165.5	585.6	264.7	2008.9	364.7	1996.2	717.3	2014.2	1056.8	2791.5
109.4	34.9	221.3	341.9	237.2	279.2	325.8	205.1	31.2	124.0
19.7	7.4	44.2	20.1	88.2	27.4	228.3	30.3	310.4	218.9
385.7	1381.0	643.3	4952.9	1339.9	6092.6	1884.5	7821.6	2613.1	9569.2
160.8	548.8	292.4	1998.9	416.9	1767.0	635.0	2467.6	953.8	3084.3
12.5	151.2	42.5	357.8	69.6	516.1	83.4	681.5	124.1	994.6
981.0	2792.2	2164.8	10257.3	3643.2	11284.0	4812.2	14063.3	6691.0	17962.1
-1811.2		-8092.4		-7640.8		-9251.1		-11271.1	

Table 3.

Japan's Exports to and Imports from the (Arab) Non-oil Countries
by country 1967-1977

	1967		1968		1969		1970		1971		1972	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Egypt	11.2	19.3	4.9	27.9	9.9	41.2	12.4	47.3	16.6	44.2	19.0	36.8
Jordan	5.6	0.2	8.2	0.5	14.1	0.2	11.0	0.1	13.9	1.0	15.9	3.2
Lebanon	17.5	1.1	20.9	1.4	25.5	1.7	29.5	1.7	45.0	1.7	52.9	2.1
Morocco	5.0	11.1	6.2	13.6	10.8	12.1	11.6	18.0	14.1	15.5	20.1	13.6
Sudan	12.9	17.4	28.5	23.4	19.1	26.5	12.8	30.1	15.3	30.2	20.0	32.1
Syria	7.1	5.1	10.4	18.7	17.8	0.9	16.1	16.7	22.7	8.5	35.5	7.5
Tunisia	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.05	0.8	0.1	5.8	0.1
Yemen (PDR)	24.9	10.4	24.4	11.6	25.7	10.7	20.5	18.7	16.1	8.5	12.7	8.1
Yemen (A.R.)	1.7	1.5	1.9	1.4	2.0	1.5	3.7	1.8	9.5	3.4	17.7	1.7
Mauritania	0.02	1.9	--(1)	4.4	--(1)	1.9	0.02	5.5	0.07	7.0	1.0	12.9
Somalia	--(1)	--(1)	4.7	0.02	4.3	0.01	3.4	0.07	3.3	0.04	4.3	0.02
Total	86.12	68.6	110.4	103.4	119.5	96.9	121.5	177.5	140.8	75.9	204.9	118.1
Balance	17.52		7.0		22.6		-56.0		64.9		86.8	

(1): Negligible.

1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
13.5	47.7	70.9	159.1	211.8	12.5	328.9	67.7	431.8	89.7
17.7	4.0	28.6	13.8	67.0	11.7	34.5	6.8	84.6	10.5
63.6	3.8	88.9	3.0	82.9	1.8	2.9	0.3	61.8	0.2
20.9	20.9	24.5	49.9	34.5	42.9	51.6	37.0	81.4	44.9
28.8	51.6	50.4	25.7	95.2	15.7	63.1	48.8	132.6	65.2
23.8	4.2	66.7	1.9	107.5	3.3	157.1	6.4	172.8	6.8
3.3	0.1	4.9	0.5	6.9	0.4	15.6	1.9	39.0	0.9
12.7	5.6	13.8	13.7	21.0	7.6	38.2	27.4	87.5	19.8
19.2	2.8	31.8	1.9	47.5	2.0	86.5	3.7	135.3	3.2
--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)
--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)	--(1)
203.5	140.7	380.5	269.5	674.3	917.9	828.4	200.0	1226.8	241.2
62.8		111.0		576.4		628.4		985.6	

Table 4.

The Percentage Share of Each Arab Country in the total Japanese Foreign Trade with the Arab Region, 1967-1977.

	1967		1968		1969		1970		1971		1972	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Algeria	2.13	0.4	2.4	0.2	3.5	0.4	4.8	0.4	7.2	0.03	2.9	0.03
Bahrain	3.38	2.1	3.2	1.1	2.5	0.7	3.5	2.5	3.4	1.6	3.2	1.3
Egypt	3.9	2.4	1.3	2.9	1.2	4.4	2.9	4.3	2.6	2.7	2.2	1.7
Iraq	6.9	5.3	11.0	2.7	5.6	0.4	3.8	0.02	4.2	0.2	3.9	0.3
Jordan	1.9	0.03	2.2	0.1	3.1	0.02	2.6	-	2.1	0.06	1.8	0.2
Kuwait	24.8	38.4	19.0	32.3	26.3	28.3	22.4	28.0	13.8	28.4	14.6	28.0
Lebanon	6.1	0.1	5.6	0.2	5.7	0.2	7.0	0.2	6.9	0.1	6.0	0.1
Libya	7.5	0.01	6.5	0.1	6.7	-	7.5	0.5	7.3	0.5	7.2	0.2
Morocco	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.4	2.4	1.3	2.8	1.6	2.2	0.9	2.3	0.6
Oman	0.3	1.8	0.6	5.3	0.2	0.1	0.6	5.9	6.6	5.6	0.9	6.6
Qatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0	0.2
Saudi Arabia	18.0	40.4	19.5	40.7	17.7	44.2	19.8	39.5	22.6	40.6	29.9	46.2
Sudan	4.5	2.2	7.5	2.4	4.2	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.4	1.9	2.3	1.5
Syria	2.5	0.6	2.7	1.9	4.0	0.1	3.8	1.5	3.5	0.6	4.0	0.4
Tunisia	0.06	0.1	0.07	0.1	0.04	0.02	0.1	-	0.1	0.06	0.7	-
U A E	7.0	3.0	8.7	6.7	8.8	8.9	8.8	10.7	0.6	15.6	12.1	11.6
Yemen (PDR)	8.7	1.3	6.4	1.2	5.7	1.1	4.9	1.7	2.5	0.5	1.4	0.4
Yemen (AR)	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.9	0.2	1.5	0.2	2.0	0.08
Mauritania	-	0.2	-	0.5	-	0.2	-	0.5	0.01	0.4	0.1	0.6
Somalia	-	-	1.2	-	0.9	-	0.8	-	0.5	-	0.5	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 4 (Cont.)

	1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Algeria	4.3	0.2	5.8	0.3	6.0	0.3	3.6	0.07	6.6	0.1
Bahrain	2.4	2.5	2.3	3.4	1.3	1.5	1.9	1.6	1.4	1.8
Egypt	1.1	1.6	2.8	1.5	4.9	0.1	5.8	0.5	5.5	0.5
Iraq	4.0	0.1	17.8	1.8	18.8	3.5	11.0	4.0	12.2	4.6
Jordan	1.5	0.1	1.1	0.1	1.6	0.1	1.5	0.05	1.0	0.1
Kuwait	14.0	20.0	10.3	19.0	8.4	17.5	12.7	14.2	13.3	15.3
Lebanon	5.5	0.1	3.5	0.03	1.9	0.02	0.05	-	0.8	-
Libya	9.2	1.2	8.7	3.3	5.5	2.5	5.8	1.4	0.4	0.7
Morocco	1.8	0.7	1.0	0.5	0.8	0.4	0.9	0.3	1.0	0.2
Oman	1.7	5.2	1.7	3.4	1.6	4.5	1.5	4.8	1.6	5.5
Qatar	1.7	0.3	1.7	0.2	2.0	0.2	4.0	0.2	3.9	1.2
Saudi Arabia	32.6	47.1	25.6	47.0	31.0	53.5	33.4	54.9	33.0	52.6
Sudan	2.4	1.8	2.0	0.2	2.2	0.1	1.1	0.3	1.7	0.4
Syria	2.0	0.1	2.6	0.02	2.5	0.03	2.8	0.04	2.2	0.03
Tunisia	0.3	-	0.2	-	0.2	-	0.3	0.01	0.5	-
U A E	13.6	18.7	11.5	19.0	9.7	15.5	11.3	17.3	12.0	16.9
Yemen (PDR)	1.0	0.2	1.3	0.1	0.5	0.07	0.7	0.2	1.1	0.1
Yemen (AR)	1.6	0.1	-	0.02	1.1	0.02	1.5	0.02	1.7	0.01
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 5.

Export of Plants (Heavy Industrial Machines) from Japan.

Area	1953-59		1960-64		1965-69		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974		1975	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
South East Asia	23	58	353	1,521	64.5	323	121	33.4	100	451	80	442	133	469	174	1,401	164	1,491
Middle East	1	0.6	21	161	6.8	46	9	4.8	18	186	15	73	21	230	33	318	46	1,143
Latin America	9	30	107	292	12.4	139	33	14.4	54	239	65	341	76	413	55	525	100	1,015
Africa	1	9.7	25	138	5.9	17	10	1.8	9	140	19	215	23	142	21	376	26	319
Oceania	-	-	16	24	1.0	68	7	7.0	8	28	1	3	3	7	4	59	11	35
Communist Countries	-	-	43	179	7.6	335	22	34.7	31	232	56	353	66	877	61	748	91	1,096
Others	1	12	19	43	1.8	38	11	3.9	11	27	21	62	28	61	67	431	51	143
Total	35	110.3	584	2,358	100	965	213	100	231	1,303	257	1,491	350	2,199	413	3,858	489	5,252

A : Number of Contracts.
 B : Amount of Money (US \$ Million)
 Source : MITI Statistics.

Table 6.

Direct Japanese Investment Abroad by Country/Region

(Unit: millions of Dollars, ¥)

	FY '76			FY '77			FY '51-FY '77		
	Number of Cases	Amount	Ratio	Number of Cases	Amount	Ratio	Number of Cases	Amount	Ratio
U.S.A.	571	663	19.2	656	686	24.4	5,088	4,767	21.5
Canada	23	86	2.5	36	48	1.7	346	634	2.9
North America Total	594	749	21.6	692	735	26.2	5,434	5,401	24.3
Bermuda	6	23	0.7	3	8	0.3	46	342	1.5
Brazil	77	270	7.8	84	267	9.5	954	2,071	9.3
Mexico	8	30	0.9	10	10	0.4	122	180	0.8
Panama	61	25	0.7	76	69	2.5	321	183	0.8
Peru	—	5	0.1	—	1	0.0	75	459	2.1
Others	49	67	1.9	40	101	3.6	490	522	2.4
Latin America Total	201	420	12.1	213	456	16.3	2,008	3,752	16.9
Hong Kong	114	69	2.0	110	109	3.9	1,144	556	2.5
Indonesia	84	929	26.8	83	425	15.1	728	3,128	14.1
Korea	44	102	2.9	33	95	3.4	927	785	3.5
Malaysia	37	54	1.6	33	69	2.5	489	425	1.9
Philippines	50	15	0.4	58	27	1.0	415	381	1.7
Singapore	83	27	0.8	89	66	2.4	596	370	1.7
Taiwan	46	28	0.8	54	18	0.6	793	244	1.1
Thailand	27	19	0.5	38	49	1.7	559	277	1.2
Others	5	2	0.1	13	7	0.2	239	162	0.7
Asia Total	490	1,245	36.0	511	865	30.8	5,890	6,328	28.5
Iran	20	144	4.2	12	172	6.1	99	465	2.1
Saudi Arabia/Kuwait	1	67	1.9	—	49	1.7	4	879	4.0
Others	20	67	1.9	13	4	0.1	83	135	0.6
Middle East Total	41	278	8.0	25	225	8.0	186	1,479	6.7
Belgium	11	36	1.0	18	21	0.7	120	142	0.6
France	20	35	1.0	41	38	1.4	241	222	1.0
W. Germany	31	35	1.0	20	45	1.6	342	252	1.1
Netherland	13	48	1.4	10	19	0.7	122	201	0.9
Switzerland	12	50	1.4	10	4	0.1	80	123	0.6
U.K.	44	88	2.5	43	50	1.8	402	1,690	7.6
U.S.S.R.	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	123	0.6
Others	24	45	1.3	20	43	1.5	295	322	1.4
Europe Total	155	337	9.7	162	220	7.8	1,606	3,075	13.8
Zaire	7	69	2.0	3	14	0.5	41	233	1.0
Liberia	64	145	4.2	35	95	3.4	235	369	1.7
Nigeria	3	13	0.4	5	5	0.2	48	129	0.6
Others	11	45	1.3	15	26	0.9	209	182	0.8
Africa Total	85	272	1.9	58	140	5.0	533	913	4.1
Australia	61	137	4.0	64	146	5.2	513	964	4.3
Papua/New Guinea	8	8	0.2	13	8	0.3	93	131	0.6
New Zealand	6	5	0.1	9	5	0.2	70	115	0.5
Others	11	12	0.3	13	6	0.2	88	47	0.2
Oceania Total	86	162	4.7	99	165	5.9	764	1,257	5.7
Total	1,652	3,462	100.0	1,760	2,806	100.0	16,421	22,211	100.0

Source: Look Japan, August 10, 1978, p.14

Table 7.

Direct Japanese Investment Abroad by Industry/Region (Cumulative total as of the end of March, 1978)

	(Unit: Million of dollars)									
	North America	Latin America	Asia	Middle East	Europe	Africa	Oceania	Total	No. of Cases	Amount
Manufacturing Industry	130	78	107	1	20	28	30	36	467	363
Food	64	109	297	4	25	43	6	4	724	1,285
Textile	30	255	189	—	—	1	30	85	282	627
Lumber/Pulp	54	111	369	14	37	4	17	98	572	1,369
Chemical	30	214	369	6	34	19	15	71	474	1,051
Iron & Steel/Non-ferrous Metal	107	108	303	5	45	—	10	9	557	513
Machinery	81	291	565	5	28	5	9	16	769	848
Electric	16	40	108	5	7	1	8	83	173	538
Transportation	108	51	706	16	46	5	13	5	969	545
Machinery	620	1,237	3,207	55	244	106	138	406	4,987	7,139
Others	80	110	213	3	2	9	84	41	485	396
Sub Total	80	110	213	3	2	9	84	41	485	396
Other Industries	33	22	100	5	4	2	63	33	299	162
Agricultural and Forestry	116	433	142	7	9	80	73	463	524	5,311
Fishery	89	78	140	18	9	2	8	4	313	202
Mining	2,118	1,978	956	35	772	418	199	107	4,420	2,955
Construction	67	617	130	24	107	533	23	42	4,420	2,955
Commerce	887	613	549	19	212	815	134	155	2,652	3,006
Finance/Insurance	1,227	242	92	2	118	24	36	3	1,557	668
Others	197	51	361	29	129	37	6	3	764	680
Real Estate/Direct Project Abroad	5,434	5,401	5,890	186	1,606	3,075	764	1,257	16,421	22,211
Opening of Branches	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	5,434	5,401	5,890	186	1,606	3,075	764	1,257	16,421	22,211

Source: Look Japan, August 10, 1978, p.15

APPENDIX

Japan's Exports to and Imports from the Arab Countries by Country: 1967-1977 (Unit: Million of U.S. Dollars)

JAPAN AND THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER

Khairy Issa

	1967		1968		1969		1970		1971		1972	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Algeria	6.1	3.1	9.2	1.5	15.9	4.0	20.2	4.2	48.9	0.5	25.8	0.7
Bahrain	9.7	16.8	12.1	10.7	11.2	6.6	14.7	25.3	22.4	25.9	28.6	29.0
Egypt	11.2	19.3	4.9	27.9	9.9	41.2	12.4	47.3	16.6	44.2	19.0	36.8
Iraq	19.8	42.3	41.7	26.2	25.4	3.6	15.9	0.2	27.3	2.8	34.4	6.1
Jordan	5.6	0.2	8.2	0.5	14.1	0.2	11.0	0.1	13.9	1.0	15.9	3.2
Kuwait	70.9	303.2	71.9	310.3	117.9	267.8	94.4	308.3	89.9	461.5	128.8	607.4
Lebanon	17.5	1.1	20.9	1.4	25.5	1.7	29.5	1.7	45.0	1.7	52.9	2.1
Libya	21.6	0.1	24.6	0.5	30.2	--(1)	31.4	5.3	47.4	9.7	63.3	5.3
Morocco	5.0	11.1	6.2	13.6	10.8	12.1	11.6	18.0	14.1	15.5	20.1	13.6
Oman	0.8	14.5	2.3	51.3	1.1	64.6	2.4	65.0	42.9	90.1	7.6	142.6
Qatar *	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	17.9	5.2
Saudi Arabia	51.7	318.3	73.7	392.4	79.4	418.3	83.8	435.1	147.2	568.4	263.6	998.5
Sudan	12.9	17.4	28.5	23.4	19.1	26.5	12.8	30.1	15.3	30.2	20.0	32.1
Syria	7.1	5.1	10.4	18.7	17.8	0.9	16.1	16.7	22.7	8.5	35.5	7.5
Tunisia	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.05	0.8	0.1	5.8	0.1
U A E	20.1	23.8	32.8	64.3	39.7	84.2	36.9	117.5	69.5	253.5	106.7	250.2
Yemen (PDR)	24.9	10.4	24.4	13.6	25.7	10.7	20.5	18.7	16.1	8.5	12.7	8.1
Yemen (AR)	1.7	1.5	1.9	1.4	2.0	1.5	3.7	1.8	9.5	3.4	17.7	1.7
Mauritania	0.02	1.9	--(1)	4.4	--(1)	1.9	0.02	5.5	0.07	7.0	1.0	12.9
Somalia	--(1)	--(1)	4.7	0.02	4.3	0.01	3.4	0.07	3.3	0.04	4.3	0.02
Total	286.82	790.7	378.7	960.62	450.2	946.0	421.22	1100.92	650.57	1622.54	881.6	2163.82

	1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Algeria	50.5	5.6	146.9	32.2	259.9	36.5	204.1	10.4	521.7	26.6
Bahrain	28.4	74.3	57.5	354.0	55.3	175.3	108.5	228.2	113.6	319.0
Egypt	13.5	47.7	70.9	159.1	211.8	12.5	328.9	67.7	431.8	89.7
Iraq	48.5	3.4	452.0	190.5	811.5	393.7	625.3	577.4	966.8	834.0
Jordan	17.7	4.0	28.6	13.8	67.0	11.7	84.5	6.8	84.6	10.5
Kuwait	165.5	585.6	264.7	2008.9	364.7	1996.2	717.3	2014.2	1056.8	2791.5
Lebanon	63.6	3.8	88.9	3.0	82.9	1.8	2.9	0.3	61.8	0.2
Libya	109.4	34.9	221.3	341.9	237.2	325.8	205.1	31.2	124.0	124.0
Morocco	20.9	20.9	24.5	49.9	34.5	42.9	51.6	37.0	81.4	44.9
Oman	12.5	151.2	42.5	357.8	69.6	516.1	83.4	681.5	124.1	994.6
Qatar	19.7	7.4	44.2	20.1	88.2	27.4	228.3	30.3	310.4	218.9
Saudi Arabia	385.7	1381.0	643.3	4952.9	1339.9	6092.6	1884.5	7821.6	2613.1	9569.2
Sudan	28.8	51.6	50.4	25.7	95.2	15.7	63.1	48.8	132.6	65.2
Syria	23.8	4.2	66.7	1.9	107.5	3.3	157.1	6.4	172.8	6.8
Tunisia	3.3	0.1	4.9	0.5	6.9	0.4	15.6	1.9	39.0	0.9
U A E	160.8	548.8	292.4	1998.9	416.9	1767.0	635.0	2467.6	953.8	3084.3
Yemen (PDR)	12.7	5.6	13.8	13.7	21.0	7.6	38.2	27.4	87.5	19.8
Yemen (AR)	19.2	2.8	31.8	1.9	47.5	2.0	86.5	3.7	135.3	3.2
Mauritania	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Somalia	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total	1184.5	2932.9	2545.3	10526.7	4317.5	11381.9	5640.6	14236.3	7917.8	18203.3

Sources: For the years 1967-1972 : *MEED*, 17 Aug. 1973, p.959,960
 - For the years 1973-1977 : *MEED, Special Feature, Japan*, 10 Nov. 1978.
 - Figures for Mauritania & Somalia are derived from : *The Statistical Year Book of CAEU*, 1976.
 (1) Negligible.
 * Figures for Qatar before 1972 were included in the UAE total.
 --: Not available.

Since the end of the second World War, the world has been divided into two separate groups of countries, the wealthy north and the poor south. The population of the poor countries amounts to more than 70% of the world population, while that of the rich does not exceed 30%. Preliminary estimates reveal that the per capita income of the people in the poor south is slightly less than \$ 100, while that of the rich north is \$2000 in the average. Furthermore, the rich countries of the north depend to a large extent in their economic growth on raw materials and agriculture products produced by the countries of the poor south. It is only natural, in the light of these facts, that the people of the poor south demand the whole structure of the world economy should be reconsidered in order to allow them a more equitable distribution of wealth. When the problem was recognized, a committee of highly economic experts from Latin America met in Santiago in February 1973 to study the issue. The document issued by these experts in economic development recognized the legitimate claim of the people of the poor south and declared that the international economic order should be restudied to allow a fairer treatment for these people. It also declared that the whole fabric of the international trade, and the international prices of raw materials and the international monetary system should be reviewed as to afford more protection to the people of the poor countries. This was the first sparkle that led the way to establishing a New Economic Order. This was later asserted by a United Nations declaration in its special session called for by Algeria in April 1974. In April and May 1974 the General Assembly of the U.N. laid down the new principles to regulate international economic relations, a declaration and a working program, which outlined precisely the objectives of the New Economic Order and means of its implementation. Article four of the declaration stated that the principles of the New Economic Order are:

1. Cooperation of all the countries on equal basis in order to ensure a fair distribution of wealth.
2. The right of every state to adopt economic and social policies more suitable to its needs.
3. Each state enjoys full and permanent sovereignty in regard to the use of its natural resources and in its economic activity.
4. The establishment of a fair and just relationship between the prices of products exported by the developing countries and the prices of

their imported products.

The Working Program indicated the general means to implement the principles stipulated in the Declaration.

In July 1975, the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. adopted recommendations covering six aspects of the problem:

- 1) international trade;
- 2) the transference of resources to finance development projects and to improve the international monetary system;
- 3) science and technology;
- 4) industrialization;
- 5) agriculture development and
- 6) the reorganization of the U.N. system.

The developing countries realized that their position in relation to these six aspects puts them at a great disadvantage compared with the developed countries.

Efforts made outside the U.N.

Starting from early 1977 a considerable number of meetings and consultation had taken place among the big western countries, and conferences were held to study the international economic order in an attempt to find measures leading to its stabilization. From the 7th to the 9th of May 1977 the third economic summit conference was held in London. It was attended by England, France, Western Germany, Canada, Italy and Japan. The conference aimed at reaching a unified agreement as to the stand of the big industrial countries in the North-South Dialogue. The London Conference was followed by a summit conference of the countries members of the Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussel. Out of these two conferences the so-called Western Alliance was formed which included in addition to the E.E.C. countries, the United States and Japan. In June 1977, the Economic Co-operation Conference was held in France, to be known as the North-South Conference which established a Dialogue between the oil producing countries and the industrial countries that were its largest consumer.

Japan and the Dialogue

Did the industrial countries of the West intend to take serious measures to create a new economic order based on equality and justice? This is very doubtful. The North-South Dialogue held in France did not result in concrete recommendations. Furthermore, the western countries refused to tie the prices of raw materials and the prices of energy with the prices of manufactured products. Belonging to the rich industrial countries - Japan found itself deeply involved in the problem which threatened to develop into a direct confrontation between the Rich North and the Poor South. In 1973 there was wide anticipation in inter-

national economic circles that Japan would extend its economic assistance to developing countries. Japan had promised, in the third Conference of Trade and Development held in May 1972, to increase its aid to the developing countries to one per cent of its G.N.P. by 1975. Japan's economic aid to these countries which was slightly less than 458 million dollars in 1970 increased to 1147,4 million dollars in 1975. However, much of this aid was attributed more to inflationary prices than real increase in volume. Takeo Fukuda pledged to keep the promises given by Japan during the London Summit Economic Conference to increase its aid to developing countries by 20% in the fiscal year 1977-1978 as compared to that of the previous year. Furthermore, Japan's delegate in the North-South Dialogue Conference of 1976 announced that his country intended to set aside an additional 114 million dollars in the form of bilateral aid on easy terms. Declarations of the Japanese delegate in the sixth session of the General Council pointed out clearly to Japan's deep concern of the problems of raw materials, energy and technology transfer. The delegate also declared that Japan acknowledged the right of all countries including developing ones to utilize their natural resources in the best manner to suit their needs. Japan, furthermore, supported cooperation between developed industrial nations and developing ones for the purpose of economic development, and promised to supply developing nations with badly needed capital and technology. Japan also realised the necessity for the developing countries to protect the limited reserves of their natural resources, especially that of oil, and called upon all countries to look for energy substitutes.

In the light of the new economic relations based on international cooperation, Japan insisted that it was the duty of developed countries to help the underdeveloped. Although Japan was hurt most than any one else by the energy crisis following the 1973 war in the Middle East, it was fully aware of its international responsibilities as an advanced industrial country, and was fully prepared to do its utmost to find solutions to the various problems facing developing countries. Japan insisted that this should be carried out through effective international cooperation. It also demonstrated its readiness to transfer its vast experience in technology to all developing countries to suit their needs and desires. The Japanese delegate assured that his country would play an effective role in the Committee of Twenty which was appointed by the Council to reform the international monetary system. Japan believed that the most effective means to achieve closer ties between the North and the South was through peaceful negotiations, preferably in the form

of Dialogue.

Japan's International Economic Position

Japan's economic progress in the nineteen-sixties was probably a phenomena unmatched in the history of economic development. Its gross income jumped from 43,000 million dollars in 1960 to 200,000 million dollars in 1970 and to 300,000 million dollars in 1972. This put Japan in the third place in World Economy, 10% enabled her to realise a favourable balance of payment vis-a-vis the rest of the world. The surplus of Japan's trade accumulated year after year and finally lead to an increased indebtedness of the leading industrial countries of the world. Fukuda, Japan's prime minister, declared that his country was working out a new economic policy to decrease its huge surplus from its foreign trade, which was estimated to be close to ten billion dollars in 1978, and that he saw no immediate remedy to the international problems resulting from such a situation. Japan would not, contrary to what some financial circles suggested, double its imports from the outside world. It was believed, however, that Japan's huge surplus could be considerably reduced in the long run as a natural result of the possible increases in the price of oil. Fukuda announced the appointment of a group of economic experts to lay down a program to stimulate internal demand, for foreign which could result in substantial increases in imports. The program would also include Japan's plan for offering new loans amounting to 500 billion yen (2 billion dollars) to help the development of small and middle sized economic projects, and Japan's intention to enlarge its financial and economic aid to developing countries.

The United States Concern Over Japan's Economic Expansion

Japan's Economic expansion became quite a threat to American economy. The U.S. Congress talked about measures to stop the inflow of imports from Japan. The deficit in the American balance of payment rose to \$ 23 billion in 1977 above. This caused the American dollar to suffer a serious drop in the world markets, from 265 yen to the dollar in Sep. 1977 to 249.8 two months later. In the meantime, the value of the Japanese yen started to rise quickly since the beginning of October 1977. The Yen's value rise from 292.50 to the dollar in June 1977 to 249.8 in November the same year. Japan took immediate measures to stop any further decrease in the value of the dollar. Custom duties were lowered to encourage imports from the United States and negotiations were started

with the United States and an agreement was reached in January 1978. Japan would increase its purchases of American automobiles and meats and at the meantime decrease its sales of steel products and electronics to the States. The negotiations were described to be very hard and, many times the U.S.A. was forced to use rough language, but eventually an agreement was reached whereby Japan considerably decreased its exports and increased its imports.

The 'chaotic' state of affair in the balance of payments of the great industrial countries of the world had serious repercussions on the world economy at large, and specially on the economy of the developing countries. One serious effect of the drop of the value of the American dollar was a comparable drop in the reserves of the oil producing countries. Also the exports of these countries, which were mainly made up of raw materials, faced serious problems, as their value measured in dollars suffered a substantial decrease. Any attempt to reform the international monetary system must take into account the special nature of the developing countries and their economic structure. The reform must guarantee a continued and balanced economic development for these countries in order to decrease the gap in their standard of living with that of the advanced industrial countries of the North.

Japan's Support for Economic Development

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development believes that the rich countries can afford more financial aid to developing countries, and therefore can decrease the gap in the standard of living between the two. Since 1970 Japan had become the main financial provider for the Bank, as Japanese loans to the Bank amounted to 45,800 million yens in 1972. The Bank report of 1973 shows that Japan held first position among the leading countries of the Bank, a position previously held by Western Germany. In 1977 the Bank was able to secure loans amounting to 100 billion yens from the financial markets in Japan, an amount equivalent to 392 million dollars. Again Japan held fourth position, following the U.S.A., France, and Western Germany in giving financial assistance to developing countries for the purpose of development through the International Agency for Development.

Japan's Direct Aid and Investments in Developing Countries

Japan directed the bulk of its financial aid and investment towards Asia, mainly towards South Eastern Asia. Following the Joint Declaration of Fukuda and Carter, Washington demanded that Tokyo should

resume its responsibilities to maintain stability and progress to the peoples of South Eastern Asia. The first few months of 1977 saw the implementation of this policy, when Japan settled the financial commitments of these countries, and their financial needs were carefully studied. Japan committed itself to offer the ASEAN countries one billion dollars for industrial projects and to study the possibility of lowering its western duties on imports from these countries. In addition Japan offered to spend 138 billion yens in the form of loans and credits facilities in its bilateral dealing with the ASEAN countries. The share of Indonesia done from these loans came to 57.6 billion yens.

According to the latest statistics, the South Eastern Asia region got 53.1% of all direct Japanese investments in developing countries during 1975, while the share of all Asia was 62.1%. That means that Japan's investments in Asia outside the south eastern region, came to no more than 9%.

Japan's Investments in Africa and the Middle East

Prior to the 1973 War Japan had practically no economic relation with Africa. Since then, because of the energy crisis, Japan started to pay more attention to the Middle East in general, and in particular to the Arab countries from the Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean.

Japan's trade with the Middle East increased from 64 million yen in 1974 to 196 million yen 1975, and to 278 million yen in 1977. Japan also started to increase its investment in the Middle East, but most of it was directed for investment in oil in Saudi Arabia and some minor industries in Arab Peninsula. There was also considerable investment in the fields of construction, banking and sea transport. The Japanese government participated in the establishment of a Petro Chemical Compound in Saudi Arabia.

In Egypt, most of Japan's investments were used to build a pharmaceutical factory in the free-zone area, and to establish a plastic shoe factory for local consumption. Up to 1978, Japan's investments in Egypt were very much limited and it seems that is still studying the potentiality and capacity of the Egyptian market.

Japan as a Model for Development

There is no doubt that Japan holds a prominent position in the world as far as economics is concerned. It is the third economic power in the world, surpassed only by the two super power i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore the Japanese model for develop-

ment stood out as one of the most impressive and unique models. Many developing countries turn to Japan as a perfect example for economic development rather than any other model. There are various reasons:

1. The Japanese model contradicted the notion that development is exclusively a European phenomena that could not be copied by others. Prior to the Second World War, there was a firm belief that economic development required certain climatic conditions and certain biological traits that belong only to western peoples. It is true that the climate in Japan is as mild as that in the western European countries, but Japan, an Asiatic country belonging mainly to the civilization and tradition of Ancient China.
2. It is again a contradiction of the racial interpretation of development, which claims that the white race alone is capable of development. Other races, the yellows, the blacks, or the browns are inherently unable to cope up with the new discoveries in science and technology. Japan furnishes the living negation of such a contention.
3. The Japanese model challenges theories of development based on religion. Such theories are based on the assumption that only Christian people are capable of development, and that other religions hold believers that form real deterrents of development. Non-Christian Japan defeated successfully this theory.
4. Japan also challenged the view that development is a non-democratic phenomena. It was believed that western European countries went through the process of development early in the nineteenth century before political liberalization took place. Economic development could only be achieved under authoritarian political systems. This view was supported later by the Russian development model which was feasible only under the absolute Stalinist political regime. Contrary to both experiences, that of western Europe, and the U.S.S.R. Japan's experience in the last thirty years was a perfect combination of political liberalization and economic development. Although one must admit that economic development in Japan arrived its taking off stage during three period of autocratic political system, i.e., during the imperial form of government which existed before World War Two.
5. Among the Third World the socialist model is the only model to fit their needs for development. The argument was that these countries possessed neither the capital needed for development nor the capacity to defend themselves against the cut-through competition of the more advanced countries. China and Cuba were taken as examples of the

socialist model for development. On the other hand, Japan presented itself as a free economy model.

6. Japan industrial might centered around the ingenuity and endurance of the Japanese people. Japan possesses no raw materials or energy to build an industrial empire. Yet Japan became an industrial Giant. Japan's model holds new hopes for the developing countries, who are poor in raw material, resources and energy. Economic development acquired new meanings i.e., adaptation of technology and hard ware. Development in Japan meant maximum utilization of human resources and the possession of technology. The ideal industrial project is the small firm and quite often the small family firm. For the Japanese people work is a virtue in itself.

DIPLOMACY OF RESOURCES IN ARAB JAPANESE RELATIONS

-Economic Survey & Political Analysis-

Scif El-Wady Romahi

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps my interests in Japan and my admiration in the Japanese people may be traced back to my early childhood, when my teacher at the primary school asked my class to memorize a poem composed by the well known Arab poet, Hafez Ibrahim. This Arabian poet was moved by the outcome of the Czarist Russo-Japanese War in which he praised the Japanese for their skills, diligence and heroism.

The teacher was explaining the verses of that poem with enthusiasm and joy. His emphasis was on our teaching of the poem's concluding wisdom of patriotism. His main interest was to teach us how to love our country on the portrait of the Japanese who, as the poem states, say that, "This is the way the Mikado taught us, to look at our nation and country as our parents."

By explaining this poet, the teacher portrayed to us the Japanese individual as a symbol of a patriot citizen. By and large, the Arabs at the start of the century were overwhelmed by this and valued the victory with pride and patriotism. Japan, to them, at that time, had demonstrated the stern will of a non-European non-Western Oriental country.

This admiration was enhanced when H.E. Mr. Takase, the late Japan's Ambassador to Kuwait visited me in my office in the Ruler's Palace of Abu Dhabi, in my capacity as Deputy-Director of the Emiri court requesting the participation of Abu Dhabi in Expo '70 in Osaka.

Ever since I was stationed in Tokyo in 1976, I put it as a goal for myself to exhaust every effort and energy for the improvement of the mutual relations between the Arab and Japanese nations in general, and the UAE-Japan, in particular.

It has been said that the Japanese people are living on a small island without much care of the outside world. This statement may reflect some facts in its essence since it is true that they were living in isolation until quite recently. However, with the vast development in technological inventions in communication, the whole world is becoming small. Distances, nowadays, does not mean a thing in contemporary world politics, nor in modern international economics. This was

one of the main reasons to let Japan abandon its isolation.

The position of Japan in relation to the Arab Middle East in general, and the UAE in particular, deserves special mention and study. Of all industrialised states, Japan is by far the most heavily dependent nation on oil supplies from the Middle East, especially from the Gulf region. As such, Japan should be particularly interested in all matters (economic and otherwise) pertaining to the area.

Following the world oil crisis in the fall of 1973, Japanese interests in the Middle East took an obvious upward trend. To counter-balance Japanese need for Arab oil, efforts were doubled to increase the export of Japanese goods into the area. While economic cooperation between Japan and the Gulf States rose steadily, private investments in the Gulf region appear to have remained unchanged.

The information and statistical data given below are taken from Japanese sources to indicate the importance of the Arab Middle East to Japan from the view point of obtaining her oil supplies which turn her industrial machines, and at the same time finding markets for her finished goods.

I. ROOTS OF ARAB JAPANESE RELATIONS

Pre-war Epoch

Although Arab Japanese relation is considered relatively new, it dates back before the Meiji Era.

And perhaps before discussing this topic it may be useful to shed some light about the facts of the importance of the Arab world and Japan to each other.

The Arab World is an area of large and diverse territory stretches from the Arabian Gulf in the East to the Atlantic Ocean in the West. This area, altogether, is twenty countries that comprise the League of Arab States. The total population of this region is estimated at over 120 million.

The entire region, presently, is of great significance to outsiders for political, strategic considerations, and for economic reasons. The region is the primary petroleum-exporting area in the world and has supplied most of the crude oil required by Western Europe and Japan. Its oil fields, mineral deposits, and manufacturing sectors continue to attract considerable foreign investment.

The Middle East has already become an extremely competitive and

rapidly expanding market for foreign-made consumer and capital goods, for which local industrialisation and development projects have created a great demand. At its beginning, the region's direction of trade has been oriented toward the West since the middle of the 19th century. However, Japan has recently emerged as one of its major trading partners and as a keen competitor to the West.

Direct Contact Initiation

Direct contacts between Japan and the Arab World are known to have occurred as early as the last quarter of the 19th century, just before the Meiji Era. This direct contacts started between Japan and the Ottoman Empire, where the Arabs were part of that Empire. In the 1890's Japan is believed to have begun importing raw cotton from Egypt.

Less than two decades later, Japan's successful modernization and her victory over Czarist Russia had far-reaching effects in stimulating nationalism throughout much of the Islamic world. Mustafa Kamil used the example of Japan in his book "The Rising Sun" to demonstrate how a non-Western country could achieve self-renewal and success. The Arab poet Hafez Ibrahim as has been mentioned in the introduction was moved by the outcome of the war to compose a poem in which he praised the Japanese for their bravery.¹

A number of nationalists, moreover, who observed that victorious Japan was the only Asian country that had adopted a form of representative constitutional government, took it as a good example to follow. Japan was considered by the governments of Great Britain and France to be sufficiently interested in Middle Eastern affairs as to warrant her being informed of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement for the partition of the Arab world that was negotiated during the First World War.² Subsequently Japan also was invited by the Allies to participate in the Lausanne (1922-23) and Montreux (1936) Conferences, which chopped the Arab territories from the Ottoman Empire, leaving Turkey proper and regulated Turkish sovereignty over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

Nonetheless, commercial ties between the two regions did not begin to assume real importance until after the conclusion of World War I. It was then that Japanese imports of Egyptian cotton reached a very significant volume.³ During the 1920's, Japan industrialized cotton textiles began to show signs of domination on a number of Middle Eastern markets. Japan's exports to Egypt between 1921 and 1924 alone, for example, expanded from ¥4,922,000 (\$2,500,000) to ¥27,080,000 (\$13,500,000). By 1928, Japanese heavy grey sheetings (cabots) and yarn dyed goods prac-

tically monopolized the local market. Some of this trade, however, was cut back temporarily towards the end of that decade, when Japan was hit by a severe economic depression.⁴

The interval between the World Depression of 1929 and 1931, and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 witnessed a remarkable growth in Japan's industrial output and foreign commerce. While other countries experienced a severe decline in their own international trade, the Japanese economy was revived. Japan succeeded in developing a global commercial network that made her the world's fourth most important trading nation after the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

In the Arab countries, Japan resumed steady inroads on the established markets of older competitors. Its exports in 1931 were valued at ¥40,000,000 (\$20,000,000). However, as a result of an uprising in exports after 1933, Japan's exports expanded to ¥149,000,000 (\$43,000,000) in 1935. This composed 3.3% of Japan's international exports for that year.⁵

Through the middle of that decade Egypt was by far the major Middle Eastern trading partner of Japan. It ranked as Japan's tenth most important global customer in terms of export volume between 1934 and 1936 and as her twelfth most important source of imports.⁶

During those same years, the United Kingdom was the only power that outranked Japan as the major supplier of commodity imports to this area.

More than 90% of Japan's exports to the Middle East in terms of value during the 1930's consisted of textiles (especially cotton fabrics), Japan's most important world-wide export item. Throughout much of that region Japanese cloth was able to compete successfully with European exports primarily because of its low price. In the Gulf area,⁷ for example, a British Vice-Consul stationed at Bushire (Iran) during that period noted that

the shortage of money and the consequent demand for cheapness with little regard to quality ... was a tremendous help to Japan in her efforts to establish a strong commercial position ... Her goods were almost invariably cheaper than those of her rivals and in addition were brought to the notice of merchants by Japanese agents who were extremely active in visiting and carrying on trade propaganda in the various towns of the Gulf. Furthermore, Japanese traders were willing to import goods on their own account and to dispose of them afterwards to merchants as and when opportunity offered.⁸

In Palestine and Transjordan, Japan rivaled Great Britain in the sale of cotton fabrics. The same thing was done to the Syrian/Lebanese domestic markets at the expenses of Western manufacturers.⁹ For commodity

breakdown of Japanese exports to the Arab countries between 1930-1934, see table below.

Japanese Exports to Arab States, 1930¹⁰
(in approximate percentage terms)

	COTTON	RAYON & SILK	WOOL	OTHER TEXTILE	OTHER GOODS
ADEN	91	5	*	1	3
EGYPT	72	17	1	3	7
IRAQ	70	19	1	4	6
PALESTINE & TRANS-JORDAN	40	32	1	6	21
SYRIA & LEBANON	72	10	*	11	7

Postwar - Pre-Crisis Era

The maintenance of a steadily increasing volume of exports has long been essential for the continued growth of the Japanese economy. Exports have been necessary to pay for the large amounts of raw materials and finished goods that have been imported for home consumption. They also have been important as one means of creating ample employment opportunities for the growing domestic labour force.

Before World War II, Japan had a booming foreign trade particularly with East and Southeast Asia and the United States. The War, however, completely disrupted her world-wide commercial network and destroyed a high proportion of her industrial and mercantile establishments.

The immediate postwar political situation made it difficult for her to reestablish her trading position in certain parts of Asia that formerly had been under her control.

As a result, Japan was compelled during the late 1940's to renew her search for markets; as well as for new sources of raw materials. Since that time, Japanese Government ministries and private businessmen alike have made sustained efforts to promote overseas sales whenever and wherever possible.

Such sustained endeavours have taken many forms, among them (1) the establishment of overseas offices and the expansion of trading services, (2) the negotiations of trade agreements, (3) participation in international trade fairs, (4) sending trade missions abroad and inviting foreign commercial delegations to visit Japan, (5) extending technical assistance and financial aid to other countries, (6) modernizing industry to improve its export competitive ability, and (7) passing export inspection laws for the sake of maintaining high standards of quality. By means of their aggressive, enterprising, and hard-working approach the

Japanese were able to widen the range of their competitive exports and also to regain a foothold in a large number of distant markets such as the Arab ones.

The drive for a diversified and strong national economy and for a higher domestic standard of living has come to characterize the policies of nearly all Arab government during the postwar period. Industrialization and modernization became the general objectives of national economic planning as early as the 1930's. After their political independence, Arab countries initiated large-scale development programmes.

The degree of state direction and control that have been imposed as well as the pace and success of such activities have varied from one country to another and from one year to another. It was apparent that many Arab countries have got industrialized to the point where they have been able to bring about significant changes in the nature of their import and export trade with foreign nations. Their efforts to become self-sufficient in the production of cotton and woollen textiles, cement, and other light industrial commodities, for example, and their increasing need for heavy machinery and for sophisticated equipment have transformed the composition of postwar Japanese-Arab trade.

At the same time, postwar Japan has been experiencing an energy revolution in which liquid fuels were replacing solid-state fuels as the preferred energy source. As a result of these interrelated developments, petroleum has come to provide more than half of Japan's total energy requirements.

Despite the growing needs for petroleum, however, the Japanese were unable to expand their own crude oil production to a worthwhile degree. Accordingly, they have had to rely on imports for the provision of most of their energy resources.

Japan's Interests in Mideast Oil

In a statement issued in 1967, a spokesman for MITI said: "if the oil supply from the Middle East is suspended, the result will be confusion in the daily life of the entire nation."¹¹ Also Mr. Masao Sakisaka, Director of the Institute of Energy Economics, in 1966, stated that, "petroleum is destined to play the leading role in the energy supply of our country. How to secure enough supply to meet the rising demand is the crux of the issue."¹²

After World War II, Japan though defeated, it successfully became one of the world's largest economic powers. This tremendous expansion of Japanese economy has been admired by Arab economists and others, every-

where. Since 1950, Japanese economy has sustained one of the highest overall growth rates in the world. The enormous demand for a cheap and steady supply of energy that has inevitably accompanied this boom has stimulated a significant expansion in the production of coal and hydro-electricity within Japan. Neither of these fuels, however, were able to meet more than a small proportion of the rising demand.

Footnotes (I)

1. See "Kuwait Makes Swift Climb to a Model Welfare Country," Japan Times, February 25, 1967, p.10. In addition, several articles were published in al-Hilal and al-Muqtataf on the occasion of the war "praising the Japanese and reflecting some sense of oriental solidarity."

2. The note of May 16, 1916, that Sir Edward Gray sent to Paul Cambon stated: "His Majesty's Government further considers that the Japanese Government should be informed of the arrangements now concluded." (Muhammad Khalil (ed.), The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record (Beirut: Khayats, 1961), II, p. 297.)

3. Between 1922 and 1923, Japanese imports from Egypt, primarily raw cotton, doubled in value from ¥10,571,000 (\$5,250,000) to ¥21,016,000 (\$10,500,000), thereby accounting for 1% of Japan's total world-wide imports in 1923. Imports from Egypt declined slightly in the following year, however, to ¥17,014,000 (0.7% of Japan's total imports). See Uyehara Shigeru, The Industry and Trade of Japan (London: P.S. King, 1926), p. 75.

4. Ibid., p.74. See also reports published during the 1920's on economic conditions in Egypt, Iran, the "Persian Gulf" and Turkey by the British Government's Department of Overseas Trade.

5. Statistics compiled from Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau, Japanese Trade and Industry, Present and Future (London: Macmillan, 1936), pp. 568 ff.

6. "Postwar Export Markets," Oriental Economist, XXV, 556 (February 1957), p. 79.

7. Geographically, the Gulf was known as the "Persian Gulf". Contemporary Arab writers and politicians use the term "Arabian Gulf." The writer, however, in order to avoid any conflicting or a controversial issue will refer to it in this work as "The Gulf". See writer's note in his book, Economics and Political Evolution in the Arabian Gulf States, (New York: Carlton Press, 1973), p. 6.

8. Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in the Persian Gulf - 1934 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1935), pp. 5-6.

9. Mitsubishi, *op. cit.*, p. 570; Sa'id Behmed Himadeh (ed.), The Economic Organization of Syria (Beirut: American Press, 1936), p. 149; and Great Britain, Department of Overseas Trade, Economic Conditions in Syria - 1932, 1934 (London: H.M. Stationery Office).

10. Japan Trade Patterns, 1930-34 (Tokyo: 1952), *passim*.

11. "Mideast Oil Curb Jolted Japanese," New York Times, June 15, 1967, p. 15.

12. Masao Sakisaka, "Amount of Energies consumed in Japan increases," Japan Times, Oct. 16, 1966, p. 8.

II. OIL CRISIS AND AFTERMATH

After the October war of 1973, in the Middle East, Japan's relationship with the Arab world has altered radically. Until then, Japan had displayed an almost total indifference to political events in the region. It preferred to focus its politico-economic attentions on the Pacific and South-east Asia. Japan's rise from economic ruin in 1945, to become the third-largest trading country in the world, has been based upon industries such as chemicals, steel, and shipbuilding.¹

The oil crisis of 1973, and the Arab oil embargo against "non-friendly" states, forcibly demonstrated that it was no longer the Western oil companies from whom Japan had obtained oil supplies who determined the production, the marketing, and the pricing of oil, but oil-producing nations.

Consolidation of Relations

To protect the oil supplies, vital to her economic survival, Japan launched a diplomatic and economic offensive designed to close the "gaps in understanding" that had hitherto existed. Support for the Arab cause was reiterated and the PLO was invited to set up an office in Tokyo. The promise of large-scale industrial and technological co-operation was held out in return for guaranteed oil supplies.

In an International Symposium held in Tokyo on October 18, 1978, at

the Japan Press Centre, to discuss the "Maritime Resources in North-east Asia" and "Implications of the New Law of the Sea for Japan and Neighbours", the opinion was held is that the growth of the Japanese crude oil market is expected to be shared among present supply sources in the same proportion as it currently exists. The International Symposium on the Sea also concluded that "Japan would continue to rely primarily on oil from the Middle East."²

Concerning energy problems in Japan and Northeast Asia, it was concluded that no much change will take place in Japan's dependence on the Middle East for oil, regardless of efforts to diversify energy sources by Japan. Although uncertainty still surround the supply problems, the symposium believed that China and the Soviet Union could supply Japan with only 10% of her oil and natural gas needs. The view was expressed that "it would make more sense to stockpile oil rather than build a large navy." Many views were also expressed on the new ocean regime brought about by the establishment of 200-mile zones. There was skepticism over whether this regime was sufficiently stable and durable. It was believed that the 200-mile zones were bringing new principles to the fore, involving 200-mile exclusive economic zones and transit through international straits covered by these zones.³

Government policy has also changed with regard to industrial financing. Since 1973, huge sums have been invested, especially in petrochemical industries. A number of joint ventures were initiated in recent years with Arab companies and/or governments, principally in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. This new relationship began to produce dividends.

The Oil Business

At the time of the 1973 oil crisis, Japan depended on imports, predominantly of petroleum, for nine-tenths of its fuel requirements.

By 1973, oil supplied 67.5% of Japan's total energy consumption, rising to 70.3% in 1975. In contrast, Western Europe required oil for 56.0% of its total energy consumption, and the USA 43.9%. With a domestic production rate that satisfied only 0.2% of its oil needs in 1975, Japan has become the world's biggest single importer of crude oil. Over 78% of its imported crude and heavy fuel oils come from the Middle East.

However, Japan has attempted since then to reduce the share of oil in its primary energy supply, and therefore, succeeded in reducing local consumption of oil below the record level of the 1973-74 fiscal year.

Furthermore, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), expects that it will top that level in 1977-78, and to continue to rise until 1985. Despite the fact that Japan attempts to get oil supplies from elsewhere, the importance of the Middle East as a main source for Japan's energy supply increase and can not be ignored.

Crude oils accounted for 31% of all imports in 1976. Japan has been aiming at reducing the role played by the international oil companies. It controlled supply and maintained closer contacts with the oil-producing states governments. It also strengthened the Japanese exploration and development sector.

According to an estimate made by the Petroleum Association of Japan, in 1975, some 37% of crude oil imports were delivered outside the channels of the French, British, and American international companies. These included government-to-government deals and direct deliveries.

Ten Japanese companies are now producing oil or planning production. Three out of these operate in the Middle East. (See estimates chart).⁴

Estimates Chart

Estimates of Japanese Oil Consumption to 1985
(million barrels a day)

1975 (actual)	1980	1985
4.9	6.0	7.0
Japanese Imports of Crude Oils 1976		
	Kilolitres	% of total crude oil imports
Saudi Arabia	80.734.245	31.7
Iran	54.007.248	21.2
UAE	30.834.874	12.1
Kuwait	18.196.816	7.6
Other Middle East	16.565.699	7.0
		<u>79.6</u>

Investment and Loans

Direct investment is often a necessary condition for largescale plant exports. Possibilities for such investments are expected to increase in compliance with the industrialization of consumption goods sectors in the Middle East. Issues involving direct investment are of the same nature as plant export problems. Depending on the stages of industrialization, and its goals, and policies on foreign investment, different procedures are required to make direct investments in the Middle East. For example, certain countries may wish to invite more direct investments; others may accept imports rather than investments. When making an advance into the Arab world, oil-producing states deem

it necessary to be prepared to make international contributions from a long-range point of view. The role of private sectors is locked upon as being significant in the education of unskilled workers or the introduction of Euro-dollars into the non-oil-producing countries.

In previous years, Japanese governmental loans were extended to Egypt and Syria, which are non-oil-producing countries, but following the world oil crisis, loans have also been granted to oil-producing countries, with the Middle Eastern nations taking an increasing share. In contrast, private Japanese direct investments in the Middle East decreased between 1973 and 1974. The reason for this decrease were a slow-down of crude oil development projects and difficulties in inaugurating other large-scale projects.

However, signs of upward trends since the fiscal year of 1975 became apparent. The value of Japanese economic cooperation with the Middle East (including Government loans and private export credits) shot up 7.3-fold in 1974-75. The Japanese influx into the Middle East expanded trade relations. Arab countries imports played the key role. The ratio of investments to imports has fallen back remarkably.⁵

Because oil-producing states are seeking to diversify their multiplying assets, the Mideast Event stated that petrodollar power made its presence felt on the Japanese bond market in 1977. Although the Tokyo stock exchange was considered by financial experts as slow, in 1977, the volume of bond transactions went over \$400 billion. In the period of the 1st quarter of 1978, the petrodollar invasion of the Japanese bond market reached \$1 billion, the largest recorded in such a short period.⁶

Trade Partners

The sharp rise in oil prices since 1973, has allowed several Arab countries to launch ambitious development plans that involved large-scale industrial projects. This action stimulated a market for the Japanese industrial and technological products. For Japan, trade with the Arab countries, apart from guaranteeing oil supplies, has provided an alternative direction for exports at a time of world-wide recession.

Japan's share of the Arab world market has steadily increased in recent years at a rate matched only by West Germany, and has more than doubled since 1970. Although Japan's total exports in 1975, remained unchanged from 1974, its export to the Arab countries rose by 62% and continued to rise in 1976. It reached 11.58% of the grand total of Japan's international export.

Japan's need for oil was reflected by an increase in the value of

imports from the Middle East of more than 200% between 1973 and 1974. Imports from this area continued to rise by 8.5% in 1975, and a further 19% in 1976 despite a drop in total imports in 1975. Japan, however, has consistently suffered a large trading deficit with the Middle East, but its export "offensive" has met with considerable success and helped the economy through the recession of 1974-75.

While Japan's interest from the Arab world is in procuring her oil requirements, it is nonetheless, also interested in selling her industrialized products. Consequently, the results of such closer economic relations were advantageous and mutual for both sides.

Between 1973 and 1975, Japan's total exports to the Middle East, however, marked a formidable increase of 3.4-fold, amounting to \$6,500 million in 1975. Exports to nearly all the countries of the Middle East showed this rise in 1975, except Lebanon, and Bahrain. In the same year, Japan's exports to the Middle East comprised some 12% of her total exports. Thus, the region became the major export market next to the West European one.

In 1976, in contrast, Bahrain imported over 90% more than in the previous year, although exports to Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan fell. A conspicuous increase occurred in exports of steel products (pipes and bars), automobiles, and agricultural and construction machinery. In comparison, during the same period, U.S. exports to the Middle East reached \$9,900 million; from West Germany, \$8,400 million; and from French shipments, \$6,500 million.

Saudi Arabia displaced Iran as the biggest customer in 1976, followed by Kuwait and the UAE, despite the fact that relations with both Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi were "slightly soured by disputes about costs and difficulties in fulfilling contracts." However, in 1977, Japan became the top supplier to the UAE.

Iraq in 1976 dropped from third to fifth in terms of imports, and "in spite of some friction when Japan bought less oil than was originally agreed by a direct deal." Japan is still an important supplier of equipment and finance to Iraq.

Egypt displaced Algeria as the sixth biggest market in 1976. Its imports rose by 50%, and its exports by 438% to a value of over ¥20 million (20,108,000 yen).

The Gulf States are considered Japan's biggest markets. The goods which the Japanese attempt to sell in the markets of the Gulf States, are in the field of large plants and machinery needed to meet the industrial requirements of those countries. Durable consumer goods are

also a commodity in heavy demand. The Gulf States provide five out of the six biggest purchasers in 1975 and 1976. Although imports from the UAE dropped by 38% in 1976, exports rose dramatically by 664%.

By and large Japan's biggest customers are the oil-producing states who bought heavily in rush to develop and industrialize their economies with the money gushing in from oil revenues. Machinery and its equipment, iron and steel products, motor vehicles, and capital goods for chemical and heavy industries accounted for a very large proportion of the total. Oil wealth has also led to an increased demand for consumer goods and luxuries.

Although the Gulf States accounted for the lion's share of the Japanese export market in 1976, exports to Tunisia, though small in comparison, rose by over 100%. Exports to Morocco, especially of heavy plant and machinery, rose by 48% and to Syria by 45%. (See trading chart)⁷.

Japanese Trade with the Middle East
(1975-1976)

	Exports to		Imports from	
	(1975)	(1976)	(1975)	(1976)
Algeria	77,710.5	60,616.4	10,899.6	3,086.2
Bahrain	16,533.3	32,212.2	52,429.2	67,776.9
Cyprus	4,497.9	8,954.0	10.9	18.0
Egypt	63,325.2	97,675.6	3,732.9	20,108.4
Iran	549,724.4	506,056.6	1,476,079.5	1,320,494.2
Iraq	242,644.6	185,724.6	117,726.6	171,483.9
Israel	21,738.2	25,021.7	26,428.8	23,734.7
Jordan	20,038.7	25,103.9	3,487.1	2,017.1
Kuwait	109,054.9	213,052.3	596,877.9	598,208.0
Lebanon	24,775.9	860.7	527.9	99.3
Libya	70,908.3	96,766.1	83,476.8	60,926.9
Morocco	10,315.9	15,311.9	12,816.5	10,975.0
Oman	20,818.9	24,763.8	154,301.2	202,395.4
Qatar	26,357.5	67,803.5	8,197.3	9,000.0
Saudi Arabia	400,620.7	559,685.1	1,821,696.6	2,323,005.1
Sudan	28,468.9	18,737.2	4,693.9	14,502.5
Syria	32,144.5	46,658.3	1,000.4	1,908.2
Tunisia	1,801.6	4,638.8	119.1	578.6
Turkey	40,586.8	94,723.9	12,559.6	16,700.1
UAE	24,678.5	188,589.5	528,342.8	732,870.5
Yemen, (PDR)	6,282.2	11,338.5	2,281.2	8,136.0
Yemen, (AR)	14,212.3	25,688.5	586.2	1,090.8
ME Total	1,807,239.7	2,310,600.1	4,992,067.7	5,589,115.8
Sm equivalent	6,044.3	8,231.6	16,695.9	19,911.4

Japan has particularly concentrated its efforts on encouraging economic co-operation in the Gulf. Aspirations in the region to develop a shipping industry have proved useful to Japan's shipbuilding giants at a time when demand has been depressed and Japanese shipping companies have had many unemployable ships. The assertion of Arab oil producers that they wanted a share in the business of transporting their own crude oil coincided with the availability of surplus tonnage.

A number of deals and joint shipping ventures with major Japanese and European concerns were concluded. But in late 1976, this field seemed to have shrunk. A number of oil states have suffered economic difficulties as a result of the rapid expansion began since 1973, consequently, the shipping industry appeared to have a relatively low priority.⁸

In the field of trade, the Arab market is as has been discussed an important one for Japanese manufactured goods next to Asian market. This may be emphasized when knowing that Japanese exports to the Arab world did not exceed \$500 millions in 1970, while in 1977, it jumped to reach \$6,000,000,000 (6 milliards). In other words, this figure performed 40% of the total Japanese exports.⁹

Japan's Exports to the M.E. (\$ millions)			Japan's Imports from the M.E. (\$ millions)				
Country	1970	1974	1977	Country	1970	1974	1977
Iraq	15,940	473,540	872,159	Iraq	0,182	201,642	735,211
Bahrain	14,734	60,794	101,572	Bahrain	25,231	375,072	283,780
Saudi Arabia	83,797	676,954	2,342,255	Saudi Arabia	435,093	5,228,315	8,505,480
Kuwait	94,356	279,142	935,458	Kuwait	308,304	2,131,949	2,487,553
Qatar	36,951	46,627	275,225	Qatar	117,472	22,131	197,274
Syria	16,122	70,060	152,515	Syria	16,738	1,938	6,156
UAE	N.A.	16,186	845,889	UAE	N.A.	552,474	2,748,153
Egypt	12,357	73,959	47,379	Egypt	47,339	168,655	78,684

Source: An-Nahar, Paris Sep. 16, 1978

Footnotes (II)

1. The Middle East Yearbook, 1978 (cited here under, as MEYB, '78), pp. 56-7
2. Tokyo Petroleum News, Oct. 10, 1978.
3. Ibid.
4. MEYB, '78, pp. 56-7
5. The "ratio of investments of imports is the annual value of direct investment as divided by the annual volume of imports.
6. Mideast Event, London, June 30, 1978.
7. MEYB, op. cit.
8. Ibid.
9. Mideast Events, London, 30 June, 1978.

III. JAPAN-ARAB POLITICAL RELATIONS

Politics: Japanese Style

With regard to its political relations with the Arabs, Japan, in 1939, sent her first diplomatic mission to Iraq who arrived in Baghdad with the task of promotion of commerce between the two nations.

The course followed by Japan in her foreign policy since its start and afterwards was distinguished by its strong economic orientation. Japanese diplomacy was concerned with the problems of maintaining peace and security and of resolving political differences that occasionally have marred relations with her neighbouring and other states, particularly the United States. Her diplomats also have endeavoured to cultivate friendly relations based on equality and reciprocity with practically every nation in the world. This helped them re-establish a position of leadership for their country in world political and economic affairs.

Nevertheless, in pronounced contrast with its prewar objectives, Japan's postwar diplomacy generally has concentrated on economic rather than on political or military matters. The promotion of trade has been regarded as important means for facilitating the country's economic growth. This has been a major concern for the Japanese Government.

Japanese leaders have continually stressed the necessity of "safeguarding overseas trade." They, therefore, have pursued a "business first" policy. Accordingly, Japan's stand on many international issues was determined largely on the basis of their actual and potential effect on her economy and foreign trade.

Japan's initial decision to assume a share of the burden of international aid, for example, was motivated particularly by her desire to improve her trading position with the developing nations of the world. Furthermore, political commitments that might have imperilled her foothold in foreign markets have been carefully avoided whenever and wherever possible.¹

Government official's preoccupation with the promotion and stabilization of overseas trade has characterised Japan's relations with the Middle East ever since she regained her political independence in 1952. Almost all Japanese official delegations were dispatched to the Arab world have concentrated on the negotiation of trade agreements or of tariff reductions that would provide Japan with "most-favoured nation" status for her export trade on the sale of capital goods and technical services.

Japanese officials were also concerned on the resolution of commercial difficulties arising out of Japan's failure to balance her trade with other certain states in the region. The relatively new visits that have been made by important Japanese government leaders to the Middle East² also have been undertaken primarily to advance Japan's commercial interests in the region. Furthermore, the Japanese decisions to establish or to reopen diplomatic relations with most Arab States have been based on economic considerations.³

In July 1956, for instance, the Government was prompted to appoint Ishiguro Shiro, the then assistant to the Foreign Vice-Minister, as Minister to Baghdad because Iraq was then developing into one of Japan's largest West Asian markets. Likewise Japan's decisions to establish a diplomatic office in Riyadh (1959), to raise its consulate general in Jeddah to ambassadorial rank (1960), and to accord Kuwait diplomatic recognition (1961), all came in the wake of increasing Japanese activity in the Gulf area emanating from the operations of the Arabian Oil Company in particular.⁴

In addition, the Japanese Foreign Ministry frequently has adopted new Middle Eastern policies to stimulate exports to this region.⁵ Most of the conferences of diplomatic envoys stationed in the Middle East that it has periodically convened have focused their attention on economic

matters. Such matters like the rectification of trade imbalances, promotion of sale of capital goods, extension of technical and economic aid, ways of meeting competition from western industrial nations, and the influence of Arab nationalism on development within the region's oil industry.⁶

The desire to avoid involvement in sensitive political Middle Eastern issues and their reluctance to make commitments that could alienate one or more groups have been only one means by which the Japanese have sought to cultivate friendly relations with the governments of the region and to reinforce their favourable economic standing. In a more positive fashion Japanese also were able to project a good image of themselves throughout the region.

During the immediate postwar period, they were not faced with the necessity of playing down a militaristic or an imperialistic image in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the Japanese Government did expand the scope of its programme of inviting large numbers of officials and business leaders to tour Japan.

Numerous programmes of cultural exchange have also been carried out. Egyptian and Iraqi archaeological treasures toured Japan as well as displays of modern Japanese art also have been sent to Middle Eastern cities.⁷ Japanese groups have undertaken extensive archaeological work in Iraq. Simultaneously, both the Foreign Ministry and the newspaper Asahi Shimbun reportedly made donations to the UNESCO campaign to preserve the temple of Abu Simbel. This cooperation was followed by the conclusion of a cultural agreements between Egypt and the Japanese Government.⁸

Japan and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been the only other major political issue in recent Middle Eastern history in which Japan has become involved. For reasons mentioned above, Japan has not become as deeply embroiled in it as have other leading nations in the West. Nevertheless, Japan's commerce with the region has been constantly affected by the Arab boycott of Israel.

Moreover, as Japan has been the only major Asian nation up to now that has accorded the Jewish state full diplomatic recognition while simultaneously maintaining embassies throughout the Arab world, she has had to devise suitable means for retain amicable relations with both sides and for reconciling their conflicting pressures and demands.

Furthermore, just as the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the single

most important political issue to affect postwar Western relations with the Middle East, it also has remained potentially the most disruptive political element in Japan's ties with much of that area.

Before 1973, Japan did not develop a great political interest in the Middle East as have the United States and Great Britain. Unlike the United States, Japan was not pulled into Middle Eastern affairs as a result of the Cold War, and unlike Great Britain she did not have any long-term colonial, treaty obligations, or defense commitments, that linked her with the region.

Nevertheless, her ties with most of the countries of the Middle East continued to expand rapidly. As a result, Japan has come to have a significant stake in maintaining political stability within the region. For Japan, first of all, stability in the Middle East became an important issue because it means more economic development and greater commercial opportunities.

In September, 1978, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda made a official visit to four Middle East countries. During his visit to Middle Eastern countries, Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan reviewed bilateral problems with Arab officials.

In his meeting with leaders of the region, in September, Mr. Fukuda agreed on efforts to further develop bilateral relations in the fields of technical and economic cooperation and cultural exchange.

This visit was the first trip made by a Japanese Prime Minister exclusively to the Middle East area. Therefore, it was considered vitally important as an indicator of future relations.

Prime Minister Fukuda explained Japan's basic position on the Middle East problem and expressed his hope for the early realization of a fair and lasting peace solution in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab areas occupied in the 1967 war and the recognition of the rights of Palestinians in accordance with the United Nations Charter.⁹

In a press conference held after his meetings with the Iranian leaders, the Japanese Prime Minister added that the Indian Ocean and Gulf areas "are very important for the maintenance of Japan's lifeline, as well as world peace, as they contain an oil-rich region and a main oil supply route to industrial countries, including Japan."¹⁰ The visit was considered to have consolidated friendship between the two nations and clarified the direction for future relations.

Daily Yomiuri, Sept. 14, 1978, mentioned that "Japan and Saudi Arabia called Tuesday for Israeli withdrawal from Arab lands occupied in

1967, as a prerequisite for Middle East and world peace." The call came in a joint communique issued at the end of Prime Minister Fukuda's talks with Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz.

Saudi Arabia was the last stop in Fukuda's four nation tour of oil producing countries, searching for more sources of oil and outlets for Japanese goods and expertise.¹¹

The communique said stepping up efforts for a just peace in the Middle East is essential for world peace. "To achieve this, it is inevitable that Israel withdraws from lands occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, and recognizes the rights of Palestinians in self-determination."

Commenting on this matter, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shintaro Abe in a press conference said that there had been no change in Japan's Mideast policy. He added that the communique said Fukuda and Saudi leaders had agreed on the need for Israel to withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in 1967.

Abe told newsmen that the Japanese Government had persistently supported the UN Security Council Resolution No.242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories.¹²

Furthermore, at the conclusion of Premier Fukuda's visit to the UAE, the joint UAE-Japan's press release, "reaffirmed the Japanese Government's position and stressed the necessity to achieve a just durable peace in the Middle East." The Release called for the implementation of the Security Councils' Resolution 242 "including the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 War, and to recognize and respect the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to self determination in accordance with the United Nations Charter." Accordingly, Sheikh Zayed, President of the UAE expressed his appreciation for the position of the Japanese Government on the Middle East question.¹³

Japan's Interests in Middle East Peace

The one field in which Japan was not able to satisfy is the Arab need of armaments. Expenditure on arms is considered one of a big allocations in government budgets in the region. Because of its constitution, Japan, since 1945, could not possess a big arms industry. It kept its production to a bare minimum to equip its limited military forces.

On Sep. 22, 1978, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shintaro Abe issued a statement saying that the Japanese Government welcomed the accord reached at Camp David between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin. Prime Minister Fukuda also welcomed the new development

in his administrative policy speech to the Diet. These statements revealed the Japanese Government's intention to help promote peace in the Middle East.

However, the Foreign Ministry was very cautious about the prospect of peace in the Middle East. One Foreign Ministry official commented on the prospect of peace saying:

- 1) Only the framework of peace was made at Camp David, and the contents of the framework depend on talks to be held in the future.
- 2) Nothing was mentioned in the accord about the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Accordingly, a violent reaction from the Arab radicals, the Soviet Union, and East European countries, which support them is expected, and a split in the Arab camp is unavoidable.
- 3) The success of peace-making efforts will depend on how far the United States will be able to persuade Israel to accept a compromise, and whether mediation involving the Arab moderates will succeed on the basis of Israel's compromise.¹⁴

Prime Minister Fukuda on his trip to the United States "was asked by President Carter to assist the Arab moderates in order to bring about peace in the Middle East."

Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, on his visit to Tokyo, expressed concern about the prospect of peace in the Middle East during talks on Sep. 20, 1978, with Foreign Minister Sonoda. Sonoda replied that (1) the countries concerned entered a conditional struggle because a framework of peace had been worked out; (2) both Israel and the Arab moderates were voicing hawkish views in order to make the terms of peace profitable to themselves, and (3) all the countries concerned, however, have difficult domestic problems, so they will have to conclude a peace treaty eventually.¹⁵

The foreign minister of Japan, whose national policy necessitates cooperation with the United States could not take a cold attitude toward the Camp David accord brought about through United States mediation.

Mr. Hirano, commentator at Japan Times, stated that, "the first thing Japan will be asked to do will be to extend economic aid to Egypt. Egypt has external liabilities totaling \$12 billion and its domestic economy is said to be in a critical condition. Japan so far has extended economic aid totaling ¥101,580 million to that country. Prime Minister Fukuda originally placed Egypt on the itinerary of his recent Mideast tour and reportedly planned to pledge a yen credit of ¥30 billion to ¥35 billion, but his visit to Egypt was canceled. However, there is a strong probability that the pledge will be honoured when the

opportunity arrives."¹⁶

Japanese officials, however, whose government has also diplomatic relations also with the Arab radicals, does not want to alienate those radical states "by siding with the Sadat administration only." It is believed, therefore, that Japan plans to extend credit to Egypt as part of its plan to treble its aid to developing countries, as promised by Fukuda at the Bonn summit. This cautious attitude may be seen as a reflection of Japan's universal diplomacy. And this is considered, however, Japanese indirect contribution to Mideast peace.

FOOTNOTES (III)

1. Mr. Saburo Okita, Executive Director of the Japan Economic Research Centre and a special assistant to the Economic Planning Agency, wrote that "Japan has been following a policy of "economic interest first." On many international economic issues, Japan took a positive attitude by examining such issues effects on Japan's economy and the protection of Japanese immediate national interests. This attitude has been effective in achieving rapid recovery and expansion of domestic economy. While Japan's economy was weak and struggling to recover from the effects of the war, such an attitude was more or less accepted by foreign nations." (Saburo Okita, "Japan and the Developing Nations," CJ, XXVIII, June 2, 1965, p.229.)

In his discussion of Japanese aid activities, John White commented that "Japan's policy in Asia is in practice ... confined to the pursuit of trade, buttressed where necessary by aid, and its principal characteristic is its avoidance of anything that might give offence." He further pointed out that the Japanese Government conscientiously avoided taking sides in the recent dispute among Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines over North Borneo because of its fear of reviving anti-Japanese feeling among them and of endangering one or more of its export markets; see J. White, Japanese Aid, pp.10-17.

2. As in the cases of Okazaki Katsuo, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Ohira Masayoshi, and Kawashima Shojiro.

3. It is interesting to note that while Japan was fairly quick to station diplomatic representatives in almost every independent Middle Eastern country during the 1950's a number of Middle Eastern Governments delayed in opening regular missions in Tokyo and in assigning permanent representatives to Japan.

4. Until that time, only a charge d'affaires had been stationed in Saudi Arabia. The Government revealed its plans to establish a diplomatic office in Riyadh on January 7, 1959, not long after Arabian Oil Company sunk its first well; see Japan Times, July 7, 1956, p.3.

5. The dispatch of commercial attaches after 1957 and the establishment of an economic and technical cooperation bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimusho) are two examples of this.

6. See, for instance, various article published in the DSJP including those appearing on February 2, 1960, (p.11); December 12, 1962, (p.6); January 23, 1963 (p.10); and February 29, 1964 (p.11); MEC, March 1960, p.5; and the Japan Times, January 7-11, 1966 and January 25, 1967.

7. Three different exhibits of Egyptian antiquities have been held in Tokyo and an Iraqi "roving antiquities show" was shown in spring of 1967. (CJ, XXV, 3 (September 1958), p.516; Japan Quarterly, X, 2 (April-June 1963), p.274, and XII, 4 (October-December 1965), p.550; Japan Times, August 6, 1966, p.4; and Baghdad News, December 14, 1966, p.3); see also Japan Times, July 14, 1956, p.8.

8. Prince Mikasa, a brother of Emperor Hirohito, participated for a few days (in October 1956) in the excavations at Tel Ath-Thalathat in Iraq, that were sponsored by the Oriental Culture Research Institute at Tokyo University. (Ariga Tetsutaro and Kato Ichiro, "The Ancient Near East," in Comite Japonais des Sciences Historiques (ed.), Le Japon au XI^e Congres International Des Sciences Historiques a Stockholm: L'Etat Actuel et les Tendances des Etudes Historiques au Japon (Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shin-kokai, 1960), pp.395-98; Japan Times, September 8, 1956, p.3, and September 18, 1956, p.1. For information on Japanese archaeological activities in Israel, see "Japanese Complete Third Dig at Tel Zeror," Jerusalem P'st, August 24, 1966, p.8; "Japanese Archaeologists Complete Excavation," Japan Times, August 25, 1966, p.10; "Tokyo University Archaeologists Uncover Bronze Age City," Japan Times, September 8, 1966, p.2; and Israel, Central Office of Information, Israel Government Year Book - 1962 (Israel: Government Printer, 1962), p.243.)

9. Japan Times, Oct. 26, 1978

10. The Iranian-Japanese joint communique stated that the two premiers agreed to promote bilateral trade, including the export of semi-finished Iranian goods to Japan and the participation of Japan in various economic projects in Iran. In the cultural field, agreement was reached on the organisation of events to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the establishment of official relations between the two countries. Fukuda expressed his understanding of the Iranian viewpoint that the Gulf area should not be subject to foreign intervention.

11. Premier Fukuda also visited Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Iran.

12. Daily Yomiuri, Sep. 14, 1978.

13. WAM, Newsreel, Sep., 1978.

14. Minoru Hirano, "Japan's Mideast Peace Role", Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), Sep. 24, 1978.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid

IV: DIPLOMACY OF RESOURCES

Professor Shinji Maejima, in his article, "Middle Eastern Culture: A Heritage for Japanese," stated that "the debt the Japanese people owe to the civilization of the Middle East is very old, dating back many

centuries."¹ He pointed out that the Japanese still only know a tiny fraction of what actually happened in both ancient and recent history of cultural interchange between the Arabs and Japan.

From what has been mentioned, one may rationalise that autumn of 1973 marked the Arabs 3rd awakening to a new dawn in their history. This third awakening does not cast them as conquerers Saracens professing a new faith, but as responsible partners in economic development at home and abroad.

World's interest in the Arab World has been intense since the oil crisis stunned the industrialized nations into recognition of the new realities of the 1970's and the potential structural changes that they entailed.

As such the Arab Nation has vital economic importance for Japan, because as has been noticed that many Arab states are among the major oil suppliers to this country which relies on the supply from the Middle East for 80% of its total consumption needs. Knowing that oil accounts for 75% of Japan's total energy consumption, one can easily conclude the importance of the Arab world to Japan. Whereas oil producing Arab States are stepping up their international economic development on the strength of their abundant oil revenues, they do need, in return, Japan's technological assistance.

Since it is the biggest object for a Japanese to seek a way for ensuring stable supply of oil for Japan's advanced industry, it may be said that both Arab and Japanese interests are to work for the promotion of their mutual "resources diplomacy" in transferring Japanese economy, technology, and its know-how for Arab oil and petro-dollars; and above all, the promotion of cultural exchanges.

A positive stand taken in the direction towards the cementation of Japan-Arab relation was the visit made by Premier Fukuda on the 5th of September, 1978. This visit was termed as "significant". Some of the Premier's aides quoted him as saying, "Japan wants closer ties with the Mideast."² He was also quoted in saying that the Arabian Gulf is a "vital line for Japan."³

Some of the fruits of this visit was the fostering of such relations which will lead to eventual promotion of economic, technological, and cultural cooperation between our two nations.

Within the political arena, Arab Japanese relation developed tremendously. During the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, when oil was used as weapon, the United Arab Emirates swiftly took action to enlist Japan on the list of friendly countries. This action left its thumbprints on the

future diplomacy of Japan-Arab relation. Thereby, Japan stood in the UN circles supporting the justice and peace the Arabs wanted.

One can also state with delight the most recent development of the establishment of two National Committees for Research on Arab Japanese Relations in Japan composed of scholars and academicians, economists and businessmen, previous diplomats and politicians, and specialists on Middle Eastern Affairs. The same was established in Cairo under the sponsorship of the League of Arab States. And this is a very positive step towards this direction.

Nonetheless, whereas Japan lived for a while in isolation, Arabs learned a little about Japan and through a third party. The image the Arabs were given of Japan, which still exists in some parts of the Arab world, is one of geisha girls, cheap transistors, and Mount Fuji.

Surely, on the other side, the same hypothesis is applied. Most Japanese businessmen admit the lack of knowledge of the Arab world. The view of many Japanese of Arabs is one of camels, desserts, The Arabian Nights Harem, and oil rigs. It is, therefore, both nations need a cultural understanding to cope with their strong economic ties.

FOOTNOTES (IV)

1. Quoted in, *Dialogue: Middle East and Japan*, Tokyo, The Japan Foundation, 1978.
2. *Mainichi Daily*, Sep. 3, 1978.
3. *Daily Yomiuri*, Sep. 9, 1978.


JAPAN'S DISCOVERY OF ARAB WORLD -Basis of Mutual Cognizance and its Future-

Yuzo Hagaki

Japan and the Arab World were separated afar off, and the both peoples had never seen each other through untold ages. The both, however, were connected with each other by unseen and intangible linkage. On the architectural mode of the Buddhist temples and on the archaic Buddhist iconography in the 6th Century Japan, we can very clearly find the influence of the Hellenistic civilization, which was introduced through and across Central Asia, China and Korea. Thus, the Hōryūji Temple in Nara, for example, proves itself linked even with al-Iskandariya of Egypt. By the 9th Century, the Arab traders had stretched their commercial activities so far to Chinese port cities, such as Chuan-chou. The city was called, in Arabic, Janfū by Ibn Khurdādhbeh of the 9th Century in his "Kitāb al-masālik wa-l-mamālik", and also called Zaytūn by Ibn Mājid of the 15th Century. This city, which Ibn Battūta visited by himself, had a flourishing Arab colony. Among the residents of the city, active and ambitious merchants from the Arab East could be found. China accepted many Japanese visitors as well, successively for centuries. They were students, Buddhist priests, merchants, and even armed pirates. It is not a baseless guess that those Japanese visitors to China did hear about the Arab traders, and vice versa, even if they might not meet each other personally.

The Arab World and Japan were, moreover, correlated by a coincidence of fate. Japanese 'bushi-dan', cavalier-typed feudal lords, succeeded in driving back the Mongol invasions to the Kyūshū Island in 1274, and once again in 1281, while, in 1260, fourteen years earlier than the Japanese first success, the Mamālik army led by az-Zāhir Ruknuddīn Baybars al-Bunduqdārī defeated Mongols at Ayn Jālūt in Syria.

Nevertheless, it is quite reasonable that either Japan or the Arab World could not perceive the mutual relationship, because they were so distantly separated and their ties were so indirect and vague. A more clear-cut answer for the reasons could be provided by the explanation as the following. Suppose, there is a diagram consisting of three circles triangularly overlapped. The three circles are to represent the Eurasian sphere, the Mediterranean sphere and the sphere of Indian Ocean respectively. The diagram displays the basic structure of the world communication system before the modern age. Each sphere may be understood as a



Difference of Historical Status between Japan and the Arab World densely and tightly organized area inside which man, commodity and information can very easily flow and circulate. As will be seen upon a moment's reflection, the Arab World is to be located in the threefold overlapped zone on the diagram. Where should Japan be? Japan is to be set on the outer point of intersection of both the Eurasian and the Indian Ocean circles. The Arab World was at the centre, and Japan at the peripheral verge. Therefore, we should pay attention not only to the geographical distance, but also to a definite gap in the historical status. This gap inevitably reflected on the Japanese image of world, which was distinctly narrower than what Arab travellers and geographers described. Concerning the latter, it may be sufficient to mention only the cases of al-Istakhrī, Ibn Hawqal, al-Muqaddasī and so on in the 10th Century. Contrary to the broader aspect of the Arabs, the traditional world-view in Japan was to be characterized by a Japanese term, 'Kara-Tenjiku'. Kara is an old word to mean China, and Tenjiku likely to mean India. In brief, the principal constituents of the outside world for the Japanese were no more than China and India. It depends on Japan's location as shown on the above-mentioned diagram. No objection can possibly be raised to an idea that Buddhism and Confucianism have sustained the ideological setup and the emotional motivations for the Japanese traditional minds. Those two must be the backbone of 'ashshakhsīya al-yābāniya'. Buddhism came from India, and Confucianism from China. The Japanese traditional image of world took shape with the orientation and aspiration for the cultural hinterlands.

Such an image was embraced by the Japanese people till 1853, when the American fleet suddenly came to the Bay of Tokyo to force Japan to open the doors with the menace of bombardment. Although some shrewd intellectuals had already given warnings against the danger of Western aggression, it took place so abruptly. Japanese people called the American fleet 'Kuro-fune'. This expression, literally 'black ship', implies their frightfulness and surprise to the Western civilization. 'Kuro-fune'

was strikingly similar to the Egyptian experience to face Napoleon Bonaparte's troops half a century before. The Japanese traditional image was challenged, and the conception of 'Seiyo', that is the Occident, emerged to the fore. After the Meiji Revolution of 1868, 'Seiyo' became a target for the Japanese. Japan launched an untiring endeavour to follow up the Western development and to adapt herself to it. It is important for us now to notice that 'Kara-Tenjiku' plus 'Seiyo' were still lacking any keen interest whatever to the Arab World.

However, it is not correct to say that Japan never had even a chance to recognize the Arab World before the modern age. There was a very fair possibility once at least, even though it could not be achieved at last. Through the 15th and the 16th Centuries, the atmosphere of Japanese society was, politically, economically, and culturally, very dynamic and productive. The then situation was revolutionarized and unstable in the course of power centralization over the rivalry of the predominant feudal lords and over the rampancy of large-scaled peasants rebellions. What are now well-known as beauties of Japan originated in this era, e.g. 'Sadō' (Tea ceremony), 'Ikebana' (Flower arrangement), such theatrical arts as 'Nō', 'Kyōgen', 'Kabuki', and 'Ningyō Jōruri', etc. In this era, many Japanese as merchants, sailors, mercenaries and pirates went abroad, mainly to the South-east Asia. And there, they must have caught a glimpse of the last decades of prosperity of the 'kārīmī' business in Cairo. It was in the latter half of the 16th Century that priests from Spain and Portugal came to Japan, introducing Catholicism of Christianity together with things from the ex-Arab part of the world. The people and the things from al-Andalus were called 'Nanban'. 'Nanban' means barbarians of the south. The concept itself should be attributed to the ancient Chinese categorization of foreigners. But, in the 16th Century Japan, its meaning was neutralized, and rather in fact, everything 'Nanban'-styled was highly estimated and respected. If the Japanese were able to search for and study about the roots of the 'Nanban' culture any more, they might have directly met the Arab-Islamic civilization.

There is a Japanese word 'juban' which indicates a long garment, open in front, with wide sleeves. This 'juban' came, with no doubt, from an Arabic word 'jubba'. A Hadith tells the Prophet took a woolen 'jubba shāmiya' in his expedition. The word reached the Japanese language through the medium of Portuguese in the 16th Century. 'Donsu', that is damask, and 'merinsu', that is muslin or Mawsilī, are the same cases in borrowing of Arabic words through the 'Nanban' languages. We

can still find a playing set of 'tawla' as one of remainings of Arab-Nanban culture in the Matsura Museum at Hirado, the western edge of Kyūshū, which was the first important port in the trade with Portuguese marchants.

The inception of such a happy encounter was banned violently, when the Tokugawa Shōgunate proclaimed and executed the policy to close the doors against foreigners except the Dutchmen who were permitted to visit the Nagasaki port. The proclamation of 'Sakoku' (the close-down of the country) was in 1639, the next year of the blood-stained suppression of Japanese Christians' revolt in Amakusa Peninsula of Kyūshū. Japan became isolated since, and eliminated for herself the possibility to enjoy the expected contact with the Arab-Islamic civilization. Arai Hakuseki, the most influential administrator in the beginning of the 18th Century and, at the same time, one of the most brilliant intellectuals of Japan historically, wrote a book titled "Seiyō Kimon" (Hearings about 'Seiyō'), basing upon the knowledges and informations procured by the interrogation of a captured Italian priest Giovanni Battista Sidotti who tried to smuggle himself into Japan in 1708. On a page of "Seiyō Kimon", Arai Hakuseki gave an imaginary illustration of pyramids in Giza, which seemed to be wooden towers of elevated trapezoid. Beside the tower-pyramids, there can be seen some pine-trees similar to those in the 'Ukiyoe' of 'Tōkaidō' Road. This illustration symbolizes Japanese ignorance about Egypt and the Arab World under the isolation on the international scene.

Thus, Japanese approach to the Arab World in the modern age was no other than a discovery. In the immense flood of modern Japanese studies on the West, we find some rare, but amply significant approaches to the Arab World. Japanese views and attitudes onto the Arab society in the modern world are, in this sense, the fascinating topics. I would like to adduce three notable examples among Japanese writings on modern Egypt.

Firstly, I should mention Shibusawa Eiichi's "Kōsei-jikki" (Diary of Voyage Westward) of 1871. Shibusawa was a leading figure of Japanese entrepreneurs in the stage of emerging capitalism. He participated to a delegation of Tokugawa Shōgunate for European countries in 1867, just one year before the Meiji Revolution. What he saw in Suez on his way to Europe was, first of all, the Suez Canal under construction. He was deeply impressed by the large-scaled enterprise operating in front of his eyes. He says, "The Europeans' purpose in the enterprise struck us most forcibly." Thus, a young xenophobe exclusionist changed his mind. What was impressed on him was not Egypt or the Egyptians, but the West-

ern Capitalism. The Egyptian labourers who worked in the construction site were absolutely out of his sight. He mentions that "the Egyptian society is still preserving the polygamy, a sign of its backwardness." And it is well-known that Shibusawa himself, later on, came to keep a number of concubines. A viewpoint of westernization preoccupied Shibusawa's observation in anyway.

Secondly comes Tokai Sanshi's "Egiputo Kinseishi" (Modern History of Egypt), 1888. Tokai Sanshi is a pen-name of Shiba Shirō. He joined, as a secretary, with the delegation to Europe and America, led by Tani Tateki, the then Minister for Agriculture and Commerce. On the way to Europe, they came naturally to Cairo and found the situation just after the British occupation. They changed their schedule, and went back to Ceylon to see Ahmad Orābī, a political exile over there. After talking with him about the causes of the Egyptians' setback, they came back again to Cairo to re-examine the result. Japan, in that period, faced the task to revise the unequal treaties with the Western Powers, and, moreover, had to confront with their repeated manipulations to introduce the Mixed Court system into Japan. This was the real background of Tani Mission's keenness to the Egyptian situation. Returning to Japan, Tōkaisanshi published the book on the contemporary history of Egypt, covering the period from the emergence of Muhammad Alī's state to the Orābī Movement. On the preface, the auther writes in an articulate expression, that the aim of the book was to warn the popular readers by the fair observation and judgement of the modern Egyptian experiences, and to urge them to stand firmly on guard against the Western pressure.

Thirdly, I take the Japanese translation of Lord Cromer's "Modern Egypt". The translation, "Saikin-no Egiputo", 2 vols., 1911, was sponsored by the Greater Japan Civilization Association which was headed by Ōkuma Shigenobu, an able politician, one of parliamentary leaders, and the founder of Waseda University. Ōkuma, giving a publishers' note, said that, if the Japanese people would study the Cromer's work, Japanese rule over Korea could be handled more skilfully. Japan annexed Korea as a colony in 1910, one year before the publication of the book. Here, Japanese interest to Egypt was concentrated to the point how cleverly the British managed the matters in Egypt, in a special reference to Japanese policies towards the Koreans.

By analysing these three examples, we can throw light not only on the Japanese changing attitudes to the modern Arab World, but also on the specific course and its characteristics in the modern development of Japan.

When Japan had to face the Western impact by the incident of the Kurofune's coming in 1853, Napoleon Bonaparte's coming to Egypt and Syria was not referred by the Japanese people. Japan participated to the San Remo Conference of 1920 in cooperation with other Powers to establish British mandatory system in Palestine. Japan is, however, insisting her guiltlessness and cleanliness over the Palestine Question. It is rather because of forgetfulness than tactics. In the early 1930's, the overwhelming advance of Japanese cultured pearl in the world market inflicted serious damages on the traditional pearl fishery in the Arabian Gulf area. Almost of Japanese people are neglecting the fact in spite of their deep concern for getting the petroleum from the area. In a sharp contrast to those Japanese attitudes, the Arab people are still fostering their interests to Japanese mind and civilization, which were caused by the observations of the Russo-Japanese War, the attack to the Pearl Harbor, the first experience of Atomic Bombs and the rapid economic growth in 1960's.

If we try to make comparison between Japan and the Arab World on some specifically designed scales in the social accumulation amount of knowledge of each other and in the degree of interestedness to each other, we may come to an interim conclusion that the Arabs are more or less superior to the Japanese for the moment. Very objectively speaking, it seems to be difficult to arrive at other conclusions.

The process of development in mutual understandings between nations is being traced from 'they' consciousness to 'you' consciousness and up to 'we' consciousness. The Arab people are having daily contacts with various and numerous commodities from Japan, and sometimes observing Japanese personal behaviors, and lately, accepting Japanese communities of fair size with even schools for Japanese children. Therefore, the attitude of Arab common people towards Japan is passing from a 'they' consciousness stage into a 'you' stage, although Japan's side as a whole seems still to remain in a 'they' stage.

It is obligatory for the Japanese people to take their own positive initiatives to change the situation. We should overcome such an unbalanced condition as quickly as possible to materialize the consciousness of 'we' relationship. Through this Symposium organized upon the scholarly and scientific basis, the participants in such a trans-national formation are making great strides for the destination to attain the 'we' solidarity.

The Arab World has taken good efforts to build up such frameworks of activity as Euro-Arab Dialogue and Arab-African Cooperation to ac-

celerate mutual cooperations with the outside world. And I am convinced that the Arab World is seeking for the third framework in the form of Arab-Japanese relations. So far as the framework of Euro-Arab Dialogue is concerned, I have an impression of Arab mentality that there seems to be a sense of divergence against the partner. Diagonally opposite to it, the Arab people take Japan as an equivalent and homogeneous partner with them. The oriental character of the Japanese society is always emphasized by the Arab people. However, Japanese visitors to the Arab World are usually impressed with its exotic atmosphere. The Arab World is observed by the Japanese people in the context of heterogeneity.

Consequently, the Arab approach to Japan and Japan's response to it must be very important topics for us. From time to time, Japan tried to keep herself aloof from the Arab World in the international affairs. But, Japan's economic commitment with the Arab World and the interdependent condition between them have been inevitably developed. What the Arabs are urgently demanding of the Japanese must be a civilizational cooperation with direct human contact. Therefore, Japan's response should not be to limit her efforts to the fringe of economic cooperation. We need political understanding as a tangible expression of cultural exchange, and political commitment as an articulate expression of human encounter. According to my research on the possibilities and conditions of anti-Japanese feeling in the Arab World, the key problem is situated on a marked discrepancy in the images of relationship between each other. If Japan behaves to injure the Arab sense of homogeneity and equivalence with Japan, it causes very much severe repercussions in Arab attitudes.

I would raise three points for our discussion as the last part of my presentation. Japanese researchers of Arab Studies should make the following three points very clear to the Japanese public.

- i) Multiple and dynamic structure of Arab identity -- How a 'national' identity is acquired as an option, and how plural 'national' identities are combined at the same time, through the process of identity crisis, either on the personal level or on any group level.
- ii) Political implications of Islam -- Progressive programmes and national unity can be endorsed by the Islamic conceptions.
- iii) Individualistic rationalism endogenous to the Arab society and its future possibility -- the points about which most of Japanese people are fatally misunderstanding, and by which the Japanese image of Arab civilization and of its contribution for the future mankind will be drastically changed.

ARABIC STUDIES IN JAPAN

Rauf Abbas Hamid

This essay is an attempt to observe and state, not to analyse or to express the author's preference and value judgements. I say this at the outset in order to justify my lack of knowledge of the language that handicapped any possibility to go through the works written by Japanese scholars on the Arab World. Nevertheless, this essay is based on my experience with Japan and Japanese Arabic studies circles, with whom I could establish strong ties over seven years. The essay deals with the academic Arabic studies in Japan generally concerned with the Arab World; its history, culture, religion, language and literature, socio-economic and political conditions.

* * *

Japan's knowledge of the Arab World is as recent as the beginning of the second decade of this century for certain historical circumstances. Since the seclusion of Japan under Tokugawa Shogunate (1603 - 1867), sources of information about alien countries were limited to what the Japanese could gather from the Dutch in their man-made island and trading center of Dejima facing Nagasaki. Through that back-side window Japan started to collect her knowledge of Western science. The school of Dutch Learning (*rangaku*) came into existence after 1720 when the Bakufu relaxed its ban against Western books and permitted works not containing Christian ideas to enter the country. This led a small circle of scholars to begin studying Dutch in order to become acquainted with Western science, and these men started to pursue such subjects as astronomy, physics, electricity, plant studies, cartography, geography and medicine.

Through that back-side window Japan obtained her first scattered informations about the Arab Countries; their peoples, culture and history based on what the Japanese scholars heard from Western traders and missionary. The first work of the kind was written by Arai Hakuseki in the first decade of the eighteenth century titled *Seiyo Kibun* (What I heard about the West). In his work Arai introduced the first informations about the Arab countries and Egypt which he could gather through a certain Italian missionary named Sidocci.

The mid-nineteenth century witnessed the collapse of Japan's policy of isolation and seclusion as a result of external pressures exerted by foreign states, and the revolutionary social pressures within Japan her-

self. To put the matter another way, when in 1854 the Japanese signed a treaty with the United States, they were not reacting solely to the American naval power, they were reacting also to the fundamental needs of their own society. Hence, the seclusion was ended and replaced by a broad policy of intercourse with the West. As a result, the Shogunate and the system of feudalism were replaced by a centralised administration carried on in the name of the emperor MEIJI (1868 - 1912), which launched the modernization process of education, army, etc.

Despite the intercourse with the West and strengthening trade and cultural relations, Japanese policy was occupied with the fear of Western influence especially when Japan needed investments to build railways. Concerning this matter there were two choices; either to invite foreign investments, or to depend exclusively on the national capital. Some politicians and businessmen stubbornly warned from being pushed into the debt trap of foreign powers in order to avoid Egypt's destiny. They studied carefully the experience of Egypt with foreign investments and its political consequences. Shibusawa Eiichi, the leading entrepreneur of Meiji era, dealt with this issue in his work "*Kosei Nikki*" (*Rebirth Diaries*). Some leading politicians such as Ito Hirobumi, Matsukata Masayoshi, and Okuma Shigenobu contributed to the campaign.

Again, the experience of Egypt with foreign influence was inspiring to Shiba Shiro in his autobiographical novel published in 1888, under the title "*Kajin No Kigu*" (*Romantic Meeting with Two Fair Ladies*). In the meanwhile the writer went in a trip to Europe escorting Tani Kanjo, the minister of agriculture and commerce, who recognized his abilities and appointed him as his private secretary. At Ceylon Shiba and his chief were able to meet Arabi Pasha, the Egyptian nationalist leader in exile, who explained to them Egypt's experience with "the aggressiveness of imperialism of the white race". Their arrival in Egypt afforded them an opportunity to observe the situation under the British Occupation. When Shiba and the minister returned to Japan in 1888, they both resigned their position and joined the political opposition to foreign debts and unequal treaties with foreign powers.

By the end of 1880's the political ideas of Jamal Ad-din al Afghani about Pan-Islamism were introduced to Japan by Yano Ryukei in his work "*Keikoku Bidan*" (*The Story of Politicians*). Both Qur'an and the work of Ibn Ishaq "*Sirat Muhammed*" were translated from English.

However, Japan's concern with Egypt or Islamic culture at that time cannot be separated from the general trend of Japanese intellectuals who focussed their intention to the study of human cultures. Arabic studies

as disciplined studies were not in existence before the 1910's, when Japanese capitalism were matured enough to push the country's policy towards military expansion at the expense of neighbouring countries, and the Russo - Japanese War (1904-1905) which resulted in the establishment of Japanese existence and interests in Korea and Manchuria.

The expansionist movement was accompanied by a wide interest in Chinese and Asian studies which became the task of the Great Japan Cultural Association (Dai Nippon Bummei Kyokai). In 1911 the Association issued the Japanese version of Cromer's *Modern Egypt* with a preface stating that the British experience in Egypt is rather instructive to Japan in her administration of Korea. The fact of having an Islamic community in China encouraged the Association to study Islamic history and culture in order to find suitable approach to the Chinese Muslims and to mark the beginning of Islamic and Arabic studies in Japan.

Since then the Islamic and Arabic studies were deeply influenced by the strategic necessities of the Japanese government either economic or political. Consequently, we can distinguish three phases in the development of those studies closely connected with the development of Japanese politics and economic interests.

- I -

The Inter War Period witnessed the first phase, in which four Arabic studies institutions of semi - governmental nature came into being.

(a) The Islamic Association of Great Japan (Dai-Nihon Kaikyo Kyokai) to which professors Matsuda Hisao, Iwanaga Hiroshi and Kobayashi Hajime were affiliated. Their concerns were varied from Islamic law and religion to the history of Islamic countries in general. Professor Kobayashi Hajime is a good example of this group. He started his academic career by Islamic law and shifted to the contemporary history of the Arab World.

(b) The Institute for Islamic Studies (Kaikyo-Ken Kenkyujo) which was founded by Manchuria Railway Company to study the cultural background of the Chinese Muslims. To this institute professors Nohara Shiro, Takeuchi Yoshimi, Gamo Reiichi, Kanazawa Makoto and Maejima Shinji were affiliated. While the first and second turned to Sinology, the third shifted to Persian and the fourth to the modern history of France. Only professor Maejima Shinji continued his career to be the leading Japanese Arabist.

(c) The Research Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimusho) which concentrated on the Arabic language and political affairs of

the Arab countries. It was an apprenticeship center for training the young diplomats who were supposed to serve in the Arab World. Besides, the Ministry started to despatch young diplomats to study Arabic language in Egypt since 1926. Among the members of this section were those who could develop their studies and became deeply interested in the literature and history of Arabs. To the latter belong some distinguished diplomats such as Tamura Hideji, Ohara Yoichiro, Odaka Masanao, Nakano Eijiro and Kawasaki Torao.

(d) The Pacific Research Association which was concerned with the study of Islamic culture and literature.

In 1939, before the outset of the war, Osaka University for Foreign Studies (Osaka Gaikokugo Daigaku) introduced Arabic as a branch of Semitic department. Since then Arabic became a disciplined study and among the graduates of this branch there are leading scholars of Arabic grammar and literature.

However, the Arabic and Islamic studies in the Inter-War period were deeply influenced by the works of the Western Orientalists as far as the Arab history and culture are concerned due to the fact that most of the Japanese scholars at that time could not consult original Arabic resources, only few of them had easy access to Arabic. But as far as the studies of Islamic history in China are concerned, the Japanese scholars were in better position since they could consult the first hand materials especially documents.

Since the Islamic studies institutions of that period were functioned as information centers to meet the demands of the Japanese diplomacy and business circles about South-east Asian and West Asian countries, they lost their raison d'etre after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War and were liquidated. Their staff members were scattered to various fields of interest, but some of them continued their career and joined the staff of certain universities.

For example, Professor Maejima Shinji who has been research worker of Kaikyo-Ken Kenkyujo sponsored by South Manchuria Railway Company, joined Keio University. He pioneered in Islamic history to which he made valuable contributions. He translated some original Arabic sources into Japanese. His translation of the Arabian Nights (The Thousand and One Nights) came out in three volumes, he translated too the Travels of Ibn Battuta and al-Jahiz's work al-Bukhala (The Stingies).

- II -

Arabic studies in the Post-War years faced a critical dilemma. Once the governmental and semi-governmental institutions were collapsed

due to the defeat which has been accompanied by the hard task of reconstruction, the Arabic studies in Japan were left for individual initiatives. While Professor Maejima Shinji established the Islamic historical studies in Keio University. Professor Izutsu Toshihiko of the same university concentrated on Islam as a religion. In 1957, he introduced the first Japanese version of Qur'an translated from Arabic in three volumes. He had the hard task of adapting Japanese characters to the Qur'anic expressions. His work on "God and Man in Qur'an" has been a unique reference in the subject for several years.

At the same time, Professor Haneda of Kyoto University pioneered the studies of Islam and Islamic culture in the regions of Mid-Asia especially the history of Turks. When he died Kyoto University turned his house into a research center for those studies known as Haneda Memorial House.

In addition, some Buddhist priests were interested in the studies of comparative religions and contributed to the study of Islam, then became more interested in certain area such as Honda Minobu who concentrated on Persian history and the history of Mongols in Persia and Mori Masao the prominent scholar of Turkish history and culture.

Another group of Japanese contained those who started their academic career as students of modern contemporary history of Europe, and organized a study group on imperialism in Asia and Africa. The nationalization of Suez Canal and following Suez War in 1956 drew their attention to study the historical background of imperialism in the Arab countries of West Asia. In search of the native viewpoint, they studied Arabic to the extent that they could be able to consult the Arabic resources. The results of their studies came out in a book on The Modern History of the Arabs compiled by Itagaki Yuzo and Nakaoka San-eki. In the 1960's the authors came to Cairo University to develop their knowledge and experience about the Arab affairs. Together with Miki Wataru, the third pillar of this group, they led a new trend in the Japanese Arabic studies.

Since the 1960's those individual efforts came to be appreciated and encouraged by the authorities when they found it necessary to have their own experts in West Asian affairs. It was then the time of economic recovery and the emergence of Japan's new capitalism.

Through the Occupation years Japan struggled up from the defeat and postwar disorder. When the Allies withdrew in 1952 her economy had at last regained its prewar level of output, real national output nearly tripled from 1951 to 1963, growing at over 9 percent a year. As Japan

moves forward in the 1960's then she has already raised her productive powers twofold above their prewar level. Since the manufacturing industries were leading the boom, Japan's demand for energy was increasing. With the Arab East acting as the main supplier of Oil, Japan's economic interests in the area were growing, and the Arab - Japanese trade flourished.

Hence, developing the Arabic studies in Japan in order to create competent experts of Arab affairs became the main target of Japanese diplomacy and economic interests. Japanese companies handling business in the Arab countries badly needed personnel with some knowledge of Arabic created a demand for teaching Arabic language and led to the emergence of concerned institutions.

In 1961, Tokyo University for Foreign Studies (Tokyo Gaikokugo Daigaku) opened a new department for Arabic language and literature. In the meanwhile, the branch of Arabic language in the Semitic department of Osaka University for Foreign Studies gained independence. Courses for teaching Arabic language and literature were organized in various universities (Tokai, Tenri, Waseda, Keio and Takushoku Universities). Besides, the Egyptian Cultural Center, the Saudi - Japanese Friendship Association and the Kuwait - Japanese Friendship Association opened evening classes for teaching Arabic.

Again the Arabic studies in Japan reached a new boom. The Ministries of Education, International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese business circles provided financial funds to the research projects and the academic institutions concerned with Arab affairs. The Arabic studies have to be re-organized in conformity with the needs of Japanese diplomacy and economic interests in several universities and research institutes.

Being the center of Arabic and Islamic studies from the mid-sixties to the early seventies, Tokyo University for Foreign Studies concentrated on the study of Arabic grammar, literature especially modern and Islamic Philosophy. The Institute for the Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (Ajia Afurika Gengo Bunka Kenkyujo) established by the same university in 1964 had a plan to promote a research project in both Islamic and African countries. In 1976, the co-ordinating project titled "Islamization and Modernization in Asia and Africa" was organized at the Institute.

This project made considerable success in bringing three generations of Japanese scholars together: those who started their research career in the Interwar period, those who started their career after the war and those who started in the sixties. Under the auspices of this project three periodical symposiums a year had to be held to which scholars from

various universities had to be invited. Each symposium was allocated for certain topic such as the Problems of Contemporary Islam in South-east and West Asia, Islam in Middle Ages, Islam in Africa, Land-ownership and Land Systems in West Asia, Rural and Urban Societies in Muslim Countries, Islamic Thought, and the Modern Arabic Literature.

At the term of a year, the Institute of the Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa used to issue a publication containing the papers submitted to the symposiums in that year, together with the comments and discussions. This publication was titled "Islamization and Modernization in Asia and Africa". As the project lasted for seven years, the Institute issued seven volumes of this publication which presents the Japanese viewpoint on Islamic societies.

While Osaka University for Foreign Studies paid more attention to Arabic grammar and linguistics, both Tokyo and Kyoto Universities have wide range of interest in Islamic studies through the Institute of Oriental Culture (Toyo Bunka Kenkyujo) in the former, and the Institute of Middle Asia (Nairiku Ajia Kenkyujo) in the latter. The Institute of Oriental Culture of Keio University concentrated on the history of West Asian countries and comparative religion. Both Tenri and Taisho Universities shared the same interest.

Besides the universities, there are two independent research institutes considered among the basic centers of Arabic studies in Japan, the Institute of Developing Economies (Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo) founded in 1958 and the Middle East Institute (Chuto Chosakai) established in 1956. While the former institute is affiliated with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the latter is affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their budgets are subsidized by the Government and Japanese business.

The Institute of Developing Economies is mainly concerned with the economic affairs and the socio-economic development in the Arab countries. Some research personnel were despatched to the Arab countries and succeeded in opening channels with the academic circles in the area, some Arab scholars were invited to the institute as well. The Institute organized study groups on the Middle East to which competent scholars from various Japanese universities are contributing.

The Middle East Institute is acting as a research and information center for Japanese diplomacy and business. It recruits the Middle East experts from the universities to carry out the research projects, and issues the Annual Book on Middle East and North Africa to provide the interested Japanese circles with the basic informations about the area.

In the early seventies there were three trends among the Japanese scholars. The first, represented those who had been educated in the West and were directly or indirectly disciples of the Western Orientalists, stood for following the traditions of Orientalism and looking for the institutes of Islamic and Oriental studies in the West as fundamental sources of informations on Arabic and Islamic countries without paying attention to the studies of contemporary Arab and Muslim scholars. To support their point of view they claimed that the contemporary works of native scholars are heavily depending on the works of the Western Orientalists. Professor Shimada Johei of Chuo University was the spokesman of this trend supported with a limited number of Japanese scholars.

The second trend was rather isolated and less supported. They call for a pure Japanese approach to Islam and Islamic societies based on the original sources and first-hand materials without considering the works of both Western Orientalists and contemporary Arab and Muslim scholars. They claimed that the Japanese scholars with their own way of thinking and cultural background could be able to have their own interpretation of Islam and Muslim societies which is different from the others. Professor Makino Shinya of the Arabic Department in Tokyo University for Foreign Studies was the advocate of this trend.

The third trend was far-sighted and gained the support of the majority of Japanese scholars. They drew their colleagues' attention to the fact that the Orientalist movement in the West was designed to meet the demands of imperialism. Hence the Western interpretation of Arab and Muslim societies was not always accurate, and the writings of the Western Orientalists on Japan are good evidence of the case. They called for taking the experience of the native scholars in Arab and Islamic countries together with the original sources as their guide without neglecting the writings of the Western scholars. Therefore interest should be cultivated in field studies and relations with Arab academic circles should be advanced. Professors Itagaki Yuzo (Tokyo University), Miki Wataru (AAKEN), and Nakaoka San-eki (AJIKEN) are the advocates of this trend which dominated the academic arena since 1973.

The third phase in the development of Arabic studies in Japan followed the October 1973 War and the oil crisis or what was described by the Japanese public opinion as the "Oil Shock". The impact of oil crisis on Japan was the most serious among the developed industrial countries, as shown by reports published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), due to the fact that Japan's dependence on overseas sources for her total energy requirement, and specifically her

dependence on Arab oil for her oil needs is far greater than that of the others.

Naturally, Japan changed her political attitude towards the Arab - Israel conflict and showed her intention to maintain and promote friendly relations with the Arabs through such measures as more active economic and technical co-operation to secure the supply of petroleum resources. This new Middle East policy impacted the Arabic studies in Japan.

Not only Government and business circles required a new approach to the Arab World, but also the Japanese people became more interested in the Arab affairs. The number of applicants to the Arabic language departments in the Japanese universities increased. The publishers became more interested in issuing books on the Arab countries and Arabic literature, etc.

In addition to the semi-governmental institutes which has been established in the sixties to supply informations on the Middle East to the Government and business circles, a new institute of the kind was founded in 1974. It is the Institute for Middle East Economies (Chuto Keizai Kenkyujo), mainly subsidized by the Agency for Economic planning and the business circles.

While the Institute of Developing Economies (AJIKEN) started a research project on the Middle East to cover the various aspects of contemporary problems, it encouraged the translation and publication of some important works of socio-economic and political significance. Under the auspices of this project the Japanese versions of al-Sharqawi's "al-Ardh" (by Nutahara), Tawfiq al-Hakim's work "Awdat-ul-Wa'iy" (by Horiuchi), and Mohamed Uda's work "Al-Wa'iy-ul Mafqud" (by Ikeda) were published.

The Institute for the Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (AAKEN) initiated a new trend in the Arabic studies. In the fall of 1974, a research team headed by Professor Miki Wataru was dispatched to the Middle East for six month term to investigate the comparative aspects of Islamic societies and their cultural changes. This team applied the field-work methods and collected various first-hand materials from the Arab countries. One of the important functions of the team was open channels with Arab universities and cultivate academic relations with the Arab scholars. The results of their studies came out in a series of publications in English and French titled "Studia Culturae Islamicae".

The Middle East Institute organized study groups to which the Middle East experts (scholars, journalists, diplomats and businessmen) partici-

pated. The topics of these study groups are closely related to Japan's policy - making and economic interests. The results of their studies are published and distributed to the concerned government agencies and business circles.

In spite of the increasing interest in the studies on recent conditions of the Arab World and especially the oil producing Arab Countries, the fundamental Islamic studies in the Oriental studies departments at the Japanese universities such as Tokyo, Keio and Kyoto are left behind.

* * *

In conclusion, the Arabic studies in Japan are developing since the sixties and making considerable achievement due to the favourable political and economic circumstances especially after the October 1973 War, which marked a new epoch of better mutual Arab-Japanese understanding and economic co-operation. Although the future of the Arabic studies in Japan is prospective, they are scattered among various institutions without creating co-ordination between them. The establishment of an Arabic studies association to act as a co-ordinating body is, I believe, a prompt need. But this association should be independent from both government and business influence in order to lay down the academic tradition of this field of studies that secures continuity.

**"WHAT IS THE ARAB WORLD LIKE?" SEEN FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF WORLD HISTORY**

**-As the First Step to the Study of "The Image
of the Arab World in Japan"-**

Goro Yoshida

A senior high school teacher who is a friend of mine, gave his new students some preliminary tests on their knowledge of the world. First, they were asked to spot East Asia, North Africa, South West Asia, Europe, Black Africa and America in a blank map of the world. Most of the students proved to be able to spot Asia roughly, but only 30 per cent of students were able to show a fairly accurate sketch map of North Africa-South West Asia, which covers nearly the whole Arab World, while the remaining 70 per cent were not able to draw boundary lines in Asia and show where South West Asia was.

Next, all the students were asked to draw a sketch map of the world on a piece of white paper. The result was much the same. The maps of East Asia, Europe and America were very clearly drawn and that of Africa was recognizable, while North Africa and South West Asia in the center of the map were only vague contours, and Minor Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, Black Sea, Red Sea and Arabian Gulf, etc. were not discernible even in tracings.

When the teacher tried calling those regions by the historical term "Ancient Orient", he found their knowledge of it broader. The students knew by name the River Nile, the River Tigris and the River Euphrates, as well as pyramids, sphinxes, and the Fertile Crescent. Nevertheless, the River Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates were not on the maps of the world which they had drawn.

He asked the students to mention the names of the founders of Christianity, Buddhism and Islam. As for the founder of Islam, 30 per cent could mention "Mohammed", but 20 per cent failed to mention it which was definitely a larger percentage than in the case of Christianity and Buddhism. When all the students came to mention the name of the sacred book of Islam, virtually none could mention "the Koran". The above test shows a typical tendency of the Japanese knowledge - the superfluous knowledge of the "Ancient Orient", contrasting with the scanty, fragmentary knowledge of the Arab World, which never goes beyond "The Arabian Nights", "deserts", "oil", and so on.

As stated above, ordinary Japanese students' understanding and

knowledge of the Arab World is very shallow. On the other hand, the same tendency is common among their teachers, and ordinary adults.

Now, I would like to explain where the real cause of this lies, referring to the handling of the Arab World in Japanese history education. The teachers of world history have a lot of historical material to cover the civilization of Ancient Orient, the Mongol Empire, the Industrial Revolution, the Russian Revolution and so on. It is a fact, however, that they cannot avoid omitting certain things because of the limited school hours available. To decide what items to be omitted is a delicate job for teachers, but the first to be omitted from their curriculum is always the history of North Africa-South West Asia, that is the Arab World, Turkey and Iran.

The teachers' classes on the history of the "Ancient Orient" go too much into specific, insignificant particulars, whilst the history of North Africa-South West Asia, including the Arab World, never plays a leading part in world history classes. From time to time it might make an appearance in a secondary role within European history. This aspect of Japanese history education developed from the textbooks used in world history. In Japan, every textbook of world history is closely censored by the Ministry of Education. Hence, nation-wide ignorance of the history of the Arab World is the result because teachers are expected to use the designated textbooks.

However the students' ignorance of the Arab World's history is, in fact, more deeply rooted in the established methods for understanding world history, peculiar and proper to Japan. It is a vital problem to decide how to understand and classify world history in the study of history. The method traditionally used in Japan divides world history into the following categories: Japanese history, "Oriental history" which is centered on China, and Western history which is exclusively focused on the modern powers in North Western Europe. The history of North Africa-South West Asia, that is, the Arab World has been omitted or expelled from the minds of Japanese teachers in considering world history.

Most Japanese textbooks of world history have been compiled on the basis of this traditional method of comprehension. You will find that any textbook of world history begins with the "advent of humankind", followed by the "Ancient Society", at the head of which "Oriental Civilization", including those of the ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, is included for mere background material. Then the "Ancient Orient", its own significant development utterly ignored, abruptly retires from the arena of world history, and the "Hellenic Civilization" takes its place. The

Persian Wars and the Persian Empire are mentioned in world history only as some foils to "the democracy in Hellenic polis". The significance of the Parthian and Sassanid Empires is ignored.

The second appearance of the Arab World in textbooks is during the period of the "Crusades", where it is treated as an object which is to be soon conquered. The Islamic Empire is also treated as nothing more than an obstacle interfering in the development of the European powers. After the Industrial Revolution, the Arab World became a mere object for the European powers to rule and exploit. It was only after World War I that national movements broke out in the Arab World, and its independence has since been gradually realized.

Such is the image of the history of the Arab World, as depicted in ordinary Japanese textbooks. According to them, its golden age is said to have finished in the period of the "Ancient Orient", and this implies the history of West Asia began and ended with that of the "Ancient Orient". The rest is regarded as a supplementary history of a frontier during the formative period of Europe. It was not long before the Arab World came to play nothing but a passive, negative role, allowing itself to be ruled and exploited by the West European powers, and serving them to complete the development of their own capitalistic system. Considering that this image of the Arab World is so biased and far from reality, it is easy to understand why they had to omit the main part of the Arab World's history from textbooks when school hours were thought to be limited.

What should we do to convey the real image of the Arab World, instead of perpetuating those false ones still prevalent in Japan? How can we help each and every Japanese student to fully understand the Arab World, to be able to make interpretations of his or her own? These are very most urgent questions, requiring the thorough examination of Japanese textbooks to find out just what problems and facts should be given to young Japanese students.

ARABIC TEACHING IN JAPAN

Osamu Ikeda

It is my great honor to speak on Arabic teaching in Japan to the distinguished doctors and professors from the Arab countries. At the same time, however, I fear that you may assume from the title of my speech that there has been an equivalent to that in Western countries of Arabic teaching over here in Japan. My speech is a report on some of the fact-finding information concerning this subject.

Firstly, I would like to speak on the brief history of Arabic teaching in Japan. This is of course on the premise that it is impossible to compare it with the Arabic teaching in Europe which has a long history.

I could not trace any Japanese who taught Arabic anywhere in Japan before 1925, although there were some who dealt in related information on subjects such as the biography of the prophet Muhammad (or siratu nnabi). For example, Mr. Tadasu Hayashi wrote about the life of Muhammad in 1876, and Mr. Kenichi Sakamoto wrote on the same thing in 1900. In addition to these two men, Mr. Kaiten Nukariya wrote "Mysterious Hero Muhammad" in 1905.

According to the opinion of Professor Fujimoto of Kansai University, the introduction of the life of Muhammad and its understanding at this period was a reflection of the influence of Thomas Carlyl's "On Heroes and Hero-worship" in which Muhammad was seen as one of the heroes of the world. However it seemed to me that the authors of these books got their information mainly from Chinese or European sources, and their knowledge of the Arabic language was far from satisfactory.

In the ninth year of the Taisho period (1920), Mr. Kenichi Sakamoto who wrote "The Life of Muhammad" in 1900, translated and published the qur'an for the first time in Japan.

This translation consisted of two volumes and was published in a series of the world's sacred books. Mr. Sakamoto stated in the translation's introduction that he always had the Arabic edition of the qur'an with him to refer to, but because of his poor knowledge of Arabic, he mainly depended on his translation of Sale's, Rodwell's and Palmer's.

Although his translation was not from Arabic itself, his statement does indicate that he at least had enough knowledge to identify difficult passages in the Arabic edition.

On the other hand, the first Japanese muslim to make a hajji

(pilgrimage to Mekka) also appeared in the Taisho period Professor Koji Nakamura will speak about him tomorrow. His name was Mr. Tensho Ippei Tanaka, and he translated the life of Muhammad from Chinese in 1922 (it was only published in 1941).

The original book of this translation was written about 1921 by Ryu Kairen and introduced to Nagasaki from China in the Edo period. At that time, however, this book was regarded by the Shogunate government, as a heretical document and was burnt in 1841. He also wrote on Rihlat al-Hajji or "Book of Islamic Pilgrimage" in 1925, the fourteenth year of Taisho.

There is much other related information on the pre-history of Arabic teaching in Japan during this period, although a greater part of it is fragmentary and I could not trace anyone who taught Arabic in an institute or university in the Meiji period or the first part of the Taisho period up to 1925. This does not imply that there was absolutely no one in the Taisho period with a good knowledge of Arabic, because, for example, when the Osaka Foreign Language College began to teach Arabic there was a Japanese professor teaching it there from 1925, the fourteenth year of Taisho.

Arabic teaching at the university level in Japan thus started up in 1925 at the Osaka Foreign Language College, now the Osaka University of Foreign Studies. That was the year when the national university was put under the control of the Egyptian government and changed its name to the Egyptian University, and when Arabic teaching in Japan emerged from its jahilian age.

The college was established on the 9th of December, 1921, and began lectures from the 11th of November, 1922. From the beginning, students in the Indian and Malayan Departments had to choose one of three foreign languages as a second language in their second year. The three languages were English, Arabic and Persian, and some seventeen students chose Arabic in 1925.

The first professor to teach them Arabic at the college was Mr. Shigehiko Matsumoto. I would like to elaborate on this professor who taught Arabic for the first time at the college level in Japan. Born in 1887 in Tokyo, he graduated from the Department of Historical Science, Faculty of Literature in Tokyo Imperial University in 1912 (the last year of Meiji). He specialized in Japanese history, and on graduation continued his studies in the postgraduate course of the same university for two years. From 1919 to 1922 he was a member of "The Institute for Ancient Studies", established by Mr. Keigo Harada. He specialized in an-

cient semitism there and during this same period, gave lectures at Keio University for two years from 1920. Then on the 13th of June, 1922, the Ministry of Education ordered him to go abroad to study the Arabic language for two years in Germany, Syria and Egypt. On the 2nd of August of the same year he was nominated as a full professor at the Osaka Foreign Language College which was founded in 1921.

Matsumoto left Yokohama port on the 3rd of September in 1922 for Berlin, and returned to Japan on the 5th of December, 1924. He stayed abroad for two years and three months.

Through the lack of information, it is difficult to determine whether he went to Egypt and Syria to study Arabic or not, but it appears that he studied mainly in Berlin, making a trip to Egypt and Syria on his way back from Germany. Nevertheless, he started to teach Arabic from April 1925 at the Osaka Foreign Language College. As far as I know, this was the beginning of Arabic teaching in Japan. He taught Arabic, German and Japanese history in this college from 1925 to 1929, during which period he also taught at Kyoto Imperial University and Osaka Senior College.

In 1929 he was transferred to Seoul Imperial University to teach Japanese history. With the change of his post, the college appears to have suspended lectures on Arabic, although it is difficult to be accurate as to what happened from 1929 up to the establishment of an Arabic department in 1939, because all relevant documents were burnt in air raid damage during the Second World War.

Professor Matsumoto introduced the German method of Arabic teaching to the Osaka Foreign Language College, whereby he attached importance to the strict teaching of Arabic grammar at all stages. He also brought some valuable books from Europe, such as "Arabishe Chrestomathie" compiled by Brunnow, Yaqut Hamawi's "mu'jam l buldan" edited by Wustenfeld, Mas'udi's "murūju zzahab", Ibn Buttuta's "Rihlat" issued by Societe Asiatique in Paris and Lane's "Arabic Lexicon".

There was another interesting development in this period. In 1926, the Japanese government opened a consulate general in Alexandria and the Foreign Ministry of Japan sent Mr. Yoichiro Ohara to Egypt as the first trainee of Arabic. In the following year of 1927 Mr. Hideji Tamura, the past Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia, was also sent to Alexandria as the second trainee of Arabic. This was the beginning of the long, successive training of Japanese diplomats in same Arab countries, namely Egypt and Lebanon, but rarely Iraq and Syria. Some of these Arabists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs later cooperated with the Osaka Foreign Language College to promote Arabic teaching when it opened an Arabic de-

partment in 1939. They also cooperated with Tokyo University of Foreign Studies when an Arabic department was founded in 1960. Professor Kawasaki was one active member at this time.

The Ministry of Education decided to increase Arabic professors and started its programme by sending Mr. Matsumoto abroad in 1922. This resulted in him teaching Arabic from 1925. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened a consulate general in Alexandria in 1926 and decided to foster more Arabists by sending Japanese diplomats there. Behind this concurrence there was a strong uprush of interest in the Arab world in Japan at this time but I have been unable to detect the real motives which brought on this strong uprush of interest.

Some 15 years later, reflecting the remarkable progress of Islamic studies in Japan, organization of research activities began in 1937 with the establishment of the Institute of Islamic Zone (Kaikyoken Kenkyujo). The Initiation of Islamic section was established in the Institute of Far East Asia (Toa Kenkyujo, Kaikyo Han) in 1939 and the West Asia section of the Department of Asian Economic Research on the Manchuria Railway (Mantetsu Toa Keizai Chosakyoku) was founded in 1940.

With organization of research activities increasing like this, the first Arabic department in Japan was opened in 1939 at the Osaka Foreign Language College, with the aid of a teaching staff supplied by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Yoichiro Ohara, Eijiro Nakano and Takashi Hayashi. The teaching materials they introduced to this college were mainly from Egypt, such as school text books that had been employed under the Wafdist government. The department accepted 15 new students every year from 1939; pages 2 and 3 show the transition of those who graduated from this department and the Arabic Department of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. The comparatively small number of graduates reflects, to some extent, the difficulty in studying Arabic on the one hand, and the difficulty of finding jobs on the other. After the oil crisis in 1973, this situation of it being difficult to find jobs for those specializing in Arabic, has drastically changed.

With the development of Islamic studies in Japan, a Japanese scholar appeared in 1939 who wrote in serial form an introduction to Arabic in the magazine "Islamic World" - 'Idaten Arabiigo' or Arabic short course from 1939 to 1941. This magazine was published by the great Japanese Islamic society, Dainihon Kaikyo Kyokai. The author of this 90-page magazine, Mr. Keiichiro Kikuchi, used handwritten Arabic letters, and tried to explain the fundamentals of Arabic grammar, relying on the European, or rather, Greek-Latin method of grammar. He also wrote about

the Hebrew language in the same magazine. At around this same time Mr. Takefumi Ishida introduced Japanese readers to the reading patterns of "the Arabian Nights" and some classical poems such as Tarafa's "diwan in Jahiliya."

In 1950, Professor Toshihiko Izutsu of Keio University published "An Introduction to Leterary Arabic", which was more elaborate in style.

Professor Izutsu had already published his famous book on the history of Arabic thought in 1941, when he was still in his twenties. He also introduced Shaikho's "Majani-l-adab, or Literary Harvest in Arab's Gardens compiled by Shaikho in 1883, and is famous for being the first translator of Qur'an from Arabic into Japanese.

Judging from his works, Professor Izutsu joined Keio University as one of the pioneers of Arabic teaching in 1940 later on, one of his disciples, Dr. Makino, was appointed as the chief of the Arabic Department in Tokyo University of Foreign Studies at the time of its foundation in 1960. Dr. Toshio Kuroda, who is also one of Mr. Izutsu's competent disciples, was appointed by the Japan Foundation as the first Japanese visiting professor to the Department of Japanology at Cairo University, and is well-known as the translator of Ibn Hazm's "Tauq-l-hamama" into Japanese. These mens' achievements, to me, symbolize Professor Izutsu's school.

In 1949, the Osaka Foreign Language College was raised to the status of University through reforms within the educational system, and has been called Osaka University of Foreign Studies.

In 1960, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies opened an Arabic department and began by accepting ten new students every year. Lately, the number of students has expanded to fifteen. The teaching staff of Arabic were appointed mainly from three sources Professor Izutsu's school at Keio University, veteran Arabists among diplomats, and graduates of the Arabic Department of Osaka University of Foreign Studies.

The many universities and institutes where Arabic has been taught, mainly since the 1950's, have related departments of Middle Eastern studies such as departments of history, religion and international relations.

Now I should like to speak about the present situation of Arabic teaching in Japan. You are requested to look at pages 4 and 5 where there are the names of the main institutes teaching Arabic in the Tokyo and Osaka districts. I divided them into three classes. In the first class I mentioned two universities, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and Osaka University of Foreign Studies. Both of them have an Arabic

department in which students specialize in Arabic studies for four years.

In the second class, I listed other universities which have various related departments of Middle Eastern studies and in which Arabic is taught as an elective or optional subject, mainly from the 1950's.

In the third class, I included many institutes or centers of Arabic teaching for the general public, the majority of which was founded after the oil crisis in 1973.

Here, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that Arabic is not taught at all in any secondary school in Japan. All students have to commence their Arabic studies only after entering university. This means that any Japanese doing research on Middle Eastern studies other than Arabic itself, faces the problem of Arabic acquisition which takes excessive time and requires much effort.

What is actually taught in Arabic departments though? To answer this question, I would like to select the curriculum of the Arabic department in Osaka University of Foreign Studies as an example. In this department there are four full-time Japanese professors, one full-time Egyptian professor, one part-time Jordanian lecturer and five part-time Japanese lecturers, making up eleven in all. They cooperate in holding twenty-five lectures, three lectures of which are for postgraduate students. One lecture here denotes a 90-minute lecture, once a week, and through one academic year.

Students in the first and second year take five lectures a week in practical training in Arabic reading, writing and speaking, and at the same time take two lectures on Islamic cultural history.

Students in the third and fourth year take at least six lectures in Arabic practical training and six lectures in Arabic linguistics, Islamic history and culture. In order to provide obligatory lectures for students, nine lectures were given last year (1978 - 1979) on Arabic grammar, the history of Arabic literature, Islamic cities, the study of the Hadith, the geographical history of the Arabs, the history of the Islamic judicial system, classical Arabic poems, the study of "the Sirat nnabi" and Ibu Khaldun's "Muqaddima".

As you may have noticed from the above cited, lectures concentrate mainly on language, classical literature and some aspects of Islamic cultures and institutions, whereas there are no lectures on modern trends in the Arab world. This is because of the lack of related specialists in the Osaka area, and there are, in fact, many students who do want to study modern trends in the Arab world. This situation is widely different from that in the Tokyo area where specialists in this field are available.

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JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ARAB WORLD

Hamid Rabie

1. Arab-Japanese Relations: Variables and Situations.

Understanding the nature of the Arab-Japanese relations and its importance in the relations between the two areas particularly in the near future, until the end of this century must be preceded by an explicit definition of a group of main variables that govern and will continue to govern the evolution of such relations. In fact the Arab world did not discover Japan and the latter was not concerned with the Arab region except after the October War. No doubt the relations between some of the Arab countries and Japan is not new, particularly in the field of traditional bilateral relations. But the mutual concern between the two regions could have surpassed the October War and the events related to it: mainly the energy crisis. While it is natural to ask about the reasons of this mutual concern after the fourth Arab-Israeli war, it is natural as well to ask why this did not happen before? The analysis of these premises will lead us to show the real variables that should be taken into our consideration while building the logic of the relations between Japan and the Arab region.

A) No doubt the mutual unconcern between Japan and the Arab region until the October War was unnatural, nevertheless, its reason is clear: Until the 1970's Japan's policy had two variables. Self-building and dependence on America. The Arab world could not provide Japan with any real help in the self building process. National resources are rare, or at least not invested, Capitals were not yet cumulated, the Arab region has its traditions of preferring to deal with the Europeans. Besides there are other variables enforcing this unnatural situation.

First: The region is characterized by unrest and instability. Wars -regional or domestic- never stop. The Arab-Israeli conflict is known, but one must mention the many other wars between the Arab states themselves. One can also mention the successive revolutions and coup d'états.

Second: The problem of the Japanese language created a wide gap that could not be narrowed easily, and the Japanese leadership did not try to solve the problem of lack of communication process.

Third: The region did not provide a tempting economic market. The absence of paying and purchasing capabilities when the process of

exploitation of oil fortunes has not reached its present rate, there are only limited markets, namely the Egyptian, that may have attracted and concerned the Economic Japanese interests.

Fourth: In addition, if one noticed that the region was involved in the cold war between the two super powers i.e., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., so that the Japanese policy was based on trying not to be committed in any of the ideological conflicts, one may understand why Japan was not concerned with the region.

But why the region was not concerned with Japan? Here one can notice the extent of the failure of the Arab policy since the second world war. The Arab policy was limited to the Middle East problem, or more precisely to the Arab Israeli conflict. In managing this conflict, it did not see but physical confrontation and neglecting any other approach in dealing with the Zionist entity or the problem of political evolution in the region or in dealing with the other international power. The inability of the Arab policy to differentiate between the region's problems and the problem of the Zionist entity in the one hand and the inability to understand the degrees of international behavior starting from confrontation, ending with sustainment, even through an intermediate, all this prevented the Arab leaders from defining a certain function for Japan in this period. One can mention the problems of economic development and the difficulties it imposes concerning the process of technology transfer. This shows how Japan in its foreign policy until this period haven't taken clear or explicit situations in supporting the Palestinian Cause, it even sometimes expressed some understanding and support to the Israeli presence in the Arab World.

B) In the early 1970's and before the October War there seemed new variables, not only in the realm of the Middle East but even related to the international balances at the global level. Japan became aware of the importance of its abandoning its traditional negative stand, and started to force international isolation and the Palestinian revolution had its effects on the air transportation process through the Arab region. The Japanese revolutionary movements, inspite of its qualitative or quantitative unimportance was allying itself with the Arab movements. Though the closure of the Suez Canal did not have grave effects on the oil supplies, it showed how different 1967 Crisis from the one of 1956. The October War forced Japan to reevaluate its relations with the Arab region. Though the invasion of the Japanese market to the region started before, it was starting from 1974 that this invasion was one of the characteristics of the economic relations in the Arab world. In spite of this,

the Arab policy is still unable to understand the reality of the Japanese political and non-political capabilities.

One must be reminded with the deep variables that govern the planning of relations between the Arab and the Japanese regions:

First: The Arab region provides Japan with about 75-80% of its oil needs. Though Japan tried since the June 1967 war to plan carefully to achieve two aims: finding alternatives to the Arab oil - at least in the long run - in order to find more than one source for energy and oil supplies, and rebuilding its national policy to enable it to store oil to a three months period. Nevertheless the Japanese economy could not spare its dependency on the Arab oil. The rise of the oil prices was to affect gravely the Japanese economy. But the Japanese capability was able to absorb this quickly and successfully. The different conditions related to this period resulted in closer Japanese Arab relations in more than one aspect.

1. At first the Japanese policy started to tend towards deepening its relations with the Arab oil states particularly the Gulf oil states specifically Abu Dhabi. And in 1975 there was a treaty with Abu Dhabi according to which it had to spend in one year more than \$ 50 million unconditioned to any oil explorations.

2. The Japanese policy was not confined to the Gulf oil states, but it was extended to relations with all the Arab states that have the means to expend specifically Libya, Algeria and Iraq. Besides, one may mention as well the deals concerning the communication sector and those related to building projects and industrial contractings in Algeria and the deliveries of industrial instruments in Iraq. Japan became the Sixth state between the industrial supplies in Algeria though it started real business with it only in 1969. The total Japanese-Algerian contracts during only 1973 is more than 3 milliard Algerian Dinar. The cooperation with Algeria includes not only the production of natural gas but also includes iron and steel as well as mining and mines development.

3. After the stage of being concerned with the Gulf oil states and that of the rich Arab states, the Japanese policy started to be concerned with the Arab populous states. This was related in fact to the process of economic invasion where the Japanese policy evolved from the level of bilateral relations to the level of regional concern. This was clear in its relations with Egypt starting with its concern with the reopening of the Suez Canal and ending with its concern with the problem of transportation in Cairo.

4. All this must have been reflected in a clear policy in various

situations related to two main problems each of them has its importance: The first is related to the adoption of the Israeli point of view. After a previous stage in which Japan did not hesitate to support - even with silence - the Jews hard positions, it announces explicitly and clearly the adopting of the Arab point of view. Japan as well did not hesitate to take the Arab oil exporting states' stand in the confrontations related to the rise in oil prices. This aspect - which the Arab policies did not understand - shows the reality of the Japanese stand towards the big multinational companies and the prospects of real cooperation between the Japanese and the Arab economies. But this is not the very subject of this study.

Second: On the other side we have to put in our consideration that the Arab area presents to Japan two different orbits of attraction: The oil market and the market for selling the industrialized products. We notice that the Japan's image in the perceptions of the Arab leaders is that of a capitalist and industrial state, like the European Common market states. This is a great fault. We can mention some main variables:

1. While Japan and the Western European countries depend on Arab oil this does not cancel the fact that the Middle East problem, particularly the domestic conflicts over the Suez Canal while gravely affecting the Western European economy concerning the imports of oil, never produced such effect on the Japanese economy that depends on the Gulf oil imports.

2. While Western Europe is a great supplier of the Arab region in industrial products as well as food including agricultural products and canning industry, Japan on the contrary imports food.

3. The long distance between Japan and the Arab world unlike Europe particularly Mediterranean. This forced Japan to think about encouraging the process of exporting to the Arab countries. Thus the oil tankers leave Japan with products, and going back with oil, which makes Japan a more easier partner to the Arab market.

4. Japanese capability in adapting technology and exporting cheap experience is uncomparable to the Western European situation. Besides, though this aspect may seem limited in its importance, Japan does not have imperialistic ambitions in the region and historically it does not present any threat in the Arab perspectives, contrary to the great heritage of imperialistic relations of the common market states.

Third: Thus the Arab area, if viewed as an economic unit, it can provide a clear model of integration with the Japanese economy. It exports to Japan what it needs of raw oil and imports from it what the Arab region needs of industrialized products. The prospects of coopera-

tion in this respect are endless: One may remember the skilled labour and the cheap advanced technology. But cooperation in this respect presupposes and is conditioned to the ability of Arab coordination, and the cooperation with Japan would arise from the idea of dialogue in which the Arab interests would be coordinated in one front. In other words Japan in the bilateral relations can never give the Arab states the same considerations given to them in the case of multilateral diplomacy. In fact the Arab states are of three groups: Oil states, particularly Gulf states that concerns Japan because they provide it with cheap continuous energy. Such countries, in spite of their ability to pay, does not provide a tempting market to the Japanese economy, the ability of consumption is limited and the Japanese economy can not deal with them on a wide range. Then there are populous Arab countries that may become a point of attraction either because of their wide consumption market or their developmental projects. Then a third group do not have neither material means nor large numbers of population. If Japan is forced to be concerned with the first group of Arab states, its concern with the other two groups is determined, to a great extent by the nature of the relations between the Arab gulf oil and the other parts of the Arab world.

C) This leads us to the following question: What is the relationship between the Japanese-Arab relations and the future of international interacts and evolutions? The recent past that preceded the October War and the period we are living, proves the great evolution of the Arab-Japanese relations and confirms a number of issues.

First: Both sides did not discover each other except recently. At least as one of the variables of foreign policy.

Second: The Arabs as well are in need of Japan, contrary to the settled picture that the Japanese Arab relations are of one aspect, based on Japanese need of oil particularly that of Gulf states. This image is only a misunderstanding of the reality of these relations.

Third: It is in the interest of the Arab states not to deal bilaterally. It should depend on group diplomacy based on coordinating the situations. This leads to the concept of Arab-Japanese dialogue, as it did before lead to the concept of Euro-Arab dialogue, but on contrary bases where in the case of multilateral diplomacy the dialogue would be in favour of the Arab side and not only of the other.

Fourth: In conclusion, the idea of bilateral relations between the Arab states and Japan must be reexamined and recalculated. This would open the door to two facts each of them completes this picture. The first is enforcing the cultural relations that still does not receive

the concern of both sides. If we are concerned with the Arab side, no doubt that (particularly if we understand the cultural relation to include specialization and high efficiency) Japan must be considered as one of the sources of scientific specialists for the Arab world. The second, leads us to the Japanese side, that is raising the efficiency and the level of diplomatic representation. The reports prove that Japan was surprised after the October War by a diplomatic instrument incapable of dealing with the situation. This stands as a real problem in the Arab Japanese relations.

2. The Future of the Arab-Japanese Relations and the Variables of the International System.

The study of the Japanese foreign policy after the October War permits us to discover its aims in its relations with the Arab region:

First: Creating close relations with Gulf oil states and finding an alternative to the Arab energy.

Second: The concern with the investment, industrial and consumption market only to reach Arab energy, directing some Japanese investments towards Saudi Arabia and enforcing consumptional relations with some of the populous Arab states is but an instrument supporting the Japanese policy related to importing Arab oil from the Gulf.

Third: The relations are based on bilateral transaction and its real logic is never being involved in the Arab Israeli conflict unless with caution and through balanced policies.

What is the importance of all these different elements? The analyst may reach a clear fact i.e. absolute independence of Japanese interests from American policy in the region. We have seen the independency in the Japanese foreign policy since the 1970's. It is also an independency that could lead to a conflict and rivalry between their interests and between Japanese and European interests as well, and the Arab side may find itself in front of at least three economic alternatives.

But the most important question is related to the importance of such points to the future will the present situation prevail at the end of the next 20 years or there will be other variables to be considered, and that can deepen the political relations between the Arab and Japanese side. These variables should be considered by the planners of both policies:

A) Concerning Japan, no doubt, due to its present conditions will not be able - at least in the near future to reach the level of the two super powers. Its defense positions, developmental capabilities, geo-

graphic situation and the characteristics of its national structure will never permit it to surpass a certain limit in the distribution of international classes. Due to this nature and these variables Japan is forced towards a global policy not confined to the regional system to which it belongs. We have seen that the real obstacle facing the international Japanese capabilities is that it lies amidst three unclear powers, S.U. in the North, U.S. in the East and China in the West. If we add Australia in the South that possesses great capabilities, we would understand that Japan is forced to go out of this containment if it wanted to achieve an international effectiveness. If we notice that the imperialistic invasion policy has no place or at least very limited in the contemporary world, and that the demographic explosion in the third world must lead to pose limits on economic exploitation and if we notice that the Pacific Ocean can never be transferred to a common market on that Western European example, we can understand also now Japan is forced - if it wants to achieve a successful policy of national security - to look to such areas from which it can easily receive the food it needs and the natural resources necessary for its industry, providing the suitable alternatives to create balance in its economic external relations.

B) The international system, i.e. the relations between the two super powers in its turn evolves towards a kind of flexibility in more than one aspect. Weakness of American internal strength, disintegration in the Soviet society will not mean in the long run that we are going to assist the emergence of a different new system based on the notion of multi centers of international powers; the actual system will continue to govern the international equilibrium for non less than other 30 years. The international balance will remain to be based on bipolarity. But this does not prevent the appearance of new powers of the second level which are going to approval and come near Japan, and so narrows the gap between the first and second level of the governmental international powers. This leads to some results that we can imagine: the contraction of the two super-powers and consequently a kind of isolation that diminish the international influence of both Moscow and Washington and the appearance of national capabilities able to create balances of regional type and so able to exercise a kind of effective control on its local destiny. Such balances will be more clear and stable and will express the reality and force of domestic powers. We shall not touch the clear-ages in the Communist camp or the disintegration in the American society but there is no doubt that the powers of attraction in both societies towards the Arab cause will increase and will be enforced.

C) The Arab world is forced to an evolution based on regional coordination, even if it is partial. Time is with the Arab world and whatever is said about domestic differences, in spite of all the images about the weakness of the Arab's will, this region is living the last chapter of the imperialistic epoch. Change will, is due and only the narrow sighted ruler will not consider them in the short run. If the Soviet policy have failed in the region until now, this would also be the fate of the American policy because it did not understand the variables of dealing with the region. This will be more clear by time and the culmination of events. Iran is not far from the Arab region, nor is it far from the nature and characteristics of the region. Regional and domestic coordination must enforce the capabilities and help making use of the fortunes of the region. The Arab region does not know demographic problems and possess agricultural and mineral feasibilities not possessed by any other region except the African Continent and this Arab region is the real door to reach the black continent.

Such variables must pose a new view of the Japanese-Arab policy. What are the characteristics of such view? And what are its aspects? And how can each side provides the other with what the latter lacks? Such questions need a much more deep study.

3. The Improvement of the Arab-Japanese Relations:

A Future Outlook.

The previous study may allow us to differentiate between the short run and the long run in the relations of Japan with the Arab world. There is no doubt that Japan, for another unshort period of time, will not be in need of the Arab world, more precisely, its need from this area will be a relative and a limited one, furthermore, we can say that it may be weakened, and minimized because of the general improvements in the contemporary international frame. It would seem that this opinion contradicts what we had previously said, and it may seem that it ignores the various facts which the contemporary world experiences since the revolution of Iran and the shrinkage in the exportation of petrol to which must lead necessarily the revolution, and in general it seems that it ignores the invisible conflict between Moscow and Washington to dominate the Indian Ocean. In spite of that, the analysis in depth of the various facts and variables which the international policy, in general, and the Arabian policy, in particular, impose will clarify the real dimensions of these future visions. From the very beginning, we have to remember that the Japanese policy starts from the perception of what we can denominate

the adaptive-compromising behaviour; it moves in an orbit relying on the pragmatic analysis of the variables which are related to the interaction with the Arab world, then forming a certain behaviour based on the attempt to make a compromise between these variables and its national interests.

A) Nowadays, the Japanese needs from the area are focused on petrol, on one side, and the local and internal market understood either as being a market for consumption or as being a market for investment, on the other side. If we leave aside the second and the third points, the first one only represents the real need of Japan. In spite of all probabilities, the coming years will be full of surprises, and the sources of petrol energy will be increased and varied, and Japan is leading a fixed policy based on variegating these sources, and all the declared statistics and the reports which circulate secretly tell us about Chinese petrol which will be exported to Japan, and tell us also about a large lake of petrol which the Chinese sea is floating over, and tell us even about numerous abilities buried in the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, added to all that the great efforts which we had previously mentioned with the concern of Siberia without talking about the petrol of Alaska. There is no need to mention the Mexican petrol. There is no doubt that Japan, for an unshort period of time, will continue to interact with the area of the Arabian Gulf, but this does not mean that its economy will be subjugated to the area of the Arabian Gulf in the field of petroleum energy.

There are various variables that will help performing this independence; these variables must be taken in account when studying the Japanese policy towards the Arabian area:

First: Now there is a real competition, in the concern of demanding Japanese technology, between the communist east, the underdeveloped south and the ambitious China. Japan can conquest any of these three markets which are hankering after it, thus it is not in need of the Arabian market.

Second: In fact, the U.S. is still dominating the world, specially, the capitalist world. Thus, it is able to perform a sort of linkage and harmony among the various parts of this world and this fact, in spite the expected disagreement, must reflect its results on the Japanese influence.

Third: The real power of the Chinese giant is still a potential one. China is still suffering from underdevelopment, it is facing violent internal problems, it is still unable to transfer the quantity which is its real weapon, into quality in the international arena.

These variables which cause Japan not to be in great need of interacting with the Arabs will be clarified when we connect the inter-

national frame to the Arabian reality. The Arabian situation during the coming few years will be characterized with certain properties all of which will act on the behalf of the Japanese policy so that this policy will be able to gain all its needs from the Arabian area without introducing the real return.

What are the expected variables in the Arabian area during the five coming years?

Generally, when studying the general improvements in the area, we can differentiate between the following aspects:

1. The performance of the perception of pacific transactions which, although causes the Arabs disunion, has penetrated the regional policy resulting in the creation of a kind of alienation and at least in the encouragement of the refusal of war or organic conflict at least on the short run.

2. With the shrinkage of the Soviet influence and the reinforcement of the American umbrella, all the powers that support the American policy will find themselves in a privileged position; we must add this fact prevents the area from being a field of the cold war between the two great powers which must facilitate the implementation of a such Japanese foreign policy.

3. In spite of the affirmation of local approachment the absence of solidarity between the Arab states and the formation of axes is going to be more frequent. This will not be in the real interests even in the Arab-Japanese relation. We have previously seen that, only from a collective outburst, the Arabian side will be able to bargain with Japan because of the properties of the Arabian economic structure.

4. This situation will end if not by the explosion of the Arab League and the specialized international regional institutions, it will end by the creation of a state of paralysis and uneffectiveness in the inter-Arab relations. This fact reinforces the previous result.

5. Added to that, that the Israeli creeping to the direct transaction with the area which led to the open-door policy must reinforce the Japanese side, even in a certain limit, with the concern of the commercial market where it will not be confronted with any national resistance, but more than that some Arabian leaders may prefer interacting with the Japanese economy rather than with the Israeli economy, thus the transactions will transfer to a competition between the Japanese and Israeli economies against any interest of our national economy.

All the previous variables act on the behalf of the Japanese conquest but on another side there are some variables which may cause the

Japanese leadership to hesitate in taking the adventure of penetrating massively the area. Interacting but with certain limits, opening the doors but cautiously. Why?

The principal reason which causes the Japanese leadership not to open the doors completely is the real conflict around the Indian Ocean which accompanies the contemporary improvements. If the Arabian area is emptied, even to some extent, from the cold war, the Indian Ocean is representing now a real area of conflict between Soviet extension and American resistance. Japan is always trying to avoid submerged in these conflicts. Also the fact that Japanese are cautious not to be committed with ideological conflicts forces it from another side also to avoid competing with the American economy which is conquering the area because the result of this confrontation is a limited one and the real utility is small. If we add to that, that there are still some important parts in the world that attract the Japanese economy, we precisely mean the pacific area, the south-east Asia and China, we can understand why the Japanese policy must hesitate between interacting cautiously or interacting openly with the Arab world during the next five years.

B) If we move to the long run and try to imagine the various improvements and variables which must proceed to formulate the dynamics of the interactions between Japan and the Arabian area we will be shocked with the complete different picture which we can forecast as the result of these new variables. We shall determine the elements of our perception:

First: Japan will find itself alone in a strong world huger than itself. China which is the giant of the future, and whose abilities cannot be neglected by the Japanese leadership, must have passed certain stages on the road to development and progress. The area of south-east Asia inspite of its slow improvement will introduce to us an explosive domain whether because it reinforces the national independence or whether because of demographic explosion which it represents, or whether because of its abilities in overcoming certain national problems. If we add to that the ability of Canada, Australia and most of the states of Latin America in creating its local frame of economic independence whether in the shape of investment or of commerce, we can understand and recognize the results this fact imposes: the expellent of the Japanese conquest and the shrinkage of the amount of natural materials exchanged which the Japanese need of it is always increasing. Also Japan will not find the domain, easy and expanded, to invest its resources and natural abilities in the pacific area because the previously mentioned powers will undoubt-

edly be strong competitors.

Second: If we remember the nature of the Japanese ecologic and economic frame where the population is centralized on a limited area very highly submitted to an intense pollution and is in need not only of the natural resources to its industries but is also in need of elementary materials helping it to survive to the extent that some experts talk about the Japanese need by the end of this century to import even drinkable water, we can understand the serious improvements which will impose itself over the Japanese leadership.

Third: Add to this what we have previously said about the relative shrinkage of the American influence which will cause the Japanese will to be able not to rely completely on the American umbrella. This fact is well recognized by the states of Western-Europe and forces them to try their best to fulfill two goals: helping the states of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) in performing the political unity, creating and reinforcing the binds with the other blocs, which might be of secondary weight, but they are able to support the European will in the sphere of international independence. France had started this policy since the regime of De Gaulle; thus he interacted with China on one side, he altered his courage policy in adopting the Arab problem on a second side, he returned the traditional old relations with Black Africa but he based it on the basis of cultural interaction and economic support on a third side, and he created permanent and fixed communicating channels, in both directions, with the states of Latin America. There is no doubt that this policy had not completely succeeded after the death of De Gaulle but it is still improving positively, thus after the death of De Gaulle some other interactions are added aiming at the reinforcement of the binds between Eastern Europe and E.E.C. If we examine the size of commercial exchanges between these two blocs, we will be convinced with this fact. The Arab-European dialogue cannot be understood unless we recognize the previous fact which alone can interpret Kissinger's rough declarations rejecting this interaction and violently criticizing the Arab-European approachment. On the contrary, till now Japan is still not recognizing these realities. We must add that it cannot, because of its geographical position, fulfill what the states of Western Europe were not able to perform in this concern.

Reaching this point of our analysis, the comparison between Japan and West Germany seems to be natural and it will show us how the differents between the two situations are relevant. Japan belongs to a regional system where enmity is spread among its elements, thus it cannot,

whatever the extent of cleverness it may reach, make its economic system to be absorbed in an economic community enclosing all the Pacific area or the states of south-east Asia without building, at first, an integrated political structure in this area. The Japanese policy will be forced then to trend towards the Arabian area. This fact is obvious to those who deliberated the Japanese policy for more than one reason. But it may be said that the interest of Japan in the Arab area does not find its *raison d'être* in its temporary needs but it is determined with long-term variables. We had previously seen that all the variables impose this global nature of the Japanese policy not only in the mean that it must look to the international interactions as one chess piece but also, on the contrary with China, because Japan will find the real support to resolve its problems, on the long run, outside its regional international system. Then we can observe that all the variables are acting on the behalf of Japanese-Arabian cooperation not on the level of bilateral interaction but on the level of multilateral interaction.

C) If we look to the Japanese side and we try to know the real benefits which it will gain from the transactions with the Arabian area specially on the long run, leaving aside all the variables of improvements in the future of the Arab Israeli conflict, we can observe five elements that must create the intellectual frame of this collaboration, and call for the elaboration of a plan concerning an interaction clear in its variables and precise in its goals:

First: The Arabian area owns minimal resources which are not yet really utilized and which must attract the attention of the Japanese capital and experience. In fact, the desert extending south the coast of north Africa, and even the coasts of the Arabian area, with the fact that there are no obstacles to utilize the Mediterranean area, represent a virginal area which has not been yet put under investigations and researches. In spite of that, the existing investigations confirm the existence of so many minimal: iron in Tunis, precious minerals in Sudan, phosphate and tin in Morocco, are but some examples.

Second: If the local market does not represent actively a real interest after twenty years, when the Arab population will be around 300 million, and when the Arab consumptive capacity will increase because of the bourgeois improvement and the enlargement of the personal abilities and socially because of the transference from the rural to the urban society, this market will not only be of certain importance but it will also be the market in the world which does not own its self-sufficiency in order to saturate the local commercial demands.

Third: Also the Arabian area is predicted to be the food basket of the world during the twenty-first century. Not only because this area does not know any real demographic problems but also because it embraces very large areas suitable for alimentary investments and this is not possible except in some other few areas: Canada, Australia, Mongolia, and Brazil. In this concern, it introduces some privileges not owned by any of these previously mentioned areas and this fact will cause Japan to gain a real benefit when interacting with the Arabian area. Canada is the natural extension to the American economy, and Brazil has within a sea of demographic explosion in Latin America, and Australia is surrounded with another kind of demographic invasion from the states of West Asia, and Mongolia will be a centre of conflict between China and Soviet Union. The Arabian area is the only one which enjoys independence and sufficient ability to satisfy all the real alimentary needs of Japan starting from the beginning of the next century.

Fourth: The Arab world is the door to the other area with the unlimited wealth i.e., the states of black Africa. Algeria, Libya and Sudan are the real channels acting as communicating channels between rich investmental economy in the Arab area and its possible management with the natural resources of these African states. The ability of participated investments shared between the Arabian capital from one side and the Japanese capital from the other side, and between the Arabian manpower, cheap and not well skilled, and the Japanese technological experience reminds us with what the Japanese economy is trying to do now in Brazil and Canada but in a more integral way.

Last and not least, through the previous exploration, we can observe that the Arabian area is in need of a concentrated industrializational process, whether this industrialization is understood to mean only a vast economic development and macrosocial modernization, or whether it will tend essentially to create a military instrument suitable to interact with the problems of the area. Development means the need of fully-prepared industries, improved technology, technical experience. Each of these three demands is richly owned by the Japanese economy and it is able, in this concern, to introduce an important alternative to what is called the occidental transference of technology which was and still the very focus of the Euro-Arab dialogue. Here we can observe how the interest of the Japanese policy ought to force this country not to wait any more to reinforce a policy of real cooperation with the Arabian area and to start from now to perform this goal; it must start from the fifth element of our analysis waiting for the moment in which

it will find itself in real need of interaction with the Arabian area in order to perform the other four goals. May be that this fact is strongly affected by those who deliberate the Japanese policy for they are now greatly interested in Algeria, Iraq and Egypt.

D) It is naturally, to complete the different aspects of this frame which analyses the Japanese-Arabian relations to ask: There is the Arabian will from the interaction with Japan?

If we try to observe objectively all the previous tends we must not be really optimistic. The Arab world, till now, is still leading a policy with certain characters that consider Japan presenting a secondary importance. The Arabian policy till now is walking in an orbit determined by the following variables.

First: Centralizing the problems of the Arabian area over the crisis of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Second: Not really and seriously interested in the problems of development and looking to the economic progress as if it means essentially expanding the consumptive market.

Third: The trend of the Arabian capital towards the external investments.

Fourth: Not understanding the importance and the real meaning of Saving Policy.

Fifth: The absence of any harmonization between the different local plans.

In fact, these peculiarities binded, its focus is the weakness of self-will, together must give place to a frame which its core is underdevelopment, and its logic is artlessness. The problem of Arab-Israeli conflict is not the only problem of the political process in the area; one must wonder: if this intruded body disappeared, will all the other problems vanish from the Arab region for ever? Looking to the development as if it is reflecting in itself a kind of political intoxication must lead us to pose the question: The oil, in the Arab world, was a grant from heaven or was it the contrary? Arab capitalists are investing in Western Europe and even in North America and if we take in consideration the real profits which offers the local market we must wonder: why these national capitalists have not preferred the local markets? No saving policy. The notion of planning is only a subject of demagogic declarations even for all that concern the management of international conflict in the area.

Thus, it is natural that the Arab-Japanese relations till now are mostly bilateral. We have seen how the Japanese diplomacy does not

hesitate in pursuing this policy based on the principle of the defense of status quo; it is not of its interest to change this status-quo. We can say that this policy, without mentioning details, differentiates between three elements: encouraging the investments within the economically strong and politically stable states specially within Saudi Arabia, encouraging the policy of aid and dumping in the markets with the economically opened states specially Egypt, exercising an exaggerated effort towards Algeria and Iraq.

In spite of that, studying the declared documents does not obviously help us in exploring the real Japanese perception about the future of these relations with the Arab area. Does it subjugate to the same logic which characterizes its macro policy which is based on the economic interaction or, are there any new variables hiding a deliberated and planned policy not yet declared?

The blue diplomatic book of 1974 published by the Japanese Foreign Ministry introduces to us a general frame which acts as a starting point in our research about the identification of the goals which Japan wants to perform from its policy within the Arabian area. The Japanese diplomacy declares that it has to face four basic elements to implement a multilateral diplomacy utilizing the dialogue policy in which the Japanese side has to respect the situation of each state, to help in creating a new economic system based on the reinforcement of cooperation among the peoples of the world, to develop the deep relations with all the states of contemporary world including the states of the Middle-East, to encourage the mutual understanding through cultural exchange.

If we translate all these elements as we understand it from that blue book published by Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1976 we can affirm two principles. The first is utilizing the notion of dialogue as the base to the Japanese diplomatic action. The second is trying to perform stable relations between Japan and all the states regardless of its political and social systems.

In fact, these principles constitute two logical results of the Japanese policy and its previous improvements. Japan believes in Pacific philosophy as a base for interaction and it ends by accepting what really exists and making of the stable-status the axis of its fiscal policy.

Then, remain the last question which starts by the interrogation: What can Japan introduce as an echo of a foreign policy embracing both pragmatic and moral trends in our contemporary world taking in account our Arab interests?

There is no doubt that the Japanese policy rejects all the traditional bases of analyzing foreign policy and that any political scientist when he affords the process of theorization of Japanese external relations cannot but be surprised and astonished as he advances his analysis in comparing or integrating this case with the evolution of actual models. He will find himself interacting with a model acting against all the usual cases and rejecting the implementation of all the stable traditions.

We must remember some intellectual models:

a. The relation between the economic, military and political weights (importance) constitutes a causal, and necessary logical relation. The first cannot be separated from the second because the history has never known an economic power which does not own its military instrument. Both the military and economic weights determine the characters of political effectiveness in the international sphere. Japan presents economic weight without military ability and without political effectiveness. The question imposed by this observation is: Will this state continue to be as it is now, and till when?

b. Post-war experience, specially when the two camps theory had dominated, confirms that the political effectiveness of the middle-power-states is determined by the nature of their subordinate relations with the two great Super States taking in account the equilibrium between the two camps.

Japan, in spite of the fact that during a certain period of time it was completely subordinated to U.S., it has realized and elaborated an independent and effective policy even relatively from both two camps, more than that it played the role of a mediator between the two camps, gaining by this a sort of international effectiveness that no analyst can deny its strength and depth.

c. The experience of the years that followed the six days war confirms that the regional effectiveness is determined by the organic domination over the regional equilibrium, domination means authority and imposes certain methods which cannot be separated from the military ability.

Japanese foreign policy represents another model aiming at the performance of this domination but utilizing effectiveness and saturation of all the economic needs, in a broad meaning, starting from the consumptive market till the manpower market without neglecting the transference of technology which constitutes another kind of transaction.

This observation must lead us to those international circles and which are attached to the problems of the Arabian area and where the

Japanese voice can say its word and where this word will be an effective one and will be attentively heard.

The theoreticians of foreign policy may attract our attention to four political domains where many interrogations can be raised and introduce many questions about each of them: many probabilities of action ought to be contemplated:

First: The Control of Foreign Policy of the Two Great Powers: Japan is a second degree international power and surely it does not belong to the first class in the stratification of international community, but in spite of that it affirms that it is able to treat to any of them as an equal and so it is able to prevent any of them from exercising its great power when interacting with a state even if this is described by the American policy as a subordinate state and by the Soviet policy as a defeated and enemy state. How can it perform that? What are its conditions? Where is the Arab world from this model of international compromising behavior?

Second: The Policy of Energy in the Scope of International Transaction: There is no doubt that Japan will continue to be the greatest importer of energy in our contemporary world. Either it continues to depend absolutely on the Arabian energy or it tends to variegate its sources, it will continue to be a dominant factor in the international market of oil. Thus it will continue to say its word, and this word will be of a certain weight in all the events attached to the problems of energy. It can impose a kind of saving in the consumption of energy, and it is able to attract the attention to utilize oil in the petrochemical and fertilizers industries, and it is clear that all this is acting to perform benefits for the coming humanity in a world in which the states exporting petrol are trending to separate between an organization for the developing states and another one for the developed states; Japanese moderated policy would be able, in this structure to create a kind of equilibrium in the domain of international competition over the prices of petroleum energy.

Third: We must not slight what Japan can present to the new International economic system. Japan according to its nature is a coloured state, thus it belongs to the non-white peoples, but according to its capitalist structure and economic progress it belongs to the rich developed states. It is the only state in our contemporary world that stands from both the states of the north and the states of the south in the position of a mediator: Taking in account its race it is a coloured state i.e., one of the south states, taking in account its abilities it

is a rich state, i.e. one of the north states. This fact may grant Japan the opportunity of acting as a mediator between the two conflicting sides, but it may also place it in a tearing position: being an industrial state its interests force it to import the natural resources paying the cheapest prices, but according to its historical roots it cannot but being a supporter of the interests of the third world. These facts may prepare Japan to play an active and determinant international role in the future world.

Fourth: We can add in this concern another field where Japan is prepared to play an important role during the following years: The process of controlling and minimizing the armament specially the armament related to the nuclear usage in the military activity. Japan, till now, is looked at as a disarmed state, thus being a great economic technological and even nuclear state it is able to initiate in all the spheres related not only to disarmament but also to the control of nuclear weapons, facing by that the five great powers which constitute for the moment the club of nuclear abilities, i.e. U.S., S.U., China, France and Britain; it may accomplish this task in order to minimize the effect of the nuclear ability not only in what concerns the international equilibrium but also it can be very active in order to protect and guarantee the non-nuclear states.

TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ARAB AND JAPANESE MODERNIZATION EXPERIENCES

-A Case Study of Some Social and Political Aspects-

Ali Hilal Dessouki

What was at the outset a discussion of the political aspects of Arab and Japanese experiences, has evolved into a comparative study of the processes of modernization in the Arab world, particularly Egypt, and Japan. This comparison has of necessity assumed the form of a survey, rather than a detailed study and is intended primarily to point out, in the first place, the validity of such a comparative analysis. Secondly, it will attempt to articulate issues for further investigation and analysis by way of outlining certain significant processes of development, cultural/religious, and institutions which can be seen to underlay the particular form which "modernization" has taken in these two areas. Further suggestions will be offered concerning the manner in which these processes, values and institutions may have furthered or impeded the modernizing of these two areas.

The Japanese experience has been selected for comparison because Japan provides a striking contrast to not only the Arab world, but to almost every "developing" country or "new state" in terms of its apparent success in attaining parity with the "developed" sector of the international community in almost every sphere. Superficially, at any rate, Japan strikes the observer as being almost as totally "modern" as any other nation of the world. By contrasting those factors and conditions obtaining in Japanese society prior to the time that it began what may be termed its modern transformation (the Meiji Restoration of 1868 is usually so considered) with factors and conditions considered to comprise elements of the pre-modern society of the Arab world, it may be possible to discern which of these factors, if any, were held in common and which provide contrast.

Not only would this indicate areas which could then be specified as topics for further research, but may also provide clues toward answering the perplexing question of why the Arab countries have not "succeeded" in modernizing to the same extent as has Japan.

Within this paper the terms "success", "achievement", "developing/development" shall be understood in their accepted meanings without reference to the validity of their pursuit.

A second aspect is possibly of more importance for this discussion,

if posed in contradistinction to its traditional society, exactly how modern is Japanese society at present, relative to the usual Western European/North American example. Or, has Japan in its modernity succeeded in synthesizing its pre-modern past institutions, value-structure and belief-systems with Western technology and method and created a modern Japanese society as opposed to simply a modern society. It is maintained herein that this is certainly the case; personal experience and recent study have been utilized to support the proposition that modern society in Japan is essentially Japanese. Many striking examples are available, and perhaps the particular structure of Japanese business organization is sufficiently illustrative to provide supporting evidence for this hypothesis at present.

Not only is the Japanese example useful for comparison because of its attainment of parity with Western nations, but also these two societies, Japan and the Arab world, were confronted with this crisis situation, the necessity for a "modern transformation", at approximately the same point in time and were thus faced with the same technological and intellectual stage of maturity in the West.

Another possible value of such a comparison is derived from an avoidance of the difficulties inherent in constantly viewing the Arab world in contrast with the model of Western Europe. Both Japan and the Arab world were faced not with a process of slow evolution, but with attempting to modernize rather immediately. When one juxtaposes a developing area with the West there is the tendency to overlook the centuries of evolution which formed the basis for technological and intellectual positions reached by the West at the time of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Consequently observers are often perplexed by the hesitant and resultant slowness with which these values and techniques are assimilated into these developing societies.

With Japan we are provided with an example of a society which, similar to the Arab world, has been confronted with the issue of meeting the challenge posed by Western technological superiority at approximately the same period in time but yet has been more successful in meeting the challenge in the sense that it is no longer a "developing" area but one considered to be "developed". And, during the process of attaining this position it has also succeeded in integrating its traditional society with modernity with much more apparent success than has the Arab world.

It would appear that Islamic modernism (Mohammad Abduh's school) has essentially been the attempt on the part of Muslims to carry out the self-same process, an attempt to synthesize Islam and modernity- to gain

the one without forsaking the other¹. The contrast then, may provide examples of how the Japanese were able to retain certain traditional value systems and institutions which can, at the same time, be said to have facilitated the process of modernization. Yet, on the other hand, it may show how institutions and values of similar type may not be as conducive to change in the Arab Islamic context.

Lastly, a portion of recent scholarship in Japanese studies has been intimately involved in these questions - more specifically, how did the period preceding the Restoration facilitate or inhibit modernization? The approach in this undertaking may well be employed, to the extent to which it is applicable, in the study of the modernization of the Arab world.

Generally, the use of concepts derived from examinations of contemporary societies would seem to be of great importance for historical research. Through the utilization of these concepts the historian may be able to throw light on the processes underlying great social, political, and economic changes which might otherwise be lost in the welter of particular facts and events. The practice of historical sociology, even though limited oftentimes by the lack of data, can indicate to us the character and processes of social change in societies no longer contemporary and by so doing bring us to some understanding of the vast changes that may contemporary societies are now undergoing.²

That the process of modernization is a complex process is a truism. The implications of the use of this term are many and varied, implying, among others, concrete technological innovations or industrialization, the increasing specificity of functional roles, and the secularization of society. This latter aspect would seem to include such various factors as education, jurisprudence, sentiments of nationalism and non-traditional attitudes towards the political process. It may be maintained that, in actuality, the progress toward industrialization and the use of technology is in many respects symptomatic of other attitudinal and ideational processes or, of how adaptive the traditional society is/was toward the implied demands of modernity.

A paper of this scope cannot, of necessity, hope to raise all of these issues. The major considerations in terms of this discussion will be with regard to certain significant socio-religious values and political-economic factors of the two societies to be compared.

In restatement, the question revolves around the ability of Arab society to cope with the challenges of modernization, be they religious, educational, economic, technological, political or otherwise. Perhaps it may be reduced to a more basic problem: can Arab Islamic society guide and determine its "progress" through the utilization of its own

intellectual and institutional heritage or must it be led by forces of change over which it can exert no effective control? This, certainly, was Mohammad Abduh's basic dilemma, and his efforts, were by way of seeking its resolution. In other words, is total secularization of Islamic society necessary for it to become "completely" modern society, in relative terms, or may it incorporate its own intellectual, religious and institutional traditions into such development?

It is in this light that a view toward the Japanese experience may be instructive. While such a comparative analysis will not pretend to answer these questions, it may help to point out not only how Japan was able to attain such a high degree of modernization in such a short space of time, but also how Japanese society, in its modernity, was able to retain a large measure of its tradition. This method may also to some degree indicate the difficulties which Arab countries are encountering while undergoing their modernization processes.

Marion T. Levy provides a methodology for those who are endeavoring to examine the process of modernization in a given society ("Modernization" being defined as the process whereby the members of a society increasingly utilize inanimate sources of power and/or tools to multiply the effects of their efforts)³

Any problem of social change is a problem of comparative social analysis. Three stages of a social system must be distinguished either explicitly or implicitly: 1- that from which change takes place, the initial stage; 2- that during which the change takes place, the transitional stage; 3- that of the system when the change understudy may be considered complete, the resultant state.⁴

This paper will, then, attempt to establish those areas or issues which a comparative analysis of the "initial stages" of Japanese and Arab society (with particular emphasis upon the Egyptian context for which much more material is seemingly available) may undertake to handle. The entire problem, of course, would entail at the same time a survey of the transitional stage, involving the agents of change and the intensity of the impact of innovation upon these respective societies. However, this complex problem will be deferred to a later time.

For purposes of discussion the Japanese period of the Tokugawa Shogunate (ca.1600-1868) will be considered as the initial stage. As regards the Arab world in the pre-modern period, from approximately 1500 and the establishment of the hegemony of the Ottoman Sultanate, the lack of materials presents special difficulties. Although a certain amount of primary source material exists, it has yet to receive the attention it would benefit from with regard to economic history.⁵ Indeed, one issue to be raised is the requirement for further study of this period

of Islamic socio-economic and political history. Consequently in most cases only general remarks may be made with regard to Egypt. Also, where possible an indication of trends appearing in the late medieval/early pre-modern period will be indicated as a basis for further discussion.

In any event, the issues with which this paper is concerned can perhaps be characterized as falling into three general categories: socio-religious, political and economic. The first of these, that which may be termed the socio-religious factor, possibly is separable as a distinct category and yet serves as a bond, linking the other elements together as a social unit.

Tokugawa society was characterized by a legal and hereditary class system, with prestige correlating directly with power. Economic wealth was not, therefore, the primary determinative of status. On the contrary ideally, and actually in the early portion of this period, power determined wealth⁶. This stratification scheme, based ideologically upon traditional Chinese views, divided society into four strata: samurai or warrior-administrator, peasant, artisan, and merchant in that order.⁷ The actual system of stratification, as reflected in the intermediate and later periods of Tokugawa history, was somewhat more complex. There had been, according to Dr. Silberman's analysis, three basic levels of prestige based upon a consideration of political and economic conditions.

The highest status group, in order of ranking consisted of the Shogun and branch families, the Emperor and court, the Daimyo and related families including wealthy urban merchants, the upper samurai (who staffed the bulk of the feudal administrative offices), the lower samurai who were generally excluded from high administrative jobs and therefore came to comprise a local elite, and wealthy local merchants. The intermediate status group was comprised generally of lower urban and rural merchants and "upper peasants" who formed the village leadership. The lowest status grouping was composed of artisans and the great mass of the peasantry.⁸

There was some mobility between the generalized status groups-high, intermediate and low — though social mobility was largely within the groups rather than between them.⁹ This point shall be discussed at greater length later when considering the role of the political elite and its emergence, but for the moment the above generalization will suffice.

Another factor for consideration would be that of family structure, specially with regard to inheritance. Not only did the family in Tokugawa

society represent in many respects a microcosm of the total society, embodying and reflecting as it did the same central value system of the society as a whole,¹⁰ but it also played the primary role in determining social status and consequently access to income, education and political power. As Japanese society prior to 1868 was ascriptive, particularistic and kinship oriented in nature, "family stratum position played an important role in social and elite mobility"¹¹. Primogeniture of inheritance as well as the lack of inter-status group mobility contributed greatly to the accumulation and maintenance of both political and economic power and resources.¹²

Overlaying and supporting this social structure is what came to be the central value system of Tokugawa Japan, 'Bushido', characterized by one writer as the "religion of loyalty".¹³ Bellah states for further emphasis that:

'Bushido', the Way of the Warrior, is of special importance to any inquiry into the values and ethics of Tokugawa or modern Japan. This is because the 'bushi' or 'samurai' embodies or were supposed to embody the central Japanese values, and because in fact the ethic of 'Bushido' became in Tokugawa and modern times the national ethic, or at least a large part of it.¹⁴

If allowed to summarize and synthesize a great amount of material, the Bushido ethic, apparently an amalgamation of traditional Shinto and Buddhism reinforced by Confucian teaching on the virtue of loyalty,¹⁵ may be said to have placed its central emphasis upon primary loyalty and obligation to one's own feudal lord.¹⁶ The anecdote regarding 'the forty-seven ronin' is often cited as an example of the epitome of this value system. This obligation was accepted to such extent that family loyalty was surpassed by loyalty to the overlord.¹⁷

In connection with Bushido the essence of Shinto would also have to be discussed. This has particular relevance in the Restoration period when the promotion of nationalism was greatly facilitated by the transfer of loyalty from the feudal lord to the Emperor.¹⁸ Although a great many practices of cult nature comprise Shinto religion, for the purposes of a discussion of this nature the relationship of the members of Japanese society to the Emperor and the gods would be of prime concern.

Robert Bellah summarizes the important characteristics of the Japanese religious system and the relevance of its values to a study of this nature:

The particular characteristic of the Japanese institutional system was its strong emphasis on the vertical axis and relatively small reliance on horizontal ties. That is, institutional structure was held together largely through ties of loyalty between superior and inferior. A strengthening of this system then meant

a strengthening of the intensity of loyalty and thus affected the relation between the political and institutional system. Being able to count on a high level of loyalty, the powers of coordination which the political system could exercise vis-à-vis the institutional system were also strengthened. With respect to the problems of modernization and industrialization it is clear that such intensive controlling powers of the political system and the disciplined response of the people to them were a major advantage.¹⁹

As opposed to the Japanese case it has been shown that by the time of the Mamluk regime in Egypt the rather distinct social classes, based at the same time upon function and economic status, as indicated by Goitein,²⁰ had become somewhat blurred. This in turn perhaps demotes a greater possibility of social mobility than was present in Tokugawa society. Although it is not possible at this time to determine whether this phenomenon predominated elsewhere in the Arab world or to what extent it pre-dated the Mamluk period, Lapidus does notice the great representation of non-merchant professionals within the commercial community-particularly the ulama but also including administrators and others. He is even led to say that: "Instead of two distinct classes, one broad ulama-merchant body was formed".²¹ Professor Petrushevsky also cites a similar widening of commercial interests in Medieval Persia - although in this case within the context of the landed aristocracy.²²

Another trend which led to an increasing lack of role specificity on the one hand as well as to increasing social mobility was one whereby the close collaboration between the Mamluk state and the merchant ultimately resulted in the usurpation of commercial activities by the state and the merging of commercial and political functions.²³ The Japanese merchant community desired and was able to resist to a large degree such tendencies on the part of Tokugawa political administration.²⁴

In contrast to the Tokugawa religious institutional system which tended to reinforce social immobility and particularistic loyalties, seen in the Japanese case as in many ways an advantage regarding the process of modernization, the Arab-Islamic tendency, ideally egalitarian and universalistic, would seem to promote, perhaps as indicated in the Mamluk experience, mobility and interaction between social classes and groupings as well as to promote extra-personal and extra-regional loyalties.

Social mobility may be a great advantage in the process of modernization, on the one hand, yet, lack of specificity of function would appear to act as a detriment. At the same time, the particularistic loyalties found in Tokugawa society were apparently greatly conducive to a nationalistic ethic, greatly facilitated the focusing of aims and goals

in a political organization- the nation state and emperor, whereas the ideological confusion resulting from attempts to synthesize Islamic universalism with nationalistic particularism is as yet an unresolved dilemma.

Upon turning to a consideration of political factors two separate areas will be discussed: leadership and law.

In a more detailed study the subject of law would be given a separate category, however, its specially prominent political function in Tokugawa society justifies its inclusion at this point, for, "Law was an instrument to be used by rulers but not to limit their actions".²⁵ Since a great deal of further research would be required prior to the undertaking of a comparative study in this area the topic will be mentioned only in passing. This does not seek to diminish the potential importance of this consideration, however.

The appropriateness of the Shari'ah to modern legal application is a recognized point of dispute. And the degree to which its maintenance inhibits modernization, and the ease and degree to which it may be modified or reinterpreted are also issues of great concern for a number of Arab countries, as well. In the Japanese case the advantages provided by the lack of highly developed traditional legal system are readily apparent vis-à-vis the process of modernization: "Since no rationalized system of jurisprudence existed, interpretation of the law was made in terms of the general morality as the particular magistrate saw it. Needless to say, his commitment was to the political authority, not to the law itself or to 'the people'."²⁶

Over and above this, the mainstream of pre-modern Japanese law itself was incorporated in unwritten custom.²⁷ A body of "justiciable" law in the commercial and criminal fields did develop in the latter half of the Tokugawa period, and consequently, the same period of time witnessed the beginnings of a professionalization of the law in the modern sense.²⁸ However, one observer is led to comment that: "...Edo law did not reach deep into the society, nor did shogunal civil law extend territorially beyond its own lands (one-seventh of Japan)".²⁹

Although it is unclear as to how or even whether Tokugawa legal institutions contributed in a direct sense to the process of modernization, it may be concluded that at least Japanese society was not possessed of divinely sanctioned, extremely complex, widely applicable and deeply penetrating legal tradition which had to be dealt with when embarking upon modernization.

The question of political leadership in the respective societies

is as involved as any issue yet raised. The elements of consideration would require a determination (with regard to both the 'initial' and "transitional" stage of the process) of the nature of the leadership on all levels: from "national" to local, the social groups and/or classes from where these groups generally originate (d), to what extent the transition to modernity was or is accompanied by a continuation of these elites in their former roles, whether traditional groups functioned in new roles and to what extent and at what level non-traditional groups assumed leadership roles. Also significant would be a determination of the extent to which central values and aims are held in common between the levels of political leadership and between the leadership groups and the total membership of the society. Communication between the levels of leadership would seem to be the central issue.

While it is not possible to deal with the intricate historical process resulting in the peculiar nature of the Restoration leadership, it has been shown by Professor Silberman that this new ruling elite, having developed the requisite dissatisfaction with the existing regime, the requisite administrative skills and techniques to implement modern bureaucratic organization and administration as well as the necessary commitment to innovation and hence modernization, emerged from the lower levels of the previous ruling elite. In the immediate post-Restoration period this new elite was increasingly comprised by the lower samurai. It can be seen that that increasing mobility of an interclass nature was not necessarily a factor in the emergence of this leadership, although mobility did emerge as a trend in the latter portion of the Tokugawa period and was definitely a factor in the overall socio-economic development of Japan.

More important, perhaps, were other consequences resulting from the emergence of the lower samurai in a position of leadership. As Silberman has commented:

...it is not enough that the national elite is committed to innovation. Unless local elites are also committed in this direction, attempts at modernization will be slow and accompanied with considerable conflict.³⁰

In the Japanese case this situation was avoided as a consequence of the nature of the new elite which had been, prior to 1868, essentially a local elite. As was mentioned earlier due to the nature of the society's stratification structure, attainment, for the most part, of higher level posts was not possible for the lower samurai.³¹ Partially due to an increasingly depressed economic position throughout the latter half of the Tokugawa period, at the time of the Restora-

tion: "One might well say that those lower and upper samurai who attained posts in the upper civil service represented, or at least were conceived as representing, a large group of their compatriots who were committed to any policy that would put an end to their increasing loss of status."³²

Silberman summarizes the results and the importance of the lower samurai's leadership:

There was, thus, a community of commitment to certain values, to patterns of behavior between the new national elite and the local elites. This commonality of values and aims and behavior provided the basis of easy communication between these two elite structures. Communication was made even easier by drawing into the national government many of the local elite, identifying them with innovation whether they approved of it or not. This linkage between national and local elites made the introduction of new political and economic institutions relatively easy. The rapidity of Japan's modernization was, then, in large part a consequence of the social origins of those who were committed to innovation.

The importance of continuity of leadership and common commitment to values and aims is then readily apparent. Such a study as that of Silberman's undertaken with regard to the particular regional Arab societies might prove specially revealing in connection with the difficulties encountered during their processes of modernization. An initial investigation might involve a determination of the exact nature of local leadership in pre-modern Arab society and its relationship with the various "anciens régimes". Lapidus' study indicated the preponderant role in local leadership played by the ulama' and the leading merchants as well as their close relationship with the ruling institution.³⁴ The apparent lack of commonality between this local elite, if trends apparent toward the end of the Mamluk period remained in effect until the immediate pre-modern period, and the newly emergent national elite committed to innovation may indeed be a very valid reason for the conflict which modernization in the Arab world had induced. This is not to say that it could necessarily be otherwise, but that such a study may provide valuable insights toward an understanding of the interacting forces in the period under consideration.

As is the case with the other categories the survey of the economic conditions of the respective pre-modern societies cannot be as comprehensive as would be desirable and could similarly, also constitute as adequate subject of discussion of itself. Studies are as yet inconclusive on the direct participation of the Japanese merchant class in the Restoration movement³⁵ and a study of the economic, and indeed, the socio-economic history of a pre-modern Arab society has yet to be written.

In addition, at this point the research for a more full study is admittedly incomplete. Nonetheless, it is interesting and perhaps significant to parallel the development of the Tokugawa period with that of the Muslim world from approximately the ninth through at least the fourteenth century.

Just as Muslim society underwent a socio-economic "revolution" or transformation following the establishment of the Abbassid Caliphate so also did Japan in the Tokugawa period. Both transformations related to a very noticeable process of urbanization.³⁶

Consequent to these "transformations" the real importance and socio-economic status (if not the ideal status of the Japanese merchant) of the merchant classes in both the Muslim as well as Japanese cases underwent obvious increases. Two different sets of principal factors are apparently responsible for these changes in merchant status (though certainly not limited to these), reflecting differences in the structures of the societies.

The Islamic world, astride the major east-west trade routes, became intimately involved in that trade with the government apparently not participating at the outset to any great degree, the merchants benefiting accordingly. The increasing "enfeudalization"- for the lack of more suitable terminology although "militarization" would be more appropriate as well as the associated incursions of Central Asian steppe nomads apparently acted as a detriment to the activities of an international commercial nature. The Islamic merchant was best able to utilize the benefits of his geographical position before the militarization of the state occurred.

Whereas, in Japanese society the rise of the merchant resulted as a rather direct consequence of the Shogunate system of feudalism.³⁷ This system, termed bakuhan, provided the daimyo, or feudal lord, with a relatively autonomous and self-sufficient existence with one very important additional consideration. In order to ensure the loyalty of his vassals the Shogun required that the daimyo maintain his family and a second residence at the capital, Edo. This was termed the san-kin-kotai system and was essentially a method whereby the Shogun kept the daimyo family as hostages and required that he make appearances at court on periodic occasions.³⁸ These obligations then required the daimyo to convert a portion, increasingly larger as the period progressed, of his "tax-rice" income to cash in order to meet his expenses in the capital. Consequently there arose two distinct regional groups of merchants aside from others locally oriented: one in Osaka which became the national

entrepot for rice conversion and one in Edo to handle credit exchange and the distribution of goods in the capital city. Due to a general rise in the socio-economic well-being of Japan during this period other prominent groups of merchants arose, specially those responsible for the distribution of urban manufacture goods.³⁹

The ruling elite became increasingly dependent upon the merchant for cash and the extension of loans to the daimyo became a prominent aspect of the society as their feudal (han) lands provided less and less of their monetary requirements- specially due, apparently, to the san-kin-kotai. The resultant condition is summarized by Sheldon:

The inherent strength of the merchants' position lay in their monopoly of commercial and financial activities and the consequent dependence of the samurai class on the merchants for the distribution of food and all types of commercial commodities, and for the essential financial services, specially lending services, which became more and more necessary to them because of their deepening indebtedness.⁴⁰

Generally speaking it may be noticed that the merchant communities provided various institutions for and effected the respective societies in similar fashion. Among these are the facilitation of the monetization of the economy. In the Islamic world this was accomplished by the merchants who served to accommodate the various coinages, principally the dinar and dirham, circulating in the empire. This role was assumed by merchants cum money-changers (sayrafi) in Mamluk Egypt.⁴¹ The Japanese merchant facilitated, in effect, the changeover from a barter to a money economy: a very important pre-condition to modernity. Both of these respective communities provided institutions of credit and banking, both public and private, as well as initiating a "letter-of-credit" system in each economy, the suftaja⁴² in the Muslim world and the tegata⁴³ in Tokugawa Japan.

A significant consequence of these developments was the increase in de facto social mobility and the social status of commercial enterprise in general, allowing for a more widespread participation in mercantile activities specially on the part of the upper strata of society. This was important in both of these societies, though engendering increasing governmental interference in the private sector to the apparent detriment of at least the Mamluk economy in the Muslim world. In the Japanese context this factor facilitated the entrance of the samurai elite into commercial activities enhancing Japan's ability to implement industrialization on a wide basis without as much reticence on the part of the ruling elite as might have otherwise been the case.⁴⁴ One significant difference is apparent in the development of these societies.

The Mamluk government which co-opted commercial functions was not committed to innovation but to its own institutional perpetuation and aggrandizement, whereas the commitment of the Japanese Restoration leadership was most definitely modernization.

One final point may be mentioned, although its significance is as yet not entirely clear. Interestingly enough, the period of Tokugawa's socio-economic expansion coincides very nearly to the economic decline of the Muslim Middle East. One might even go out on a limb and conjecture that, at least with regard to Egypt, Muslim society was most ripe economically for modernization in the fifteenth century.

CONCLUSION

This brief survey may have served to indicate that two extremely important factors conducive to Japan's particular modernization process were the nature and origins of its Restoration leadership and, at the same time, its institutional emphasis upon particularistic loyalty and allegiance. As one source mentioned, it was relatively easy to transfer this allegiance from one particular governmental institution to another, from the daimyo and Shogunate to the nation-state/Emperor, specially since the membership of the national government remained essentially the same. It came primarily from a sub-stratum within the major social class: the samurai nobility.

Further, and seemingly more important with regard to Arab societies, it has been shown that a national elite committed to innovation is not sufficient. Unless local elites are also committed in this direction, attempts at modernization will be slow and accompanied with considerable conflict.⁴⁶ Silberman's statement with regard to India may be particularly applicable to Arab societies:

Here as elsewhere the elite in the national government are often competently trained and committed to the creation of a modern society. Yet this elite has attained little success in its attempt to communicate innovations to the vast mass of society. In the absence of a mass communication system characteristic of a highly integrated society, such an attack upon tradition must take place through those who wield power at the lowest levels. But these two elite structures, and there may be more, have few or no common values or norms. The national elite differs from local elites in social origin and status, in economic status, in educational background and as result in language as well. The value or orientations, the objectives and the whole pattern of life of these two elites are almost as distinctively different as if they were inhabitants of two different societies. Under such circumstances, the national elite must overcome vast obstacles to introduce the simplest type of innovation.⁴⁶

This paper was written with the intention of being a point of departure, an agenda for further research. It is hoped that it has at least shown the possibility of gaining new insights through the use of comparative social analysis as well as the prospect of this analytical approach enabling those concerned to frame basic questions from different perspectives, perhaps with some increased capability of resolution.

NOTES

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2. Bernard Silberman, Ministers of Modernization, Elite Mobility in the Meiji Restoration 1868-1873 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1964), p. 117.
3. Marion J. Levy, Jr. Modernization and the Structure of Society, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p.11.
4. Marion J. Levy, Jr. "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan", in Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, eds., Simon Kuznets et.al. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1955), p. 497.
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6. Robert Bellah, Tokugawa Religion, the Values of Pre-Industrial Japan (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 24, and Silberman, op. cit., p. 17.
7. Ibid
8. Silberman, op. cit., pp. 7-13.
9. Bellah, op. cit., p. 25.
10. Ibid., p. 39.
11. Silberman, op. cit., p. 31.
12. Levy, op. cit., p. 517.
13. Bellah, op. cit., p. 81.
14. Ibid., p. 90.
15. Ibid., pp. 55, 88-89.
16. Ibid., p. 89.
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18. Bellah, op. cit., p. 53.
19. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
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21. Ira M. Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p.109; See also comments regarding social stratification, pp.80-81.
22. I.D. Petrushevsky, "The Socio-Economic Conditions of Iran Under the Il-Khans", in the Cambridge History of Iran, vol.5, ed., J.A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 509.
23. Lapidus, op. cit., pp. 119-128.
24. C.D. Sheldon, The Rise of the Merchant Class in Tokugawa Japan, 1600-1868 (Locust Valley, N.Y.: J.J. Augustin, 1958), p. 166; and Bellah, op. cit., p. 25.
25. D.P. Henderson, "The Evolution of Tokugawa Law", in Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan, ed., John W. Wall et al. (Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 208.
26. Bellah, op. cit., p. 24.
27. Henderson, op. cit., p. 204.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 205.
30. Silberman, op. cit., p. 114.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., pp.114-115.
34. Lapidus, op. cit., pp.108-109; see also chapter IV, "The Urban Notables", pp. 116-142.
35. Sheldon, op. cit., p. 37; and E.S. Crawcour, "Changes in Japanese Commerce in the Tokugawa Period" in Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan, pp. 189, 201-202.
36. For the Japanese case: Sheldon, op. cit., pp. 4-5, 8.
37. Crawcour, op. cit., p. 196; and Sheldon, op. cit., p. 18.

38. Silberman, *op. cit.*, pp. 9,123.
39. Crawcour, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-201.
40. Sheldon, *op. cit.*, p. 166.
41. W.J. Fischel, *Jews in the Economic and Political Life of Medieval Islam* (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1937) p.4; and Claude Cahen, "Quelques Problemes Economique de l'Iraq Buyide", in *Annales de L'Institut d'etude Orientales* (Alger: Universite d'Alger), Vol.X (1952), p.353. *Sayrafi* are discussed by Lapidus, *op. cit.*, ... pp. 120-121.
42. Suftaja, discussed by Fishel, *op. cit.*, p. 17, and Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, p. 242.
43. Sheldon, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
44. Levey, *op. cit.*, p. 531.
45. Silberman, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 113-114.

ON THE EXCHANGE OF EXPERIENCES BETWEEN THE EMERGENCE OF JAPAN AND EGYPT

Mouhamad Anis

At the beginning of the Meiji restoration in Japan (1868-1912) a book was published in the form of a political novel. Such was the only way of expressing the opposition at that time in Japan. The name of the book was "Kajin no Kigu" and it was reviewed in English under the title "Romantic Meeting with two fair Ladies". The book was a sort of autobiography of the author whose pen-name was Tokai Sanshi. The real name was, however, Shiba Shiro.

The first part of the book was published in 1885 and the last and eight parts in 1897. The novel talks about a journey made by Mr. Shiro to Ceylon and Egypt in 1888. In Ceylon he met Orabi Pasha, the leader of the Egyptian National Revolution in Egypt against foreign domination and the Khedive Tawfik. Shiro after listening to Orabi, decided to visit Egypt to see by himself the consequences of the foreign domination and the defeat of a rising national state at the hands of Western imperialism. It might be important to give a brief idea about the education and the growth of Shiba Shiro and why he was so interested in the Egyptian cause. Shiba Shiro was born in December 1852 and he was one of Lord Matsudaira men who fought against the clans of Satsuma and Nagato, beside the Tokugawa Shogunate. We know very little of this conflict, but the net result that one might gather is that Shiba Shiro was fighting against the Meiji who won the battle at last.

Shiro at the time was fourteen years old, when the Meiji proved to be victorious, he realized that it would be rather impossible for him to reach any high post in the Japanese administration under the Meiji. Therefore he decided to continue his education abroad. Under these circumstances one can understand the reason why he went to the United States, and with the assistance of some relatives, he joined a college specialised in economics and finance in St. Francisco. This took place in 1879. In 1881 he continued his studies at the University of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia. In that University he studied finance at Wharton College of Finance such subjects seemed to be appealing to Shiba, why? It happened that Japan at that time was at the cross-road of its development and there was only two ways for Japan to choose either depending on foreign loans and dealing with imperialistic Western countries as a weak partner or depending on its national resources and confronting Western imperialism.

Egypt stood at that time with Orabi's Revolution, as an example of the second way. But Egypt was occupied by Britain and Western imperialism dominated it, economically and politically. That is why Mr. Shiro was interested in the cause of Egypt to the extent that he went to Ceylon to learn from Orabi himself the story of Egypt, struggle against Western imperialism.

This explains also why he was interested in economics and Finance.

From his book one can also easily gather that Shiro was antagonistic to the idea that Japan should be committed to Western imperialism.

Japan did not take into consideration his views. On the contrary Japan made a military alliance with Great Britain in 1902. That is why he and his Minister of Trade resigned as a protest to the state's policy.

From his book one could easily say that the author had recalled how many weak nations in history had been subdued or oppressed by the strong such as Egypt, Poland, Hungary, and others all formed a striking object-lesson in the problem of national survival, and he was determined to do all he could to prevent his own country from treading the path along which those ill-fated nations had gone. Accordingly he decided to warn his fellow-countrymen by publishing his own views on such vital matters as political freedom, a firm foreign policy and the development of the state on an industrial basis.

Two years after the military alliance with Britain Japan defeated Russia in a decisive battle (1904).

The victory of Japan was received in the Arab World as whole and most particularly among the circles of the national movement with great admiration. Mustafa Kamel, the leader of the National Party (afterwards) wrote his book on Japan in 1904. The name of the book was "The Rising Sun" in which he expressed his utmost admiration. This Arab admiration of Japan went on after Mustafa Kamel and remained up till now. Japan was always looked upon in the Arab World as a successful oriental country who was able to build itself and become a super power. Japan was the only foreign country mentioned in the Egyptian National Charter announced by the late leader Nasser in 1962.

However during Mustafa Kamel's time at the beginning of the century there were two specific reasons to cause such huge admiration.

A) Japan defeated Russia which always threatened the biggest Islamic country, i.e., the Ottoman Empire. And the movement of Mustafa Kamel was relying heavily on the Ottoman Empire. Egypt, even after the British occupation, was legally and internationally a part of the Ottoman Empire.

B) Cromer, the British consul in Egypt followed the policy of throw-

ing the Egyptians into complete despair of getting rid of British occupation. He continuously threw doubts on the Egyptian capacity to be an independent nation, mainly because Egypt was an oriental country. Then came the victory of Japan over Russia as an opposite example to Cromer's preaching Mustafa Kamel's views were rather naive. He never thought that Japan was playing the role of great Britain in South East Asia. It was a complete imperialistic state. Japan invaded Formosa in 1895 and in 1905 took by force the South part of Sakhalen from Russia. She fully played the part of an imperialistic state in Manchuria and in 1910 conquered Korea.

Thus Japan in its development as state committed itself in imperialistic bargains. No wonder that the war between Japan and Russia took place in 1904, the same year which Great Britain concluded the entente cordiale in the same year Mustafa Kamel, however didn't realize these facts.

In this book, previously mentioned he says in page 3, "Some of us, the people of the Orient, say we are a nation whose role has already passed, and history has closed its political existence and they have no way to be on the level of Europe or the capacity to resist it and there is no other way but to submit to the West and accept its domination without work for the present and without hope for the future."

Then came the nation of Japan to prove the wrong of this preaching and reminding the orientalist that the way for prosperous development lies just in front of them if they work hard to reach their aims. He goes on in such a language through all his book, forgetting completely that Japan at that time was no less imperialistic than England and that through a strong army and a strong aggressive military navy Japan reached what England had already reached. The only difference was that England was a western state, and Japan was (and still) an oriental state. The imperialistic intention and aim were not realized by Mustafa Kamel and the victim was China in case of Japan, while Egypt was the victim of Great Britain.

To conclude, the main idea of the author of this article one might say that Egypt by its defeat during Orabi's Revolution was giving Mr. Shiba Shiro and Japan a failing but true and honourable example of a nationalist movement defeated in the face of an empire like the British empire while Japan gave the Arab Nation a successful but untrue and false example.

In December 1937 the Moqutataf, an Egyptian Magazine, wrote about Japan, "Britain was the Greatest old enemy of Russia, giving Japan the

most support and courage to conclude with her the treaty of 1902 which was immediately changed to military alliance and when the war was waged between Russia and Japan in 1904-1905, Japan was able, with the help of some Western states, to defeat Russia".

HAJJI OMAR MITSUTARO YAMAOKA,

-His Life and His Works-

Shinji Maejima

- I -

Who was the first Muslim in Japan? And who was the first Hajji in Japan? To the first question, it is difficult to give a definite answer. However to the second the answer is easy because we can say without hesitation that Mitsutaro YAMAOKA was the first Hajji in Japan. Even with the first question, it is clear that YAMAOKA was at least one of the first Muslims in Japan and that he consecrated the latter part of his long life to the promotion of friendship between the Islamic people and his compatriots. YAMAOKA was born in Fukuyama city, Hiroshima prefecture, on the 7th of March, 1880. He finished primary school in Tokyo, and middle school in Okayama prefecture. After that he entered the Department of Russian language of the Tokyo Foreign Language School (the present Tokyo Gaikokugo Daigaku). He was graduated from this school in the spring of 1904, as one of the first graduates of its Russian Department. At that time Japan had already declared war against the Empire of Russia. Hence, YAMAOKA volunteered for the army and was enrolled as an interpreter in the 10th Division of Himeji and went to the front in Manchuria.

After the restoration of peace in the following year, he served in the army in Manchuria and Korea for a few years, and during this period became acquainted with Shaikh Abd al-Rashid Ibrahim, a patriotic scholar born in KAZAN from a distinguished family of the Bashdjirt (Bashkir) people. Shaikh Ibrahim was condemned to exile because of his activities in independence for his native people and he came to Japan, where he considerably influenced some Japanese through his teachings of the doctrines and sublimity of Islam.

YAMAOKA wrote in the preface of his work entitled, "The Mysterious Power of al-Islam" (published in 1921) as follows:

"It was in September of 1909 that the present writer left Japan for Mecca in Arabia. I sailed to Singapore, Colombo, South India and reached Bombay. There I came together with Mr. Ibrahim who had left Japan before me. I learned from him there the doctrine, discipline and method of prayer of Islam, etc. and then started for Mecca".

In fact, YAMAOKA's conversion to the faith of Islam took place only after his arrival in Bombay. His conversion was at first, it is said, for convenience sake in order to enter the holy city. But after that, he became a sincere believer of al-Islam.

If this was so, what was the initial purpose of his going to Mecca? We cannot find any explanation from YAMAOKA himself concerning this question. However in the preface of another of his book, entitled "My Journey through Arabia, the Land of Mystery in the World" (published in 1912 in Tokyo), the author says as follows:

"We cannot agree with those are intently yearning only after the civilization of Europe and America. We should hold in respect not only our country, but also the many people in Asia and Africa, and we should strive for their happiness. Some far and clear-sighted seniors of ours have already taken into consideration the situation above cited and having turned their attention to the South-West corner of Asia they decided to dispatch me there. Their minds are truly immeasurably deep and are full of magnificent ideals...".

Who were these farsighted seniors of YAMAOKA who encouraged and helped him to go to Arabia? It is not easy to ascertain their names.

- II -

YAMAOKA and his friend left Bombay on the 20th of November, and sailed on board in English steamer with many Indian and Chinese pilgrims, arriving in Jidda on the 10th of December, 1909.

From Jidda to Mecca they hired mules and entered the Holy City on the 11th of December.

When YAMAOKA left Tokyo, he said that he would not return to Japan alive. But quite unexpectedly, the authorities and the people of Mecca treated their first Japanese visitor warmly. On the 22nd of that same month he was able to attend the ceremony of Wuquf at Arafat, though he was suffering from a fever and dizziness, and was bestowed with the honor of becoming the first Hajji of Japan.

Before that day, on the 14th of December, he was granted an audience with Sharif Husain ibn Ali. YAMAOKA wrote in his book above mentioned his impressions of the sharif as follows:

"His Majesty the Imam seemed to be around sixty years old with plump cheeks, silver bearded. His attitude was calm and majestic.... Seeing him, I thought to myself that if some drastic changes ever occurred in the Ottoman Empire, just who would be able to rule over the whole land of Arabia except this person?"

YAMAOKA and his friend left Mecca on the 9th of January, 1910. They joined a band of Tartar pilgrims and traveled to Medina. Their arrival in Medina was on the 22nd of that month. In Medina also, he was welcomed enthusiastically by the people. He once delivered a speech at a meeting of its citizens. Shaikh Ibrahim translated it into Arabic.

From Medina, he went to Damascus by train. He was probably the only Japanese to experience this trip by the famous Hijaz Railway. He returned safely to Tokyo through Turkey and Siberia in October of 1911, wrote a book about his journey and published it in July of the next year.

His life after traveling to Arabia was very eventful. We can trace his career to a certain extent, but many periods still remain obscure. Apart from the two works already mentioned above, he published at least five other books the titles of which are as follows:

1. The Confidential Reports about My Travels Abroad. 296 p. Published in Kanagawa pref. in 1922.
2. The Japanese Residents in South and Middle America. 435 p. Published in Tokyo in 1922.
3. Two Great National Movements of Asia. -- Those of Muslims and of Jewish People --. 515 p. Published in Osaka in 1928.
4. From Holy City to Holy City. 222 p. Published in Osaka in 1928.
5. Blood and Money. 452 p. Published in Osaka in 1936.

In addition to these, his lecture under the title: "The Islamic countries and the daily life of Islamic peoples" was recorded and published in Tokyo in 1926, together with the lectures of several other scholars. The title of this book is: "From Persia to Turkey".

- III -

YAMAOKA's second long journey to Islamic countries began in December of 1912 and lasted until February of 1920. He visited chiefly Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey. He also traveled through many countries in South and Middle America.

The third long journey began in January of 1923 and lasted until 1927. He stayed chiefly in Cairo, Jerusalem, and Istanbul. In Istanbul he was imprisoned on suspicion of being a military spy from Japan. He spent about six months in jail, from December of 1927 to June of the next year. One of the informers who betrayed YAMAOKA to the Government of Republican Turkey was, according to YAMAOKA, the very son of Shaikh Ibrahim, his bosom friend. The real cause of his imprisonment is said to have been that his Pan-Islamic activities were detested by some young republican Turks.

After World War II, we found him in Tokyo as a penniless and forlorn old man. He was wandering through the streets of Tokyo devastated by the war. I still remember his pitiful figure, wearing worn-out garments and worn-out shoes. Yet he himself was still proud and rather haughty.

In those days, from about 1946 to about 1949, the meeting for Islamic studies was held almost monthly at the office of the Islamic Association

of Japan at Ekoda, Tokyo. YAMAOKA used to attend the meetings, and at the beginning of the programme he did not offer a prayer to Allah Taala. I remember that when I myself spoke about the Wahhab movement in Arabia, YAMAOKA stood up and praised the contents of my speech. He would always sign at the top of the signature book for the participants of the meeting, as Hajji Omar YAMAOKA, in Arabic characters.

I also remember that he always carried an old canvas bag on his shoulder. In that bag he treasured the manuscripts of his last works, some of which were not published until his death, and others which still remain unpublished today.

Around 1952 or 1953, YAMAOKA disappeared from Tokyo. He left the capital and we heard nothing of him for about the following ten years. In 1960, Hajji Fujio KOMURA, present Imam of Osaka and the director of the Islamic Center of Japan, contributed an article to a weekly newspaper, published by Kashu NAGASE, strict Muslim. The article by KOMURA was entitled: "I visited the place of death of Shaikh Mitsutaro YAMAOKA, the precursor of the Islamic Circle of Japan".

According to KOMURA, Shaikh YAMAOKA was taken from a home for the aged in Umeda, Osaka, to another one called "Fukusei-kan, in SAKAI City on the 10th of April, 1954. There he died in September, 1959, at the age of eighty years. His last wish was that his death should never be informed to anyone.

He left after him several notebooks and manuscripts. Some of the contents are as follows:

1. The Arab and Jewish Peoples in Palestine. 742 leaves.
2. The Decisive Proposal for the Settlement of the Palestine Problem. 450 leaves.

Hajji Omar YAMAOKA was rewarded neither with honor nor a glorious title, by his own country. But I believe his name will be remembered for a long time, nay I dare to say, forever by those who wish to increase the friendship between the Islamic and Japanese people.

EARLY JAPANESE PILGRIMS TO MECCA

Kojiro Nakamura

FOREWORD

I intend to clarify in this paper what the early Japanese pilgrims to Mecca saw and felt, how they were received in the Holy Cities, and how meaningful all these pilgrimages were to the relation between Japan and the Arab and Muslim world. There have been some studies on this topic by such scholars as Prof. Maejima Shinji, Mr. Tamura Hideji, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Nakata Yoshinobu and others. And I do not claim to be original in this paper. I just arrange the materials and sources supplied and mentioned in those studies according to my own interest.

- I -

Overturning the Tokugawa ancient regime and its isolationist policy in 1868, Japan set out to modernize the country under the strong leadership of the centralized imperial government. In this process Japan gradually tended to take the imperialistic and colonialistic policies toward Korea, Taiwan, Mainland China, and other surrounding oversea areas. Thus she came into collision with two big countries of China and Russia. Winning two wars -- the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) -- the Japanese became militarily more self-confident, and nationalism was ever more enhanced. Helped by this militaristic nationalism, the military men became more and more recalcitrant and independent in their activities in China and finally got out of control of the central government. After the "Manchurian Incident" (1931) Japan established her influence in the "independent" state of Manchukuo. Further stepping into the Japanese-Chinese War in 1937, Japan penetrated even more deeply into the Chinese Mainland. She became all the more isolated internationally and rushed headlong into war with the United States of America and other allied countries (1941-45) on the side of Nazi Germany and Italy. In the meantime Japan was interested economically and militarily in Southeast Asia, and occupied French Indo-China, the Philippine Islands, Shingapore, Java and others soon after the breakout of the war.

Thus many Japanese went oversea and worked as military men, merchants, businessmen, government officials, political organizers, intelligence agents, speculators and others. Since many Muslims lived in those areas, those Japanese inevitably became acquainted with Muslims, their life and

religion. Some even went so far as to adopt the faith of Islam. Take for example Ahmad Ariga Bunpachiro (1866-1946). He went to India in 1892 as a businessman, and came to know Muslims in Bombay. Though being a Christian, he was so moved by the simple tenet of Islam and the faithfulness and sincerity of the Muslims that he started learning the religion of Islam. Some years later -- or toward the end of 1930's according to another source -- he became converted to Islam. On retirement in 1913, he devoted himself to propagating Islam, but he counted only seventy Muslim converts by 1933. (In passing, Ariga later on translated the Qur'an into Japanese in collaboration with Takahashi Goro in 1938. This was the second translation, the first being the one by Sakamoto Ken'ichi in 1920.)

So was 'Umar Yamaoka Mitsutaro (1880-1959), the first Japanese pilgrim to Mecca. Graduating from the Department of the Russian Language, Tokyo Gaikokugo Gakko (Tokyo School of Foreign Languages, which has later become the present Tokyo University for Foreign Studies), he went to the Mainland and worked as an official interpreter for the army in Manchuria and Korea. Back to Japan, he came to know 'Abd al-Rashid Ibrahim who had struggled for the independence of the Tartars and taken refuge in Japan on being exiled by the Russian government. In 1909 Yamaoka set out to make a pilgrimage to Mecca with this Ibrahim, while being not a Muslim. But it was disclosed in Bombay that Yamaoka was a pagan. This gave rise to such a commotion that he witnessed the Shahada on the spot and was given an instant Islamic education by Ibrahim.

The same is true with Nur Muhammad Tanaka Ippei, who performed two pilgrimages, one in 1924 and the other in 1934, and also with Nakao Hideo, who accompanied Tanaka to Mecca in 1934. After learning the Chinese language at Taiwan Kyokai Gakko (School of Association of Taiwan), which is the present Takushoku University, Tanaka went to the Mainland and worked as an interpreter and intelligence agent for the army. In the meantime he got interested in Islam and the Muslims, and began to learn about them. He finally became a Muslim in 1924, and set out to Mecca for the pilgrimage of the same year. On the other hand, Nakao had been working for the Japanese Embassy in Russia and Turkey for a long time, when he adopted the faith of Islam and got married to a Tartar woman.

Suzuki Tsuyoshi, who was later to play a major role in the Japanese pilgrimages to Mecca since 1935, went to Celebes at the age of twenty-four. He was working in those Pacific areas, when he was converted to Islam. During the wartime he was active as a political maneuverer and organizer among the Muslim peoples.

It is true, of course, that there were many other Japanese Muslims

who were proselytized in Japan like Ariga Bunpachiro and his Muslim followers. But it is noteworthy that most of the early eminent Japanese Muslims first came into contact with the Muslims and were converted to Islam outside, or back to, Japan. This is even more peculiar in comparison with the traditional pattern of the Japanese adoption of foreign religions: the missionaries, Buddhist or Christian, first come to Japan to propagate the religion and then follows the proselytizing of the Japanese natives. The introduction of Islam into Japan, however, took a different course. No Muslim missionaries came to Japan for the specific purpose of propagating Islam. But rather the islamization of the Japanese first took place in the oversea lands.

This fact also appears peculiar even in the past long history of Islam. There is, however, nothing new in reality, when we consider the fact that the personal contacts and practical reasons have always been significant in the islamization process in the past. I believe this has something to do with the fact that Islam essentially does not have any specific clerical orders and hierarchies.

- II -

We do not know exactly how many Japanese were thus converted to Islam. But they were not many. From among those Muslim converts eight groups of pilgrims were organized during the period 1909 - 1938. Six out of them actually participated in the Hajj, but two of them failed. Yamaoka Mitsutaro is honored to be the first Japanese hajji, who journeyed to Mecca with Ibrahim for the Hajj (December, 1909). Tanaka Ippei performed the second pilgrimage (July, 1924) with a Chinese Muslim and the third (March, 1934) with a Japanese Muslim. Between these two pilgrimages, a young Japanese, Koizumi Kota, tried alone to make a pilgrimage in 1929 by land through Central Asia, but he did not reach Mecca. Koizumi had studied Islam, Arabic, Turkish and Tartar for about a year under Qurban 'Ali, a Bashkeer refugee, who was staying in those days at Yoyogi (Tokyo).

The fourth group of pilgrimage was organized for the Hajj (March, 1935). The members were Suzuki Tsuyoshi, Hosokawa Susumu, Kori Shozo and Yamamoto Taro. From this year onward the group was organized every year. The pilgrims for the next year (1936) were Kori Shozo, Yamamoto Taro and Uehara Aizan. Unfortunately they did not reach Mecca in time for the Hajj because of the accident (Uehara committed suicide on the way). So the fifth pilgrimage to Mecca (February, 1937) was completed by Suzuki Shozo, Hosokawa Susumu and Enomoto Momotaro; and the sixth pilgrimage (February, 1938) by Suzuki Shozo and a Manchurian Muslim, Zhāng Shì ān (張世安). This was the last Japanese pilgrimage before the War.

These pilgrims all suffered a great deal from the long voyage by

sea, bad sanitary conditions, heat, unfamiliar climate and geographical conditions, and others. Most of them were taken ill or met accidents on the way or in Mecca. Now what did they see and feel in the Holy Cities after such hardships and sufferings?

Yamaoka, who just became a Muslim on his way, did not feel at ease, even though accompanied by Ibrahim and successfully admitted into Mecca, until he met Murad, who was Ibrahim's compatriot and comrade in the struggle for the Targar independence and had been staying in Mecca for a long time. The Hijaz was still part of the Ottoman Empire, and the Sublime Porte was propagating pan-Islamism to win over the support of the Muslims over the world. Therefore, the Ottoman consul-general at Bombay not only issued for Yamaoka an entrance visa instantly, but was so generous as to give a free passenger ticket for Jedda to a Muslim from an Asian country which had recently won the war with Russia. Yamaoka was enthusiastically received in Mecca due to Ibrahim's propagation. He was not only given a special favor of personal meeting and dining with the Hashimite Sherif Husain, but was privileged even to see inside the Ka'ba. "It was the greatest honor," Yamaoka says, "for a humble subject of the Japanese Empire." The news of this extraordinary treatment spread immediately as far as Constantinople and the world over. After the Hajj Yamaoka traveled to Medina and further to Damascus, where he was warmly welcome. Thence he went to Constantinople by way of Beirut. Wherever he might go in Turkey, he made "a big propagation for the Muslim awakening" and was given an ovation. All these activities, however, made the Russian officials feel so suspicious about him that he was put under strict control by the Russian police all the way back to Japan via Siberia. When Yamaoka visited again Constantinople later on in 1924 soon after the Ottoman Sultan was banished by the Kemalist Republican government, he was immediately taken into custody on arrival as a Pan-Islamist, and ordered to quit the country in 1927.

Tanaka Ippei entered Mecca for the first time in 1924. Since he passed rather as a member of the Chinese pilgrimage, he did not receive any particular welcome. He found Sherif Husain still proclaiming to be the "King of the Arabs" in the Hijaz, though under the strong British influence. On his way to Mecca and in this Holy City, he also saw everywhere the domination of the Asians and Muslims by the Europeans, and "discovered in this antagonism abundantly observable between the Whites and the Muslims many materials to take into consideration when he would think about the future of Asia." When Tanaka visited Mecca ten years later again in 1934, the Holy Cities were already under the rule of the

King Ibn Sa'ud.

The members of the fourth group for the Hajj (March, 1935) were Suzuki Tsuyoshi, Hosokawa Susumu and Kori Shozo. Yamamoto Taro joined them on the way in Afghanistan. Although the Japanese pilgrims came to be able to go off and back to Jedda by automobile by now, they suffered from traffic accidents and wounds this year. At Jedda they met the representatives of 250 Chinese pilgrims from Xin jiang Province (新疆省), and heard their denunciations of the Soviet policy toward the Muslims. And they were "impressed with the pitiful conditions of the oppressed people."

They felt apprehensive and nervous at first in Mecca since they knew that their recitations of Arabic formulas were still peculiar. But once they came to be known as Japanese, they felt warmly welcome and were invited to parties and meetings. In this pilgrimage they witnessed King Ibn Sa'ud being assaulted by the assassins while performing the last Tawaf in the Haram. At the imperial audience at the valley of Mina the next day, the Japanese pilgrims were given the special honor of staying beside the King himself. They left Mecca about a week after they attended "the International Holy Convention." The representatives of the pilgrims of each country joined together for a meeting here and there at Mina. They reported on the political, economic, social and other problems of their own countries and criticized, yelled and appealed for the emancipation and freedom of the oppressed peoples.

According to the report of the Japanese pilgrims, Arabia was flooded with Japanese-made clothings and other goods of daily use. They attributed the Arabs' patronage of Japanese goods not only to the low price, but also to "the spiritual tie and intimacy the Arabs seem to have toward Japan as a strong country of Asia."

The Japanese participants in the Pilgrimage (February, 1937) for the fifth time were Suzuki Tsuyoshi, Hosokawa Susumu, Enomoto Momotaro and three others. At the imperial audience at Mina on completion of the Hajj, the King immediately recognized Suzuki and Hosokawa and excited them by giving the special greetings and the extraordinary favor of seating them beside the King himself as before. Suzuki later says:

We felt highly honored and glorified in the presence of some hundred representatives. This is due to the fact that we are Japanese. But this should be ultimately attributed solely to the virtue of the Imperial Majesty universally evident under the sun and to the greatness of the Empire whose dignity covers the whole world as the sunlight does. Remembering all this, we felt grateful and were moved to tears.

This very favorable treatment of the Japanese pilgrims by the Sa'udi government had another aspect, namely, an economic one. They were invited to meet again the Minister of Finance, Sulaiman. The Minister expressed in this meeting the wish to establish the direct trading and commercial relations between Saudi Arabia and Japan, and made three proposals for this purpose:

- (1) To open an Arab-Japanese trading company under joint management at Jedda,
- (2) To establish an exhibition house to introduce and advertize Japanese goods,
- (3) To move the port of call for Japanese ships from Aden to Jedda.

The "International Holy Convention" of this year is reported in details. In the meeting of the Malays, for example, participated about a hundred representatives of each Muslim country. Grand Mufti of Palestine, Amin al-Husaini, was one of them. The report says:

The meeting began with the recitation of the Qur'an. Then several representatives of the Malay pilgrims stood up and reported on the political situation of the country, and appealed passionately for the solidarity of all the Muslims in order to get rid of the imperialistic domination, and expressed their thanks to al-Husaini, an energetic leader of the anti-Jewish struggle in Palestine.

Some of them also referred to Japan and stressed her duty as the leader of Asia to help the other Asian oppressed peoples to free themselves and reach the goal of happiness and prosperity.

Then Prof. Ahmad al-'Arabi, the tutor of the Saudi princes, stood up and recited his impromptu poem. Enomoto then rose up and reported on the current situation of the Muslim activities in Japan. He responded to the Malaysian appeal for the Japanese leadership, saying that Japan had proved that the Asians were never inferior, even if not superior, to the Whites, and that the Malays were, therefore, able to accomplish what the Japanese accomplished, and encouraged their efforts for progress. Finally touching on the Japanese view of the Jews, he concluded his speech by saying that Japan would not take side with the Jews.

Next al-Husaini spoke out, encouraging the Malays by taking Japan as an example. Then referring to the Palestinian anti-Jewish struggle, he clarified its goals:

- (1) Recovery of the lands unduly taken away for the Jewish immigrants.
- (2) Prohibition of the further Jewish immigration.
- (3) Self-government and independence of the Arabs in Palestine.

He concluded his speech by stressing that it was the duty of all the Muslims regardless of nationality to defend the land of Palestine and made a strong appeal to establish the all Muslim front for the anti-Jewish campaign.

It was widely said that Amin al-Husaini had been endeavoring since 1926 to hold the World Muslim Plenary Meeting at Mecca with a view to form a Pan-Islamic League of Muslim Nations and irritating the nerve of the British government. The idea of this meeting, however, did not bear fruits.

The Ethiopian pilgrims, reporting on the processes of the Italian-Ethiopian War, praised the greatness of Mussolini and declared that Ethiopia had just been born as a new Muslim state. In passing, Mussolini obtained the support of the Muslims by proclaiming at the outset of the war, "I am the protector of Islam." And he actually gave financial aids for the construction of mosques in the capital and for the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Also noteworthy in this pilgrimage is the fact that General Mǎ Lín (馬麟), former head of Tíng hǎi Province (青海省), and his group got in touch with the Japanese pilgrims. Perhaps they discussed in this meeting the problem of the Japanese influence and support among the Chinese Muslims, especially the warlords in North-West China. As a matter of fact, Suzuki promised to meet the General Mǎ again at Shànghǎi later on his return to Japan, but he could not carry out the promise because of the outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1937.

The sixth and last pilgrims, Suzuki Tsuyoshi and a Manchurian Muslim, Zhāng Shì ān, set out for the Hajj (February, 1933). This time Suzuki had to work hard in order to obtain the entrance visa and other permissions for his Manchurian partner, since Manchukuo as a Japanese puppet had not been recognized internationally after its "independence" in 1932. Naturally the relation between Suzuki's group and the Chinese Muslims was very cold and antagonistic due to the Japanese-Chinese War in 1937.

Certainly they received a special treatment by King Sa'ud at the imperial audience. But this pilgrimage did not seem to be a happy one for the Japanese group. In fact, the Chinese Mission to the Near East headed by Wáng Zēng Shāh (王曾善) took the opportunity of the "International Holy Convention" at Mina to strongly denounce the Japanese aggressive policy in the following words:

Japan is a colonialistic state. She utilizes religion as an instrument for her economic aggression, and thus intends to colonize the Muslim countries. Japanese are destroying many mosques and killing Muslims in China.

Against this claims, it is reported, Suzuki had to fight all alone explaining and defending the significance of the "Holy War" of Japan.

- III -

The organizer and financial supporter of all these Japanese pilgrimages except the first one by Yamaoka Mitsutaro was Wakabayashi Han. According to his book, entitled "The Islamic World and Japan" (1937), he once visited British India and realized that the Muslim policy of Japan was very significant as a cornerstone for the Japanese hegemony in East Asia. He further put into practice his idea by sending his younger brother to Northern China in 1914 to let him make acquaintance with the Chinese Muslims in Hú nán (湖南) in anticipation of the future Japanese policy toward China. But his brother died there halfway in his mission in 1923.

In the meantime, Wakabayashi went to Tíng dǎo (青島) to meet Tanaka to discuss his long-cherished idea about the importance of the Muslim policy for the Japanese hegemony in East Asia. Wakabayashi successfully persuaded Tanaka to work in collaboration with him. Thereupon Tanaka decided to devote himself to the study of Islam and the Muslim peoples. He finally became a Muslim himself in 1917 and set out for a pilgrimage as we have mentioned before. "As a result of Mr. Tanaka's pilgrimage," Wakabayashi writes, "our knowledge of the Muslims and the Muslim countries has been deepened and I am even more convinced of the rightness of my view on the political and economic importance of the Muslim policy."

In 1933 Wakabayashi sent Tanaka again as a pilgrim with three young Muslims, but Tanaka died soon after he came back. Wakabayashi, thereupon, decided to send the Japanese pilgrims to Mecca every year from 1934 onward, "under the support of various sections of Japan like the Families of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, and the Union of the Japan Spinning Industries, the Kwantung army, the South Manchurian Railway Company, and others."

Now what is the significance of "the Muslim policy" in view of Wakabayashi? According to him, it lies in the plain fact that "the rise and fall of the Islamic world and the Muslim lands is inseparably related to the ups and downs of Asia and the Asian peoples." Therefore, he says, "it is needless to emphasize how important Japan's Muslim policy is for herself as the leader of Asia and the leading empire which takes it as its main duty to establish world peace. This is the very basis of the proclamation of the benevolent imperial cause."

Wakabayashi further elaborates this point as follows:

Look! We sell a hundred and fifty millions yen of exports to Dutch Indonesia, but the Muslim natives are the main customers who buy seventy percent of the exports. We sell two hundred and fifty millions yen of exports to India, but the Muslims are the customers who buy a fourth of the exports. We have also six millions of Muslim customers in Malay and the Philippine Islands. Furthermore, do we not see the Japanese-made goods overflowing the wide market areas covering Afghanistan, Persia, Middle Eastern countries, Central Asia, Arabia, Egypt and North Africa? We shall see later in the report of the pilgrims to Mecca how favorably the Japanese goods are patronized in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia....

What we believe to be the most important about the Muslims is their strong religious solidarity. This religious tie comes from their sincere religious faith which transcends the racial and national ties. The Muslims are unrivalled in this strong sense of brotherhood in the world.

This explains why their solidarity has such a great political and economic influence.... The sense of religious solidarity is that of the spiritual unity which supercedes any other practical interests and concerns. So if we channelize this solidarity in our favor, we can easily win over to our side the masses of three hundred and seventy millions of people. But if not, then we have to confront a thousand millions of people as enemies.

Wakabayashi's idea of "the Muslim policy" is very clear to us. I do not think it necessary to elaborate it any further in my words. With this grand scheme in mind, he organized and sent the Japanese pilgrims to Mecca, though he himself did not claim to be a Muslim as far as I know.

CONCLUSION

I do not mean to say here in this paper that the faith of the Japanese Muslims was after all pragmatical. On the contrary, I am convinced that they were sincere, at least subjectively, in their confession and sympathy toward the Muslim peoples oppressed by the Europeans. Why, then, did not the solidarity which was stressed to be very strong above all other ties hold the Chinese and Japanese Muslims together against the common enemy, as we have seen in the report on the last pilgrimage soon after the Japanese-Chinese War in 1937? Isn't it that the religious tie was much stronger than any other ones since it was spiritual? One of the answers to this question lies, I believe, in the fact that the early Japanese Muslims were nationalists first of all, and that they all devoted themselves, even spiritually, to the cause of the Japanese Emperor and Empire. Islam is, as Wakabayashi rightly pointed out, essentially a religion which transcends states, nations, castes and all other human systems and institutions, and criticizes them according to its transcendent norm. The Japanese Emperor and Empire and

its apparatus are no exception. But there seemed to be no such agonizing spiritual conflicts between the religious ideal and nationalism in those early Japanese Muslims as we saw in Uchimura Kanzo, who criticized as a Christian the Japanese militaristic policy. This is, I assume, due to the fact that they were nationalists first of all and understood Islam in this nationalist framework. That is the reason why they naively took the Hajj as a good occasion to enhance national prestige, not vice versa. Saying this, I must hurriedly add, in order not to be unfair to them, another fact that Japanese knowledge of Islam was very limited. Let me point out the fact that we had only one unsatisfactory Japanese translation of the Qur'an, a secondhand translation from the European languages, all through this period in question.

STUDIES ON EGYPT'S LEGAL SYSTEM CONDUCTED BY JAPANESE BUREAUCRATS IN THE EARLY MEIJI ERA

San-eki Nakaoka

Immediately after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the Meiji Government launched into the adoption of the Western Legal system and institutions, in order to reform the traditional system inherited from the Tokugawa feudal Government. In 1869, Japan was in the last stages of a civil war between the Meiji Government and the persistent pro-Tokugawa feudal forces of northern Japan. The power of the Meiji Government had not yet been firmly established. Even so, the Government did its best, without delay, to realize the independent status of Japan in international society, de facto and de jure, by the implanting of the Western legal system and institutions. Reflecting the revolutionary atmosphere and energies which had prevailed since the end of the Tokugawa Era, the French and then the English (and American) legal systems and their political ideals were chosen as a models to be adopted. The Meiji Government had the support of the nation in its first aim - to revise the Unequal Treaties which had been concluded by the Tokugawa Government in 1858 and had stirred up Japanese nationalist feelings.

In accordance with clear-cut diplomatic principles, in 1868 and 1869 the Meiji Government issued a circular notice to Western powers, declaring that Japan had a strong and nation-wide desire to revise or abolish the Unequal Treaties. This proposal was, however, completely ignored and ridiculed by Western powers. Therefore, in order to abolish the Unequal Treaties, Japanese political leaders did their utmost to establish Japan as an international power from the political, economic, legal, and diplomatic points of view. In this connection, the real aim of the Government in adopting the Western legal system and institutions was to establish Japan as a power able to compete with Western powers, or which was at least a superior power in the Far East. For instance, Shimpei Etō (Minister of Justice in 1872-'73) hoped to force all foreigners staying in Japan to conform to the Japanese legal and jurisdiction system by abolishing the Unequal Treaties. S. Etō organized the Civil Law Compilation Committee in 1871, whose purpose was to implant the French legal system in Japan. There was a clear-cut consciousness of, and nation-wide support for, the national target. The only question was concerned with what means would be adopted to realize the target.

It is worthwhile mentioning here that, in the early Meiji Era, there was an influential group of liberal and democratic thinkers even inside the Government, although the main body of the Government held tenaciously to despotic and ultra-nationalistic principles as being indispensable for nationbuilding. Generally speaking, we may call the former Minken-ha (People's Rights Group) and the latter Kokken-ha (Sovereign Rights Group). These two groups intermingled with each other, inside and outside the Government. Part of the Minken-ha and Kokken-ha insisted on complete abolition of the Unequal Treaties, but another part of the Minken-ha and Kokken-ha believed in compromising with Western powers, which would require a partial and gradual revision of the Unequal Treaties. Jiyū Minken Undō (Freedom and People's Rights Movement) lasted into the 1880's, although the movement rapidly declined in the 1890's. It then took the role of the opposition party, speaking out against the Government's policy of making maximum concessions to the demands of Western powers for keeping extraterritorial rights and the unequal tariff system.

In line with the untiring efforts of the Government to implant a Western legal system in Japan and to revise the Unequal Treaties, a keen interest in Egypt's legal system appeared, and in particular with the Mixed Courts of Egypt, an introduction of which was at the time under negotiation between Egypt or Nubar Pasha and Western powers.

The Government's concern with extraterritorial rights and the Mixed Courts of Egypt was generated in accordance with the advice of the British Foreign Minister, Earl Granville when Vice-Premier Tomomi Iwakura visited England in 1872 with his suite of nearly 50 members. Many of these members took a decisive role in negotiations regarding the Unequal Treaties and later in the study of a mixed courts system. The Iwakura Mission had visited the USA in the previous year, and, under the pressure of the Western powers, had almost given up on immediately negotiating the revision of the Unequal Treaties. In England, the British Foreign Minister recommended to T. Iwakura that Japan should follow in the steps of Turkey and Egypt regarding the transformation of extraterritorial rights by negotiation. This seemed to be the first time that the Government had heard of the existence of a mixed courts system. Iwakura immediately ordered Gen-ichirō Fukuchi, First Secretary of the Mission (who later became a journalist and writer), to visit Istanbul to collect the necessary information on a mixed courts system. G. Fukuchi failed to discuss this matter with the Turkish Government, which was fully occupied with Turko-Russian affairs, but he was able to see Nubar Pasha through an introduc-

tion of the Russian Ambassador in Istanbul. G. Fukuchi's Report on the Mixed Courts System was submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1873. Fukuchi concluded in his report that if we failed to abolish the Unequal Treaties and were forced to adopt a mixed courts system in the hope of recovering our rights as a nation in future negotiations, we would have to always keep in mind that our people were suffering from these extraterritorial rights and consular jurisdiction, and we would have to negotiate the revision of the Unequal Treaties for the happiness of our people. In the same year the Translation of Consular Jurisdiction in Turkey and Egypt was produced by the Translation Bureau of the Cabinet Office. Rinshō Mitsukuri (later Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice) was at the centre of the study on Egypt's legal system and perhaps took a major role in this translation work. His book on Egyptian Laws was published in 1878. Both of these men had once been bureaucrats in the Tokugawa Government, in the Bureau of Research on Western Publications in which Mitsukuri served as a director, and had then served in the Meiji Government.

Japanese concern Egypt in general was not large, though it was not negligible, in the early Meiji Era. Historically, up to the middle of the Meiji Era, we can find several works on modern Egypt or works referring to modern Egypt produced outside the Government, such as Yukichi Fukuzawa's works and Tokai-Sanshi's works. These works certainly expressed a quasi-sympathy for Egypt and the Egyptian people suppressed by tyrants and Western powers, but their main concern was always with the persistent nationalistic desire to build an independent Japan.

The Government made an unique study of Egypt's legal system in an atmosphere of revolutionary, liberal and democratic thought. The study was indispensable for Japanese political leaders, who were either aiming at a complete and immediate abolition of consular jurisdiction and reform of the tariff system or aiming at partial and gradual revision of them. Important promoters of the study were Tomomi Iwakura, Taneomi Soejima (Foreign Minister 1871-'73), Munenori Terajima (Foreign Minister 1873-'79), Kaoru Inoue (Foreign Minister 1879-'87), and Hirobumi Itō (Minister of Technology 1873-'80, and later Premier).

Under the encouragement of these important figures, young bureaucrats such as R. Mitsukuri, G. Gukuchi, Takashi Hasegawa (later President of the Tokyo Court of Appeal), and Takashi Hara (later Premier), did some splendid work in the 1870's-80's on the Mixed Courts of Egypt. Some foreign advisors employed by the Government, such as G. E. Du Bousquet, G. R. Davidson, G. F. Verbeck, J. R. Boissonade, also put much effort

into the promotion of the study, but it was the Government which took the initiative in instigating it and in making all final decisions.

For Japanese political leaders as well as young bureaucrats, Egypt was a living lesson to them in their search for a way out of Japan's subordinate status. They were very careful not to follow in the foot-steps of Egypt, in the course of adopting a Western legal system and negotiating revision of the Unequal Treaties. Their main concern was with the mixed courts system, or extraterritorial right in Egypt, and not with the suppressed people of Egypt. Again T. Hasegawa was sent to Egypt in 1885-'86, in order to get the advice of Nubar Pasha on introducing mixed courts into Japan, in the face of British and German proposals about revision of the Unequal Treaties. His Report on the Mixed Courts of Egypt was submitted to the Minister of Justice in 1887. Hasegawa was completely against an introduction of the mixed courts system to Japan, and his opinion was based on his previous long experience as a judge at the Yokohama court. Hara's report on the Mixed Courts of Egypt, published in 1889, came to almost the same conclusion. Let me quote a relevant passage from his report: "Introduction of Mixed courts is not one step forward abolishing extraterritorial rights. The Dual Control of Egyptian finance and the introduction of the Mixed Courts System into Egypt was incompatible with the sovereignty of Egypt's government... The rights of a nation, such as sovereign power, independence and equality, can not be upheld by an empty theory. Any nation would end up following the destiny of Egypt, unless she could build up national strength..."

Both inside and outside the Government, three groups existed: the first group was trying to introduce a mixed courts system into Japan, with some amendment, in order to replace separate consular jurisdiction with a unified mixed courts system, and differed from Egypt's in terms of the right of appointment of foreign judges as well as the duration of the system; the second group gave priority to the reform of the tariff system rather than to abolition of consular jurisdiction. Ministers of Foreign Affairs, from M. Terajima to K. Inoue, were in the first group and were supported by a limited circle. This group's goal of compromising with the Western powers' demands that revision of the Unequal Treaties be kept to a minimum was always interrupted by the second group, which was supported by the emerging Japanese bourgeoisie, and by the third group, composed of Kokken-ha and Minken-ha and supported by popular opposition groups both inside and outside the Government. M. Terajima and K. Inoue failed to conclude a treaty with Western powers because of

popular opposition from the Minken-ha and Kokken-ha, and both of them were reshuffled. G. Fukuchi and R. Mitsukuri in their early years, and T. Hara, were sympathetic to the Minken-ha.

French advisor G. E. Boissonade, for instance, recommended not introducing a mixed courts system into Japan. Boissonade said: "The judge is the most important Government post... and one should not give this post to a foreigner... The only one exceptional case in which this post has been given to a foreigner is the Egyptian case. Egypt has been subordinated to Turkey and has not maintained an independent and free spirit, like Japan... And finally Egypt was occupied by Britain. I would like recommend that Japan not follow the way of Egypt and not introduce the mixed courts system. If she does, Japan will be despised by all nations...". On the other hand, British advisor J. R. Davidson tried to persuade Japan to adopt it, as a step toward abolishing it completely in the future. In the initial stages of the introduction of the Mixed Courts system into Egypt France had taken the initiative, but, as a result of diplomatic manoevers against Britain, she seems shifted to being reluctant to introduce it into Egypt, and thus the Mixed Court system was established in Egypt in the absence of, and in anticipation of, French approval. France was afraid of losing her legal and cultural superiority in Egypt through internationalization of consular jurisdiction. Britain expressed strong support for Nubar Pasha's programme after 1868, which aimed at replacing consular jurisdiction with a system of mixed courts to exercise commercial and civil as well as general criminal jurisdiction. In the case of Japan, Britain had been eager to introduce this system into Japan, but suddenly changed her attitude towards the issue of extraterritorial rights in 1894, and then took the initiative in abolishing the Unequal Treaties with Western powers, so that she could make Japan an ally of Britain against the Russian menace in the Far East.

Before 1894, the Government tried eagerly to adopt every aspect of Western civilization which would be helpful in the building of Japan into a modern state, but in spite of pressure from Western powers, the Government succeeded in refusing to introduce the mixed courts system into Japan and persisted in pushing for the complete abolition of extraterritorial rights and for reform of the tariff system, in accordance with international political changes. This was finally realized, first by the Anglo-Japanese Commercial and Navigation Treaty of 1894, which abolished extraterritorial rights and re-established partial independence over the tariff system. A completely independent tariff system was re-

alized in 1911.

The Government's concern with Egypt as such was overshadowed by its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-'95, in the midst of the first industrial revolution in Japan. The Government's concern with Egypt, as well as Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, etc. was reinforced by shifting to a different concern: to study British and French experiences of colonial rule in the Arab world as a model for Japan's colonial rule in Taiwan and Korea. Moreover, even in 1876, Japan acquired extraterritorial rights in Korea through the Japanese-Korean Amity Treaty of 1876, and then in China through the Sino-Japanese Commercial and Navigation Treaty of 1896. Before the abolition of the Unequal Treaties, Japan had become a power which exercised extraterritorial rights in Korea and China.

Japan finally succeeded in abolishing the Unequal Treaties in 1899, as a result of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894, and had the honour of being the first state to do away with extraterritorial rights and consular jurisdiction. However at the same time, Japan shifted to being an imperialistic power, which demanded extraterritorial rights in Korea and China. Japan became a gendarme of Britain in the Far East, and Japanese young bureaucrats lost their interest in Egypt, as I mentioned before, because this interest became useless for both the Government and themselves.

They were then concerned about the rights of the Japanese people, and not the rights of Arab and Egyptian people, and about Japanese sovereignty and not Egyptian sovereignty. Furthermore, we can say their concern was mainly focussed on Japanese sovereignty rather than the rights of the Japanese people, regardless of whether they belonged to the Minken-ha or not.

In conclusion, I would like to thank Mrs. M. Fukushima for her helpful suggestions regarding my paper. Manuscripts and printed documents produced by Japanese young bureaucrats in the early Meiji Era were collected from the Cabinet Library, Library of the Ministry of Justice and the Constitutional History Library in National Diet Library.

SHIGETAKA SHIGA AND THE ARAB WORLD

Yoshiro Mutaguchi

For more than the past twenty years I have been studying Middle Eastern affairs, firstly as a permanent correspondent of a Japanese newspaper stationed in Cairo covering events from Morocco to Iran, and thereafter as an editorial writer with the same newspaper. I take very much pleasure, on this occasion, to present you with one of my studies related to the subject of this symposium.

My study concerns a Japanese who travelled through Middle Eastern countries more than fifty years ago, assigned to personally inspect the oil situation there, in the interest of Japan's future. He is regarded as the first Japanese to have recognized the importance of oil in the Middle East.

He was Shigetaka (called Juukoo) Shiga (1863-1927), originally a famous geographer in modern Japan. In 1894, he published a book entitled "Landscape of Japan" (Nihon Fukeron), one of his most important works and a 'best seller' at that time, through which he raised the Japanese people's traditional aesthetic consciousness to a more nation orientated level by the introduction of a new concept of modern geographical science. He also travelled around the world three times, at a time when there were no such communication facilities as commercial planes. By doing this he tried to expand the insular character of the Japanese people into a more internationally-orientated one. In these two areas his spirit of enlightenment was always constant.

When Shiga visited the Middle East in 1924, at his own expense, he was already in his sixties. This action showed both his physical strength and his sense of duty as a nationalist. However the trip was his last one as he died three years later.

From the end of February, 1924, he travelled over the region for more than a month. He visited Mascat, Bandar Abbas, Bahrain, Kuwait, Abadahn, Khoramshahr, Baghdad, Damascus, Amman, and Tel Aviv. The record of this trip is found in "Unknown Countries" (Shirarezaru-Kuniguni 1926), the last book he published. The book contains many countries unknown to the Japanese at that time, covering not only the Middle East but Cuba, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and South Africa, which today we call the Third World. The author emphasized in the book the importance of studying Third World problems. Over some forty percent of the book had been assigned to the Middle East, making it clear to readers just how much importance the author placed

on Middle Eastern affairs.

The book, as such, is unknown today because more than half a century has elapsed since its publication. Nevertheless, we should re-examine the significance of this book today, now that every Japanese is aware that the future of Japan depends on the supply of Middle Eastern oil.

Why did Shiga travel to the Middle East in 1924, giving all his attention to the oil there, and when did he remark on the importance of oil?

It was two years previous to this date, when he went on a trip to the American continent. During this trip he noticed that real economic power was switching from the iron industry to that of oil. Furthermore, he saw that the age of "Iron is gold" had past and that the age of "Oil is gold" had arrived. He wrote that a country where the supply of oil is abundant becomes prosperous, while a country lacking in oil loses in the competition. Then he posed the question: What are Japan's oil politics? The issue of such politics was regarded as affecting the very existence of Japan.

From this stance he remarked on the possibilities of Middle Eastern oil, and with the purpose of enlightening Japanese leaders and the public, inspected Persia where the oil industry was developing, and Iraq where the Iraq Petroleum Company was to be founded.

Through this trip he came to understand the causes of Arab nationalism. Moreover, seeing the existing state of things whereby big powers were struggling for oil concessions, Shiga, as a nationalist, was obliged to regard the future of the Middle East in relation to that of Japan. He remarked that these countries were being exploited by "white" races, and the resistance of "non-whites" against the despotism of "white" races would inevitably result in a clash within a generation or two, more intense than the recent Russian Revolution. He foresaw this happening west of India, namely in today's Middle East, and appealed to Japanese to come to the region and gain knowledge in preparation for the possible clash.

He expressed these ideas in talks with two particular Arabs. One was Taimur b. Faysal Al Said, the Sultan of Oman and the other Yassin, a younger man of twenty-eight years old, and a graduate of the American University of Beirut.

Shiga's trip began from Mascot where he was granted an audience with the Sultan. They exchanged views on Asian nationalism. The Sultan used the word Arabistan, which appears to be the contemporary Arab Middle East, and told Shiga that Arabistan belonged to Asia, just as Japan did. In

the same way that European matters are put in Europeans' hands, Asian matters should be put in the hands of both of these Asian countries, he said. Furthermore, the Sultan urged the Japanese to come to Arabistan because there they could exchange goods, develop industry and establish mutual friendly relations and in doing so, could reform and reconstruct Arabistan to the mutual advantage and prosperity of both sides. Shiga replied that he held the same views as the Sultan and promised the Sultan that he would convey this message to the Japanese. This he did.

Following this, Shiga became acquainted with Yassin aboard a ship from Bahrain to Basra. He learned of the Arab national character from this youth and was told of the nationalism rising from Morocco to Persia through Lybia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Yassin expressed the opinion that if Europeans were to continue with despotism over the people of these countries, they could no longer endure it, and a clash between the East and the West would occur. He asked Shiga's opinion as to what would be Japan's attitude in such a situation.

In the attempt to develop a Middle Eastern nationalism there would inevitably be a clash between the East and the West, but just which side would Japan support? Shiga realized the importance of this question, posed to him not only by Yassin but by all the world, excepting the Europeans and the Americans. Shiga's reply was as follows: in the light of such an event occurring Japan would be forced to risk its whole existence as a state, and if Japan were to support the West, it would lose the sympathy of all "non-white" races, which make up two-thirds of the world population. He spent several difficult years trying to clarify his thoughts on whether Japan should side with the East or with the West. Finally he begged Yassin not to probe into the problem any further, but rather, come up with a solution on his behalf.

The day following this request, Yassin told Shiga that he could fully identify with Shiga's words because he himself was in the same dilemma, by this stage reacting as if he were actually Japanese. He said he thought not only of what would be best for Japan but also what would be best for the East. He ultimately said to Shiga that Japan should not join the East which was lacking in sufficient weapons. Even if it had weapons it could not do without financial power. And even if it had that power, it could not do without science. "Until we get these three, Japan must not join us." Yassin's last words were blended with tears. Shiga, perceiving him as a sincere nationalist, told him that Japan must defend nothing but justice, not joining the West nor losing the sympathy of the East. Also, he added that there would not be any other principle for

Japanese diplomacy to be guided by but this one.

After recording the conversations with Yassin, Shiga took the Nailun bus from Baghdad to cross the Syrian Desert, which had inaugurated as transportation service only six months previous to this. This crossing was his second aim in taking the Middle Eastern trip, the first being the inspection of the oil conditions at the time. As a geographer, Shiga was very proud at becoming the first Japanese to cross the desert by this bus service. Moreover, his detailed record of the crossing was valued as a precious document in the history of transportation between Baghdad and Damascus.

Shiga then entered the heart of the Arab Mashriq, visiting the main cities of the area, one after another, from Damascus, Amman, Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. According to his observations, the center of the world conflict had shifted from the Balkan to this area. Since the four empires of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey had been destroyed at the same time, problems in the Balkan offered nothing but research material for historians, and the South Western part of Asia, namely the Arab Mashriq, had come to replace the Balkan. Yet whilst the study of this area was very popular both in Europe and in America, there was little attention given to it in Japan, which was also a part of Asia.

Deploring this Japanese attitude, Shiga described the political situation from the declaration of war against Turkey by Hussein of Mecca who was supported by British up to the downfall of his son, King Faysal of Syria by French troops, and the creation of Iraq and Transjordan, through to serious discords between the British and the French. Secondly, he presented the severe struggle between Hussein and Abdul-Aziz of Nejd. Thirdly, he remarked on the rising of Syrian nationalism against French domination, and finally, identified the sprout of the Arab-Israeli conflict after the Balfour Declaration.

"The Arabs want true independence", Shiga wrote, "and dislike the existence of Hejaz, Transjordan and Iraq which are founded by the British who betrayed them. True independence means the achievement of an Arabia without British influence. This explains why the Arabs get angry with the Jews who are going to construct their state in Palestine with British backing. Some ninety percent of the population in Palestine is occupied by Arabs."

Shiga described the Arabs as thinking in following way "After the Jews had abandoned Palestine two thousand years ago, we (Arabs) came here and established our old homes. How can they possibly return here after two thousand years absence and create a state under British political

support and the subscriptions of Jewish richmen living in Europe and America? Who can accept such an unreasonable proposal?"

He continued to follow Palestinian problems even after his return to Japan, and in his book wrote on how Lord Balfour, when visiting Palestine and Syria in 1925, met with big demonstrations organized by the Arabs there. Thus Shiga became the first Japanese witness and reporter of the conflict in its still very first stages.

My personal interpretation of Shiga is as follows. Throughout his trip in the Middle East I could not detect any imperialistic tones in Shiga's thinking. He was a nationalist but an anti-militarist. His views were very much based on a level of "give-and-take", or mutual assistance. Ignoring his appeals for Japan to establish its own oil policy and co-operate with the Arab people in their development, our imperial government forcibly declared war against the big western powers to maintain its oil supply route from South-East Asia.

Even today, more than thirty years after Japan's defeat, and when our oil consumption is several hundred times greater than during Shiga's time, Japan has still not established an oil policy to meet with the oil crisis, nor shown any sincere co-operation and participation with the Arab people. Professor Hashem pointed this out to us all yesterday. The above explains why Shiga's report of fifty years ago has still quite a useful, fresh impact on us.

In addition, I want to tell you of one anecdote on his trip. It concerned a romance of the Sultan of Oman, Taimur Al Said.

In 1936, after abdicating and staying for a short time in Karachi, the Sultan went to Japan and lived his life as an exile in Kobe. Never saw Shiga again, however, because of his death nearly ten years previously. During this year Taimur married a Japanese woman who bore him a daughter, who in turn became the aunt of the actual Sultan of Oman, Qabus b. Said b. Taimur. But with the outbreak of the Second World War he was obliged to leave Japan in 1940 and go to India. Taimur took only the child because her mother had died already, and he himself later died at Bombay in 1965. The story does not end here, however. This princess, who presently lives in Mascat, came to Japan in the autumn of 1978 for the first time since she had left as a child. During her stay she visited the grave of her dearest late mother which her father had constructed.

I would like to say, in closing, that Princess Buthaina b. Taimur is the first, and very precious, fruit of the Arab-Japan dialogue officially recorded up to this present day.

CONCLUDING SPEECH

Shinji Maejima

Representing the Japan Committee I am very much honoured and pleased to be able to deliver the concluding speech here. I would like, first of all, to express my cordial thanks to all the participants and guests at this symposium. The two days of meetings between the Arab and Japanese experts will prove to be, I believe, an important step in furthering our mutual understanding. We discussed many subjects of wide ranges and scopes, and through them we gained a deep, academically based insight into the economic, diplomatic, technological, cultural and historical relations between Japan and the Arab world. The subjects discussed here may have been too many and varied to be fully examined over the two days of meetings. However, our results were fruitful as much as they encouraged even further mutual understanding of the Arab and Japanese civilizations and cultures.

As the president of the symposium, I would like to have seen more Japanese speakers present papers on subjects relating to the present economic, technological, and diplomatic relations between Japan and the Arab nations. This was the first symposium on Arab-Japan relations however, and I hope the second and the third symposiums will also be organized on similar lines to this one. Thank you very much for your kind cooperation - for the financial support from the Japan Foundation and the Toyota Foundation, and for the kind services rendered by the Arab and Japanese liaison offices. I sincerely hope that we shall see each other in the near future in a city of one of the Arab countries. Thank you.

CONCLUDING SPEECH

Fouad Hashem Awad

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I was really very honoured to have been chosen to represent the Arabs as president of this symposium. We have had two very useful days covering, as Prof. MAEJIMA mentioned, a wide range of subjects on Arab-Japan relations and Moslem-Japan relations. This being the first Symposium, the aim was to introduce many different subjects to act as a starting point and to become familiar with certain issues of mutual interest to the two nations. I feel the Symposium has been very successful in achieving its aims. I am sure that we all are anticipating even greater successes in our future cooperation with one another--year by year it gains a momentum which results in better understanding, and a better overall mutual relationship based on a firm foundation fit to benefit both the Arab and the Japanese peoples.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank the Japan National Committee, the Japan Foundation, and the Institute of Developing Economies for the careful planning of this Symposium to make it the true success it was. I also wish to thank personally, Prof. MAEJIMA, Prof. ITAGAKI, Dr. NAKAOKA and Prof. MIKI for their conscientious efforts, my colleagues, who offered papers, presented them very competently, and who also took part in discussions to assure the success of this Symposium.

Finally, I wish to extend my thanks to the ladies and gentlemen who gave us great moral support and helped us with many fine details concerning the Symposium. I am glad to say that Prof. MAEJIMA and the Japan National Committee have graciously accepted our invitation to hold the second symposium in one of the countries of the Arab world. This may take place early next year, very probably in January. I thank you all again, and hope this success will continue on for ever.

SUMMARY OF PAPERS IN JAPANESE

(日本語要旨)

(1) アラブ・日本経済関係

ファード・ハーシェム・アワド

日本とアラブの経済関係は、世界経済に占めるアラブの石油の重要性と、日本経済にとっての石油輸入の重要性とを反映したものであった。それゆえ両者の経済関係の発展は1973年の石油危機以降のごく最近になってからのことである。その場合日本は石油供給地としてのみアラブ世界を認識していたわけではなく、資本投下の場としても認識し、日本企業のアラブへの進出が始まった。そして同時に中東は今や日本の工業製品の輸出市場として、第2位を占めるようになったのである。

日本の技術は大変優秀であり、アラブ世界にとって日本の技術は欠くべからざるものである。しかし、今までの日本の経済的、技術的協力は、産業プロジェクトにしたがって行なわれ、しかもこうしたプロジェクトは、発展途上国よりも日本自身が利益を得るものであった。また将来において技術部門における日本とアラブとの協力が実現するためには、日本の技術を活かすに足るインフラストラクチャをアラブ側は築いておかねばならない。日本は商業ベースから離れて、アラブとの技術協力に力を入れることが望まれている。

(2) 日本と新経済秩序

ハイラー・イーサー

第2次世界大戦以降、世界は2つのグループに分かれた。豊かな北と貧しい南の諸国である。この南北問題を解決すべく、新経済秩序の提案がなされたのである。

日本は南北問題に直面することにより、日本自身の発展を左右するこの問題の重要性に気づいたのである。日本は発展途上国、特に東南アジアに対し、それらの国々にが必要とする資本や技術援助を行なうことを約束した。日本は先進国が発展途上国を援助するのは当然である、とも主張しており、南北の対立を解消する最良の手段は平和的な話し合いであることも認識している。

経済面をとりあげるならば、日本が世界に対し強力な立場にいることは明らかである。そのため多くの発展途上国は、日本を経済発展のモデルとしている。なぜなら原料やエネルギー資源をほとんど持たない日本が達成した経済発展は、第3世界に対し、人材の効率よい利用と高水準の有効な利用という格好のモデルを示しているからである。

(3) アラブ・日本関係と資源外交

セイフ・アル＝ワーディー・ロマヒー

アラブと日本の結びつきは19世紀末にさかのぼる。それは日本はエジプトから綿花の輸入を開始した1890年代のことである。そしてこの日本の綿花輸入は第1次大戦後さらに大幅に増加し、依然エジプトは中東の中で日本の貿易の主要な相手国の位置を占めていた。また日本から中東へは繊維製品が輸出された。

第2次大戦後、日本はエネルギー革命に直面した。石炭から石油へのエネルギーの転換は大きな変化をもたらした。石油資源の乏しい日本は、外国からの原油輸入に頼らざるをえなくなったのである。

1973年の石油危機により石油価格および生産量の決定はもはや外国資本ではなく、石油産出国自身の権限となった。今までメジャーを経て石油を得てきた日本は、石油の供給確保と経済成長の維持のため、それまで日本とアラブの間に存在した相互理解への距離をちぢめるべく、アラブに対し外交的、経済的に積極的な態度をとった。日本にとってのアラブの重要性はもはや無視できないものとなっていた。その結果、日本はアラブから石油を輸入し、アラブは日本から消費財、あるいは奢侈品を輸入する、密接な相互関係が成立したのである。

日本の外交方針にはアメリカの影響が大きく、日本は平等主義、互惠主義を原則としアラブとの確固たる関係の維持に努めている。

アラブと日本の利益は、日本の技術、経済とオイルダラーによる相互の資源外交の促進によってひきだされる。一方、アラブと日本の文化に対する相互理解の程度はまだ低い。それゆえ経済の強いきずなを維持する上で、文化交流の重要性が認識されるべきであろう。

(4) 日本のアラブ世界発見

板垣雄三

日本とアラブは距離的に離れているため、人びとの直接の交流をみるまでは長い月日を必要とした。しかし目に見えない絆で双方は結ばれていたのがある。たとえば日本の寺院建築に見られるヘレニズム文化の影響は、アラブ文化の片鱗をうかがわせる。しかしこの絆は間接的であるゆえに、アラブ・日本の相互理解をはかるのは難しい。それゆえ地理的距離のみならず、歴史的世界におけるそれぞれの位置の違いにも注目しなければならない。

日本人の過去の世界観である、唐、天竺、西洋という概念のいずれにもアラブ世界への興味の表われを知ることはできない。しかし日本語となっている襍字は、アラブ世界から来たものであり、江戸時代にポルトガル人を通じて間接的に日本に伝えられたのである。

アラブの日本への接近そして日本の対応について触れるならば、相互の関係を促進するためにも、正しい理解の方法を知るべきである。日本の側にとっては経済協力にとどまることなく、政治への理解、そして文化交流が必要とされている。日本のアラブ理解にとっての今後の課題としては、アラブのアイデンティティの多面的・動態的構造、イスラムの政治的な意味、そしてアラブ社会に固有の個人主義的合理主義とその将来の展望をあげることができよう。

(5) 日本のアラブ研究

ラウーフ・アッパース・ハーミド

日本が初めてアラブに関しての情報を得たのは江戸時代、長崎の出島の外国商人を通じてであった。新井白石の「西洋紀聞」にその様子がうかがわれる。

維新後、富国強兵の政策により海外侵略をはかる日本政府は、中国のイスラム教徒社会の発見により、イスラムの歴史・文化研究を進めた。

両大戦間の日本のアラブ研究は、公共的色彩を持つ各種の研究機関を有しながらも、直接アラブに接することができない故に、西洋の東洋学者に負う点が大であった。

第2次大戦後、敗戦により公共機関によるアラブ研究は一時期不可能となり、個人的な研究に頼らざるをえなくなった。そして復興後、経済力を充実させた日本は、アラブとの経済外交の必要性から、さまざまな研究機関を生み出した。

70年代初頭において、日本のアラブ研究者は3つのタイプに区別できる。第1は西洋の東洋学者の視点に立ち、現在のアラブ人の学者の研究をあまり重視しない流れ。第2はイスラムやイスラム社会に対し、西洋の東洋学者やアラブ人学者の立場をとらず、あくまで日本人的見地によって研究しようとする流れ、そして第3は、西洋の東洋学者の視点、アラブ人学者の視点を共にとり入れようとする流れである。

石油危機以降、日本は新しいアラブ研究の段階を迎えた。すなわち政府や企業ばかりではなく、民間ベースでのアラブ研究熱の高まりが見いだされたのである。今後は政府や企業の影響を受けない、学術的な機関のできるだけ早い設置が望まれる。

(6) 世界史教科書におけるアラブ世界の記述

吉田 悟 郎

古代オリエントに対し、日本人は多くの知識を有している。ところがアラブ世界についての認識は、いまだに“千夜一夜”、“砂漠”、“石油”のわくを出ない。

日本で一般的とされる世界史教育は、東洋史、すなわち中国を中心とした歴史、そして西洋史、すなわちヨーロッパを中心とした歴史の2つに分けることができる。日本の教師は世界史を教える場合アラブ世界を除外している。

日本国内の大多数の世界史の教科書は、そのような考えを基礎として書かれている。まず教科書の“古代”にはエジプト、メソポタミアが記述されているが、その特徴ある発展については無視されており、またササン朝ペルシャの重要性も認識されていない。十字軍の記述では、イスラム帝国は当時のヨーロッパ勢力の進歩をさまたげた障害としてしか述べられていない。それゆえ、アラブの栄光は古代に生れ古代に消えた印象を与えるのである。このようなゆがんだ視点が一般的である。

どのように真のアラブのイメージを伝え、生徒たちがアラブに対し正しい理解を示すようにさせられるか、できるだけ早く、日本の教科書を検討し、現在若い日本人学生に教えるべき問題と事実は何かを調べるべきであろう。

(7) 日本におけるアラビア語教育の歴史

池 田 修

日本のアラビア語教育は1925年に始まった。それ以前にもマホメット伝やコーランの邦訳が刊行されていたが、大学レベルでの教育は大阪外国語大学の前身、大阪外国語専門学校で松本重彦氏の指導のもとで同年に開始された。

翌1926年、外務省はエジプトのアレキサンドリアに総領事館を開設し、日本人外交官の派遣によりアラビストの育成に力を入れた。1937年には日本国内に回教圏研究所が設立された。これは日本におけるイスラム研究の高まりを表わすものである。

1939年には大阪外語大に日本初のアラビア語科が設置された。これは外務省からの講師陣に負うところが多い。当初は1学年15名でスタートしたが(現在25名)、この人員の少なさは、アラビア語教育の難しさ、また当時アラビア語を必要とする職場の少なさを如実に物語っている。1973年の石油危機を境に、この職場は著しく増加したのであった。

日本におけるアラビア語教育を語る上で慶応義塾大学の井筒教授の輝かしい業績を忘れるわけにはいかない。また、同教授の門下生の活躍も特筆すべきであろう。

1950年代にはアラビア語教育を行なうさまざまな大学や機関が存在するようになり、また1960年には東京外国語大学にアラビア語科が新設され、当時定員は1学年10名(現在は15名)であった。

現在のアラビア語教育の問題点は、中東研究に携わる人は皆まず最初にアラビア語習得に非常な時間と努力をしいられることであろう。

(8) 日本の対アラブ外交政策

ハミード・ラビーエ

戦後日本の外交政策は、アメリカの軍事力の傘の下で平和主義外交を枠組とした1945年～52年の完全な従属期と、1952年～73年の再軍備化を進める一方で政策の力点を国内充足に置いた第2期、そして1973年以降、ドルショック、オイルショック、日中国交回復の3つの契機を経て外交政策が新たな「国際化」の動きを示しはじめた第3期と、3つの局面において整理することができる。さて日本・アラブ関係を以上の局面の推移からみたとき、73年10月戦争以前の相互の無認識・無接触状態をもたらした諸要因としては、第1に言語的・文化的障害、第2に日本にとってアラブ諸国が経済的市場として魅力がなかったこと、第3に中東紛争が東西対立の大きな焦点であって日本の外交政策の方針上これに積極的にコミットできなかった点などが指摘できる。しかし、今後の日本・アラブ関係をとくに経済的側面を中心に展望するならば、第1の焦点は石油問題であり、日本はアラブ側か、イスラエル側かその立場を改めて明確にすることを問われるであろうこと、第2はアラブの市場としての重要性の増大であり、その場合ECとくに西独との比較が考察されねばならないこと、第3はアラブ側の問題として、アラブ諸国が単一の経済共同体として日本との協力関係をつくることができるかという問題があり、この場合には、アラブ諸国が資金豊かなガルフ産油国、人口（労働力）の豊かな国と、そして人口も資金も乏しい諸国にわけられることに注意しなければならない点などが考えられる。

(9) アラブと日本の近代化比較

アリー・ヒラル・デスキー

日本の近代化の過程は、アラブ世界のみならず発展途上国のほとんどに対し明白な対照をなしている。アラブと日本の近代化を比較することは、なぜアラブが日本と同等な近代化に成功しなかったかを探る糸口となるであろう。日本は近代化以前の制度、価値構造、信仰体系と西欧の技術をうけついで単なる西欧型の近代的社会ではなく、日本独特の近代的社会をつくりあげたのではなかろうか。

日本とアラブ世界の近代化を比較するとき、共にほぼ同時代に、科学技術の面、知識の面で完全に発達した段階にあった西欧と接触した、という共通点がある。アラブと日本の近代化は共にかなり急激なものであった。日本は近代化を進める上で近代性とそれまでの伝統的社会を統合する過程においてアラブ世界にまさる成功をなしとげたのであった。

はたしてアラブ世界は近代化に対し、独自の英知と制度を利用して進歩を位置づけることができたのか、あるいは変化の力によって導かれたにすぎないのか。

近代化は3つの視点、すなわち社会・宗教的、政治的、経済的の対比を行なうことができる。

日本人は神道、武士道に基づき忠誠心と確固たる身分制度を樹立した。それゆえ將軍、のちには天皇への忠誠心を常に抱いていたのである。これに対しエジプト・マムルーク王朝は、徳川幕府に比してより多くの社会的可動性を有していた。しかし日本において徳川時代に培われた忠誠心は、ひいては愛国心となり近代化の前進に大きな役割をはたしたのである。

またその他の近代化要素の共通点としてはアラブ、日本社会の当時の商業の台頭もあげることができよう。

明治時代初期に東海散士は政治小説「佳人之奇遇」を発行した。これは、1888年の彼のセイロン、エジプトの旅行についての小説である。セイロンで彼はエジプトの民族主義運動のリーダーであるオラビーパシャと会った。こののち、その目で西欧帝国主義の掌中にあるエジプトの状況を見るべく、彼はエジプト行きを決意する。

東海散士こと柴四郎は、松平藩に生れ、維新後アメリカで経済・財政学を学んだ。当時の日本は、西欧帝国主義国からの借款に依存するか、あるいは、列国に対抗し自国の資源のみで自立するかを選択に迫られていた。エジプトはオラビー革命において後者を選択したが、結局、イギリスと西欧帝国主義列強に経済的、政治的に従属化した。それゆえ柴四郎はエジプトの状況に興味を抱いたのであった。

「佳人之奇遇」において、日本が列強と手を結ぶべきである、という考えに彼は反対した。そして彼は、政治の自由、確固たる外交方針、産業を基盤とした国の発展に基づいて、日本が西欧のような帝国主義の路線を取るべきでないことを主張した。

ところが当時の日本政府は、彼の意見をとりいれず、逆に日英同盟を締結し、日本は日露戦争を開始し、さらに大陸に侵攻してゆくことになる。

これに対しエジプトはオラビーパシャ革命によって、たとえ失敗ではあっても真実であり誇るべきエジプト民族主義のイギリス帝国主義に対する運動の高まりの例を示したのである。

日本人として最初に巡礼を行ない、ハジの敬称を受けたのは山岡光太郎であった。彼は日本人の中でも最も最初にイスラム教を信仰した人びとのうちの1人であった。彼は晩年イスラム世界の人びとと日本人との間の友好関係の確立に力を尽した。

山岡は1880年広島に生れ、東京外国語学校（現在の東京外国語大学）のロシア語科を卒業し、日露戦争の前線で活躍した。その後満州と朝鮮にとどまる間に、彼はカザン生れのシェイフ・アブド・ラシード・イブラヒームに会いイスラムを知った。

1909年、山岡はメッカを目指し、日本を出発し途中ボンベイに寄港した。そこで再びイブラヒームと会いイスラム教義を学んだのであった。当初、山岡はメッカへ入る便宜をはかるため改宗したのであったが、後に彼はイスラムの熱烈な信奉者となったのである。

1909年12月11日、彼はメッカに到着し、市民の歓迎を受け巡礼を終えた時に、彼は日本人として最初のハジの称号を受けたことに強い感動を覚えた。

山岡は、その後もイスラム諸国を何度も訪れるが、親友であった師イブラヒームの息子に裏切られ、スパイ容疑でトルコで投獄されたこともある。

第2次大戦後、1954年にこの世を去るまで彼は日本のイスラム研究の発展に貢献した。

ハジ・オマール山岡は故国においては何の栄誉を受けることなく亡くなった。しかしイスラム世界と日本との友好関係の樹立、発展につとめる人びとの胸から山岡は消えさることはない。

02 メッカへの初期日本人巡礼

中村 廣治郎

明治維新後、日本は鎖国と徳川政権に別れを告げ、政治的、経済的そして軍事的に近代化され強化された国づくりをめざした。この過程で、日本は隣接するアジア諸国へと進出した。そして外国に進出した日本人のうちには、中国や東南アジアに住むイスラム教徒に出会う人もいた。またこれらのイスラム教徒も日本を訪れたり、あるいは日本に身を寄せる人も出て、日本人はしだいにイスラム教に関心を抱くようになった。その結果、イスラム教徒となる日本人も出てきた。それらのムスリムたちは第2次大戦終了までに8つの巡礼団を組織しメッカに向ったが、成功したのはそのうちの6つであった。巡礼の長く苦しい旅の途中で彼らは人びとの厚意とムスリムとしての意識の昂揚を感じたのであった。

第4回以降の巡礼は若林半の援助によって行なわれた。彼は中国や東南アジアのムスリムの政治的重要性に気づいていた。

巡礼団の日本人は、巡礼がイスラム教徒にとって最も重要な行為であると同時に、全世界からのムスリムが集まり、情報を交換し、彼らが直面している政治的な問題について討論する国際的な政治会議の場としての有効性に気づいていたのである。そこには、天皇を中心とする日本的ナショナリズムとイスラム的普遍主義との矛盾は感じられなかった。

03 明治前期の日本人官吏によるエジプト法制研究

中岡 三益

1868年の明治維新以降、明治政府はフランスとイギリスの法制をモデルとして西洋法制の導入に力を尽した。明治政府の課題は、近代法制の整備によって不平等条約を改正することにあった。

同時に明治政府はエジプトの法制に深い興味を示した。岩倉特使欧米差遣を契機として、岩倉具視、伊藤博文、副島種臣らをリーダーとして研究が組織されたが、その下で実際に調査研究に当たった福地源一郎、箕作麟祥、長谷川喬、原敬らの若い官吏の活動を忘れるわけにはいかない。

これらの日本人官吏は当時の日本の従属的立場からの脱却のため、エジプトにおける条約改正、混合裁判所制度の導入による従属体制の継続をひとつの活きた教訓とみなしていた。彼らは西洋の法制の導入と、不平等条約の改正をめぐるエジプトの二の舞となることを避けようとした。福地源一郎や長谷川喬はエジプトに派遣され、条約改正問題について直接ヌバーパシャに指導・助言を求めたのであった。

日清戦争以降、明治政府は別な視点からエジプトやチュニジアに関心をむけるようになった。それは日本の台湾および朝鮮統治のモデルとして、イギリスやフランスのアラブ統治の方法を学ぶためのものであった。

日本はついに1899年に不平等条約の改正に成功したが、反面、条約改正と併行して朝鮮と中国に対し治外法権を求め、日本は帝国主義へと急速に傾斜していったのである。

志賀重昂は著名な地理学者であり、日本人で初めて中東の石油の重要性に着目し、1924年に産油状況を調べるべく中東を旅行した。

その後彼は1926年に「知られざる国ぐに」を出版したが、50年を経過した今日、彼の著作は再評価されるべきであろう。

彼はナショナリストでもあり、またジャーナリストとして啓蒙の人でもあった。石油を豊富に産出する国は富を蓄積するであろう。そして石油を持たない国は競争には勝てないだろう。それでは日本の石油政策はどうか。彼は中東の石油の将来性に注目し、そして当時石油産業が興隆しつつあったペルシャと石油の調査段階であったイラクについて観察している。

結論として彼は、白色人種によって開発されたこれらの国ぐににおいて近い将来、非白色人種の抵抗はロシア革命を上回るスケールでの衝突がさげられないだろう、と予測した。

彼はパレスチナを旅行し、アラブ・イスラエル紛争を日本人として初めてその目で見、紛争に対するアラブ的見地を呈示したのであった。